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The International Regulation of Climate 
Engineering: Introduction 
Presently, anthropogenic climate change is perhaps the greatest environmental threat and 
is among the most daunting challenges faced by global society. Its economic costs are expected 
to be a few percent of global economic activity, or on the order of tens of trillions of present-
value euro.
1
 The world’s poor will disproportionately suffer, and the environmental impact will 
be unprecedented. Indeed, climate change has elements of a ‘perfect storm’ of a problem. Its 
primary causes, carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel combustion and—to a lesser extent—
land use changes, are central to modern human activity and development. The sets of people who 
have benefitted the most from historical greenhouse gas emissions and of those who are most at 
risk have little overlap, with the former having relatively great power while the latter are 
relatively weak or essentially voiceless (ie, future generations). Emissions abatement is a global, 
transgenerational collective action problem, in which actors generally lack sufficient incentive to 
take significant action, yet it is in their interests to free ride on others’ efforts. Attempts to reduce 
climate change risk opening other problematic dialogues such as those regarding heterogeneous 
economic development, historic responsibility of industrialized countries for the relative poverty 
of the developing ones, and the preferred relationship between humans and the natural 
environment.  
To date, the leading organized effort to reduce climate change risks has been greenhouse 
gas emissions abatement, which has been largely unsuccessful. Global annual emissions rise 
almost every year. The leading international vehicle for these efforts, the Kyoto Protocol to the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, appears to have accomplished little.
2
 
In fact, although those industrialized countries which committed to emissions abatement through 
the Kyoto Protocol—accounting for only about one-fifth of annual carbon dioxide emissions—
                                                 
1
 The present-value (ie, discounted) of expected climate damages for the ‘no controls’ scenario is estimated to be 23 
trillion US dollars, or 16 trillion euro. William Nordhaus, A Question of Balance: Weighing the Options on 
Global Warming Policies (Yale University Press 2008) 204. 
2
 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (adopted 11 December 1997, 




appear to have collectively met their 2012 targets, this is due largely to two developments which 
were not driven by climate policy.
3
 First, the bulk of the emissions reduction was due to the 
economic decline of Eastern Europe in the early 1990s and to the global financial crisis of the late 
2000s. Second, during this period, much heavy manufacturing migrated from the industrialized 
countries with Kyoto commitments to developing countries without them—a textbook case of 
leakage. The prospects of a successor agreement which meaningfully reduces emissions seem 
slim. For example, Japan (the 7
th






















), and South 
Korea (12
th
) never committed to Kyoto abatement.  
There are several reasons to remain pessimistic about future action to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions. First, fossil fuel combustion remains essential to economic activity, and its 
reduction will carry large costs.
5
 It is true that industrialized countries account for the majority of 
historical emissions, and it is perhaps easy for observers there to see abatement opportunities with 
low or even negative costs and with little impact on quality of life. However, most current 
emissions are, and most future emissions will be, from developing countries.
6
 This leads to the 
second reason: countries greatly diverge in their commitments to abatement. In developing 
countries, widespread access to reliable, affordable energy is presently the only known route to 
development with its concomitant improvements in living conditions, some aspects of which can 
be considered as human rights.
7
 Understandably, leaders there insist on such development. Third, 
as described above, abatement is a global transgenerational collective action problem, whose 
resolution would require each country to undertake costly actions in order to prevent damage 
throughout the world—including in distant locations—and in the future. Such steps are politically 
                                                 
3
 Emissions data are for 2011 and from World Resources Institute, ‘Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) 2.0’ 
<http://cait2.wri.org> accessed 16 June 2014. Unlike other datasets, this includes land use change and 
forestry. 
4
 Ibid; ‘Kyoto Deal Loses Four Big Nations’ Agence France-Presse (29 May 2011). 
5
 Nordhaus (n 1) estimates that aggressive emissions abatement would cost about 30 trillion present-value US 
dollars, or 21 trillion euro. 
6
 Current emissions from World Resources Institute (n 3); forecasts from International Energy Agency, World 
Energy Outlook 2013 (International Energy Agency 2013), ch 2.   
7
 Arjun Sengupta, ‘On the Theory and Practice of the Right to Development’ (2002) 24 Hum Rts Q 837. 
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unpopular and the temptation to free-ride is great.
8
 Fourth, because accumulated carbon dioxide 
does not significantly leave the atmosphere on human time scales, abatement will only delay a 
given amount of climate change. Actually avoiding dangerous climate change requires radical, 
rapid changes in the economy and energy systems, and net negative emissions.
9
 Finally, the 
negative effects of climate change, which potentially could increase political support for action, 
are delayed by decades relative to the emissions which cause them. Indeed, we have already 
committed to a significant but unknown magnitude of future climate change, possibly exceeding 
the agreed-upon threshold of 2°C warming, even if all emissions were to immediately cease.
10
 By 
the time strong negative effects are felt, it will be too late to avoid more extreme damage through 
abatement. 
The second primary category of action to reduce climate change risks has been to adapt 
society and ecosystems to a changed climate. Although consideration of adaptation lagged behind 
that of emissions abatement, it is now on almost equal footing in the international discourse, at 
least rhetorically.
11
 The capacity for adaptation is also limited. It is more urgent in developing 
countries, which are more vulnerable to climate change due to their economies and geographies. 
Because these countries are poorer and because the wealthy industrialized countries dominate 
historical emissions, the latter are expected to finance adaption.
12
 However, the necessary 
massive wealth transfers are likely to be politically unpopular in their source countries. 
                                                 
8
 Although support for action against climate change is popular in isolation, it is low when placed against competing 
policy objectives. For example, in an annual American survey, ‘dealing with global warming’ has been last 
or second-to-last among the 15 to 20 public policy priorities since its inclusion in the 2007 survey. The Pew 
Research Center for People and the Press, ‘Thirteen Years of the Public's Top Priorities’ (2013)  
<http://www.people-press.org/interactives/top-priorities/> accessed 27 May 2014. Similarly, the UN has 
conducted an online, non-scientific poll which asks respondents for their preferred priorities for the UN. 
With more than two million responses, ‘action taken on climate change’ is the bottom of sixteen priorities. 
United Nations, ‘MY World’ <http://data.myworld2015.org/> accessed 16 June 2014. 
9
 In order to give an idea of the change required, if the climate sensitivity (the warming resulting from a doubling of 
atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations) is the estimated 3°C, then keeping warming to the agreed-upon 
limit of 2°C requires the deployment of 1100 megawatts of carbon-free power generation (about 1.5 times 
the capacity of a nuclear power plant) every day for fifty years. Ken Caldeira, Atul Jain and Martin Hoffert, 
‘Climate Sensitivity Uncertainty and the Need for Energy Without CO2 Emission’ (2003) 299 Science 2052. 
The actual climate sensitivity may be higher. Further, this research is now eleven years old and thus the 
requirements are now greater. 
10
 Myles Allen and others, ‘Warming Caused by Cumulative Carbon Emissions towards the Trillionth Tonne’ (2009) 
458 Nature 1163. 
11
 See Roger Pielke, Jr. and others, ‘Lifting the Taboo on Adaptation’ (2007) 445 Nature 597. 
12
 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (adopted 9 May 1992, entered into force 
21 March 1994) 1771 UNTS 107 art 3.1, 4.4. 
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Furthermore, there are limits to what adaptation can accomplish, and it can be difficult to 
distinguish it from traditional development projects. This may tempt leaders of industrialized 
countries to merely reclassify traditional development aid as adaptation financing, and the total of 
the two could remain limited. Indeed, international adaptation financing appears to be inadequate, 
although it is increasing.
13
 
It is in this context that some scientists and other observers are increasingly discussing 
and researching proposed large scale, intentional interventions into global environmental systems 
in order to counterbalance some effects of climate change. These ‘climate engineering’ or 
‘geoengineering’ methods are diverse, and there are two primary categories of climate 
engineering. Carbon dioxide removal (CDR) would remove this most important greenhouse gas 
from the atmosphere. In general, these methods would be slow and expensive with less potential 
for negative secondary effects. Solar radiation management (SRM) would reflect a small portion 
of sunlight away from the earth in order to counteract the warming component of climate change. 
In general, SRM methods would be relatively fast and inexpensive with greater potential for 
negative secondary effects. However, even within these categories there is great breadth. For 
example, both ocean fertilization and large scale afforestation would be considered CDR, and 
both stratospheric aerosol injection and increased albedo of human-made structures would be 
SRM.  
Climate engineering has been and remains controversial. Indeed, it was essentially taboo 
prior to 2006, and even now a cloud of suspicion follows the topic.
14
 The concerns vary widely, 
but are grouped here. The first three clusters of concerns are relatively well established in the 
literature. First, there would be risks to humans and the environment through potential negative 
secondary effects. Perhaps most importantly, climate change will impact both temperature and 
precipitation patterns heterogeneously in time and space, while SRM would counter each 
                                                 
13
 Muyeye Chambwera and others, ‘Economics of Adaptation’ in Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
Working Group II, Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability (Cambridge University 
Press 2014); UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Sixteenth Session, Held in Cancun 
from 29 November to 10 December 2010 (FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add1, Decision 1/CP16, 2011) which 
established a Green Climate Fund. 
14
 Paul Crutzen, ‘Albedo Enhancement by Stratospheric Sulfur Injections: A Contribution to Resolve a Policy 
Dilemma?’ (2006) 77 Clim Change 211; Mark Lawrence, ‘The Geoengineering Dilemma: To Speak or not 





 Thus, regardless of the latter’s optimization, warm, cool, dry, and wet places would 
remain. SRM would also alter sunlight, making it more diffuse with uncertain impacts on 
ecosystems and agriculture.
16
 Furthermore, interventions such as ocean fertilization would alter 
marine ecosystems.
17
 Some CDR methods would require massive land-use changes, and stored 
carbon dioxide could leak.
18
 A leading candidate for stratospheric aerosol injection, sulphur 
dioxide, could damage the ozone layer.
19
 Most likely, some climate engineering methods would 
bring with them still-unknown secondary effects. A second cluster of concerns is the political and 
social challenges. Many observers believe that discussion, research, and development of climate 
engineering would reduce the political willpower and incentives for the preferred responses of 
emissions abatement and adaptation.
20
 Some are worried that such activity now would bias later 
decision-making toward implementation through ‘technological momentum,’ ‘lock-in,’ and the 
establishment of influential vested interests.
21
 Others focus on implementation scenarios, arguing 
that disagreement over the planet’s climate will escalate international tensions and that the 
practice is ungovernable without autocracy.
22
 Another fear is that, once started, SRM would need 
to be maintained for a very long time, and that its cessation would cause rapid climate change and 
severe harm.
23
 The ability to alter the climate, and especially the exclusive means to do so 
through intellectual property claims, for example, might alter and exacerbate power relations 
among states, international institutions, people, corporations, and other actors.
24
 The third cluster 
                                                 
15
 Ben Kravitz and others, ‘A Multi-Model Assessment of Regional Climate Disparities Caused by Solar 
Geoengineering’ (2014) 9 Envtl Res Lett 074013. 
16
 Lili Xia and others, ‘Solar Radiation Management Impacts on Agriculture in China: A Case Study in the 
Geoengineering Model Intercomparison Project (GeoMIP)’ (2014) 119 J Geophys Res Atmos 8695.  
17
 Phillip Williamson and others, ‘Ocean Fertilization for Geoengineering: A Review of Effectiveness, 
Environmental Impacts and Emerging Governance’ (2012) 90 Proc Safety Envtl Prot 475. 
18
 Klaus Lackner and others, ‘The Urgency of the Development of CO2 Capture from Ambient Air’ (2012) 109 Proc 
Nat Acad Sci 13156. 
19
 Giovanni Pitari and others, ‘Stratospheric Ozone Response to Sulfate Geoengineering: Results from the 
Geoengineering Model Intercomparison Project (GeoMIP)’ 119 J Geophys Res Atmos 2629. 
20
 Albert Lin, ‘Does Geoengineering Present a Moral Hazard?’ 40 Ecol LQ 673. 
21
 Dale Jamieson, ‘Ethics and Intentional Climate Change’ (1996) 33 Clim Change 323. 
22
 Bronislaw Szerszynski and others, ‘Why Solar Radiation Management Geoengineering and Democracy Won’t 
Mix’ (2013) 45 Env Plan A 2809.   
23
 Marlos Goes, Nancy Tuana and Klaus Keller, ‘The Economics (or Lack Thereof) of Aerosol Geoengineering’ 
(2011) 109 Clim Change 719. 
24
 Anthony Chavez, ‘Exclusive Rights to Saving the Planet: The Patenting of Geoengineering Inventions’ Northwest 
J Tech Intell Prop (forthcoming). 
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of concerns is ethics.
25
 Some writers assert that developing and implementing climate 
engineering would be unjust, both across generations and among groups within current 
generations.
26
 Some people may be harmed, and it remains unclear whether and how they could 
be compensated.
27
 One could also argue that some form of consent would be necessary in order 
to proceed with climate engineering field research or implementation.
28
 Others assert that climate 
engineering would be hubristic, that it would be contrary to appropriate human-nature 
relationships, that it fails to address the root cause of climate change, or that it merely replicates 




Three other clusters of concerns regarding climate engineering are somewhat speculative 
but I believe that they underlie a significant portion of its controversy. First, the prospect of 
trying to intentionally manipulate the climate raises deep-seated anxieties in most people. 
Specifically, studies of risk perception have indicated that laypeople strongly fear risks which are 
outside their control, potentially widespread, involuntary, unfamiliar, and invisible.
30
 Climate 
engineering fits these characteristics well. Second, climate engineering runs contrary to the norms 
held by many environmentalists, which constitute a large portion of the voices active in the 
climate change discourse. For example, cultural theory posits that people generally organize their 
understanding of the world in one of four (or sometimes five) worldviews, each with its related 
understanding of nature.
31
 Much of the ‘deeper’ or ‘green’ environmentalism is built upon an 
egalitarian worldview, with the understanding that nature is ephemeral.
32
 Yet these egalitarians 
are also generally averse to large-scale technological endeavours. Consequently, 
environmentalists who might otherwise be supportive of an additional means to reduce risks from 
                                                 
25
 For a review, see Christopher Preston, ‘Ethics and Geoengineering: Reviewing the Moral Issues Raised by Solar 
Radiation Management and Carbon Dioxide Removal’ (2012) 4 WIREs Clim Change 23. 
26
 Toby Svoboda and others, ‘Sulfate Aerosol Geoengineering: The Question of Justice’ (2011) 25 Pub Aff Q 157. 
27
 Toby Svoboda and Peter Irvine, ‘Ethical and Technical Challenges in Compensating for Harm Due to Solar 
Radiation Management Geoengineering’ (2014) 17 Ethics Pol’y Env 157. 
28
 David Morrow, Robert Kopp and Michael Oppenheimer, ‘Toward Ethical Norms and Institutions for Climate 
Engineering Research’ (2009) 4 Envtl Res Lett 045106. 
29
 Clive Hamilton, Earthmasters: The Dawn of the Age of Climate Engineering (Yale University Press 2013). 
30
 Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischhoff and Sarah Lichtenstein, ‘Behavioral Decision Theory Perspectives on Risk and 
Safety’ (1984) 56 Acta Psychologica 183. 
31
 Michael Thompson, Richard Ellis and Aaron Wildavsky, Cultural Theory (Westview Press 1990). 
32
 Karl Dake, ‘Orienting Dispositions in the Perception of Risk’ (1991) 22 J Cross-Cult Psych 61.  
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climate change are often opposed to climate engineering.
33
 Finally, climate change has become 
such a prominent and difficult debate in part because it is fundamentally linked to several other 
issues with high stakes and strong opinions. In this, many of the supporters for action against 
climate change foresee other benefits concomitant with emissions abatement and adaptation. 
Environmentalists, particularly those of the ‘deeper green’ variety, may expect broader 
deindustrialization and generally reduced environmental impacts with aggressive emissions 
abatement. Similarly, advocates of global justice and economic development may expect 
significant international wealth transfers from industrialized countries to developing ones through 
adaptation funding and through certain abatement mechanisms, such as carbon markets with joint 
implementation and a clean development mechanism. Thus, from a more politically pragmatic 
perspective, in their eyes climate engineering might be able to reduce the risks of climate change 
while, to the extent that it might decrease abatement and adaptation, failing to deliver these 
concomitant benefits. This likely further undermines support among constituencies who may 
otherwise seek to reduce climate risks. 
Although almost no climate engineering advocates are presently calling for 
implementation, research itself raises some risk of negative secondary effects. Scientists will 
soon wish to test these methods in the field. Particularly in the case of SRM, they would 
eventually need experiments of sufficient space, time, and intensity in order to detect the test’s 
signal amid the noise of the weather.
34
 This sort of research is unprecedented, and some form of 
regulation appears to be justified in order to balance potential benefits with risks. Furthermore, 
these effects—during both research and implementation, both intended and secondary, and both 
beneficial and harmful—would take place across national borders and in areas outside of state 
control. Regulation thus becomes an international matter. Yet no multilateral environmental 
agreements directly address climate engineering, although some would be applicable.  
1. QUESTION AND APPROACH 
This dissertation examines the international regulation of climate engineering. 
Specifically, considering the proposed technologies, the suggested research toward them, extant 
                                                 
33
 Clare Heyward and Steve Rayner, ‘Apocalypse Nicked!’ (2013) Climate Geoengineering Governance Working 
Paper Series 6 < http://www.geoengineering-governance-research.org/cgg-working-papers.php> accessed 
12 August 2014. 
34
 Douglas MacMynowski and others, ‘Can We Test Geoengineering?’ (2011) 4 Energy Environ Sci 5044. 
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law, and the political context, to what degree could existing and feasible international regulation 
minimize the risks from climate engineering while allowing it to develop in order to reduce risks 
from climate change? The work herein focuses primarily on climate engineering research and 
particularly on the more highly leveraged proposals such as stratospheric aerosol injection and 
marine cloud brightening. It does so in both positive (asking, for example, what is the existing 
international regulation?) and normative (asking, for example, what should the international 
regulation be?) manners. However, because the dissertation consists of five separate essays which 
have been or will be published as articles in refereed academic journals, it does not systematically 
address this broad question but instead examines a handful of specific aspects, striving to 
contribute distinct parts to a larger picture. 
Furthermore, the five articles do not possess a discrete methodology, but do share a 
general approach to their particular questions. First of all, because regulation is usually legal in its 
character, this research project is centred in law, and specifically in international environmental 
law. Although definitions vary, here law refers to formal systems of norms and rules which are 
developed, promulgated, monitored, and/or enforced by authoritative institutions in order to 
intentionally guide behaviour and to prevent and resolve conflicts. States are the central—but not 
the sole—actors in law. Because states’ existence is based upon sovereignty, national law differs 
fundamentally from international law. Within states, there are typically clear constitutional means 
for the production and revision of law, a hierarchy of authority, and enforcement backed by the 
threat of force. However, beyond the state there is no such hierarchical authority and states are 
mutual peers.
35
 In that domain, states voluntarily make commitments to one another though 
means including explicit legal instruments, customary law, and principles—together constituting 
international law.  
The emphasis throughout is on the logic of consequences. This may stand in contrast to 
the bulk of international legal scholarship, which focuses instead upon the logic of 
appropriateness. This is not to imply exclusive attention to the former at the expense of the latter, 
nor that the latter is unimportant; only that I am more interested in what would be effective and 
feasible relative to what is normatively preferable from a legal perspective. As such, the research 
here draws from three related fields, although these are more like shadows in the background 
than overtly employed methodologies.  
                                                 
35
 The European Union is a notable exception.  
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The first such ‘methodological shadow’ is political science. As the study of how and why 
societies make collective decisions, political science is closely related to law and clearly relevant 
when asking what may be feasible. Although cross-fertilization between the fields has a long 
history in the domestic context, such connections in the international domain have proven more 
challenging. International political science has generally taken the form of international relations, 
which examines interactions among states. Specifically, the institutionalist view asserts that states 
are the dominant (but not sole) actors in international relations, that they have varying interests 
and capabilities, that they rationally pursue those interests, and that they seek absolute gains. To 
that end, states sometimes cooperate in order to share information, to lower transaction costs, to 
coordinate, and to address collective action problems. Such cooperation can lead to diverse 
agreements, which vary in the degree of legalization and which can be expanded into regimes: 
‘principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations 
converge in a given issue-area.’
36
 Although the violation of agreements can be costly due to 
reciprocation, retaliation, and reputational loss, it can sometimes still be rational and beneficial.
37
  
The second ‘methodological shadow’ is economics. Many of the most difficult questions 
concerning climate change and climate engineering present challenging trade-offs. For example, 
climate engineering and its research may reduce the risks from climate change yet pose risks of 
their own. The difficulty presented in this is central to how international law may respond to 
climate engineering. Economics attempts to rationally explore how people—individually and 
collectively—use limited resources to pursue competing goals and can thus assist in such a 
balancing. The field’s tools can provide the basis for benefit-cost analysis of both possible 
responses to climate change and regulatory options. This analysis will be particularly difficult in 
the case of climate engineering, for several reasons. First, knowledge of possible outcomes and 
their probability will both remain problematic.
38
 Second, decisions concerning climate 
engineering are not simply an expense versus a benefit but often constitute a risk-risk trade-off in 
                                                 
36
 Stephen Krasner, ‘Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables’ (1982) 36 Int 
Organ 185, 185. 
37
 Andrew Guzman, How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory (OUP 2008). 
38
 Stirling would call this ignorance. Andrew Stirling, ‘Risk at a Turning Point?’ (1998) 1 J Risk Res 97; 
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which risks can be transformed in terms of their affected population and their type.
39
 Third, the 
expected damage of climate change and climate engineering each have long-tail probability 
distributions, in that there are small chances of very high damages.
40
 Despite these challenges, 
society must make decisions, and a rational weighing of advantages and disadvantages remains a 
superior (but by no means the sole) basis of decision making.
41
 This will not be simple work 
which will provide clear answers, and I do not purport to conduct it here. However, the existence 
of rational weighing underlies the economic analysis of law in general and the papers here 
specifically. 
Finally, this is an example of the regulation of new technologies. To some degree, some 
of the questions posed by climate engineering are not fully novel.
42
 Several scholars have offered 
general suggestions for how law and regulation can address powerful new technologies.
43
 
Clearly, when new technologies pose risks of negative external effects—to human health, to 
institutions, to the environment, or to widely held values and interests—then regulation may be 
warranted. However, new technologies can be unlike other regulated activities in questions of 
scale, uncertainty, complexity, and the speed of innovation.
44
 Yet the relationship between law 
and technology can be reciprocal. For example, a new technology can alter the cost of violating 
and/or enforcing laws, the facts which previously justified laws, or the underlying justifications 
for legal concepts and categories.
45
  
                                                 
39
 John Graham and Jonathan Baert Wiener, ‘Confronting Risk Tradeoffs’ in John Graham and Jonathan Baert 
Wiener (eds), Risk vs Risk: Tradeoffs in Protecting Health and the Environment (Harvard University Press 
1995) 19-41 
40
 Richard Posner, Catastrophe: Risk and Response (Oxford University Press 2004). See also Cass Sunstein, Worst-
Case Scenarios (Harvard University Press 2007). 
41
 See Richard Revesz and Michael Livermore, Retaking Rationality: How Cost-Benefit Analysis Can Better Protect 
the Environment and Our Health (Oxford University Press 2011). 
42
 Already in 1982, Douglas and Wildavsky noted that, ‘Once the source of safety, science and technology have 
become the source of risk.’ Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky, Risk and Culture: An Essay on the 
Selection of Technical and Environmental Dangers (University of California Press 1982) 10. 
43
 See Arthur Cockfield, ‘Towards a Law and Technology Theory’ (2004) 30 Manitoba L J 383; Roger Brownsword 
and Han Somsen, ‘Law, Innovation and Technology: Before We Fast Forward, A Forum for Debate’ (2009) 
1 L Innov & Tech 1; Gregory Mandel, ‘Regulating Emerging Technologies’ (2009) 1 L Innov & Tech 75. 
44
 Floor Fleurke & Han Somsen, ‘Precautionary Regulation of Chemical Risk: How REACH Confronts the 
Regulatory Challenges of Scale, Uncertainty, Complexity and Innovation’ (2011) 48 CML Rev 357. 
45
 David Friedman, ‘Does Technology Require New Law?’ (2001) 25 Harv JL & Pub Pol'y 71. See also Lyria 
Bennett Moses, ‘Recurring Dilemmas: The Law's Race to Keep up with Technological Change’ (2007) 
2007 U Ill JL Tech & Pol'y 239. 
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2. THE ARTICLES 
The first article, ‘The Regulation of Climate Engineering,’ provides an initial exploration 
of the challenges raised by climate engineering and its research. It argues that regulation is indeed 
justified, and that SRM versus CDR and research versus implementation should each be kept 
distinct. It concludes that innovative regulatory approaches hold significant potential for this 
goal.  
The second article, ‘Climate Engineering Research: A Precautionary Response to Climate 
Change?’, co-authored with Floor Fleurke, explores how the precautionary principle could be 
applied to climate engineering. We make a case that, prima facie, climate engineering may 
provide means to reduce climate risks, and conclude that precaution encourages moderate scale 
climate engineering field tests, despite potential risks. 
The third article, ‘Climate Engineering Field Research: The Favorable Setting of 
International Environmental Law,’ examines the relevant existing international environmental 
law. The approach here is distinct in that it distinguishes between climate engineering research 
and implementation, and emphasizes both the climate change context of these proposals and the 
enabling function of law. It concludes that extant international environmental law generally 
favours climate engineering field tests, in large part because, even though field trials may present 
risks to humans and the environment, climate engineering may reduce the greater risks of climate 
change. Notably, this favourable legal setting is present in those multilateral environmental 
agreements whose subject matter is closest to climate engineering. 
The fourth article, ‘The International Regulation of Climate Engineering: Lessons from 
Nuclear Power,’ looks to climate engineering’s closest existing analogy—nuclear power—for 
lessons, and from this concludes that climate engineering research will be promoted and will not 
be the subject of a comprehensive binding multilateral agreement in the near future. Instead, 
climate engineering and its research will more likely be internationally regulated gradually, with 
an initially low degree of legalization, and through a plurality of means and institutions. 
The final article, ‘A Critical Examination of Climate Engineering Moral Hazard and Risk 
Compensation,’ critically examines the widespread concern that consideration, research, and 
development of climate engineering would reduce greenhouse gas abatement and adaptation. 
After examining this concern from three vantages, the paper concludes that this concern appears 
to be overstated, and it should not play a central role in climate engineering policy.  
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Finally, the brief conclusion makes some recommendations toward the international 
regulation of climate engineering research. It proposes the further development of norms, an 
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The Regulation of Climate Engineering 
Jesse Reynolds 
ABSTRACT 
Intentional interventions in global physical, chemical, and biological systems on a massive scale 
are receiving increasing attention in hopes of reducing the threat of anthropogenic climate 
change. Known as climate engineering, or geoengineering, research is moving forward, but 
regulation remains inadequate, due in part to significant regulatory challenges. This essay asserts 
that key to overcoming these regulatory challenges is distinguishing between the two primary 
forms of climate engineering, and between deployment and research. One of climate 
engineering's two primary forms, carbon dioxide removal, can largely be addressed through 
existing legal instruments. In the case of solar radiation management, the other primary form, 
focusing initially on research can bypass the geopolitical quagmire of deployment. Two other 
major challenges to developing regulation for solar radiation management research remain: 
establishing regulatory legitimacy, and developing an appropriate definition of research. Potential 
regulatory forms include centralized international legal instruments, fully or partially private 
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INTRODUCTION
Among the greatest challenges faced by society today is the threat of anthropogenic
climate change. Its economic costs alone could be 5 to 20 per cent of global production.1
These costs will be disproportionately borne by the world’s vulnerable populations. In
addition, there will be non-economic costs, such as human suffering and loss of
biodiversity.2 Estimates of the likely impact of climate change have become increasingly
dire.3
Unfortunately, there is little reason for optimism. Atmospheric concentrations of
greenhouse gases, the cause of anthropogenic climate change, continue to rise.4 Models
which extrapolate current activities estimate that average global warming will double the
oft-cited 2°C target limit by the end of the century.5 International agreements to reduce
* PhD candidate, Tilburg Institute for Law, Technology, and Society, Tilburg University, The Netherlands.
1 Nicholas Stern, The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review (HM Treasury, 2006) is generally
considered the most comprehensive economic analysis of climate change.
2 See eg Chris D Thomas et al, ‘Extinction Risk from Climate Change’ (2004) 427 Nature 145.
3 Compare conclusions of the four Assessment Reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC), issued in 1990, 1995, 2001 and 2007.
4 For recent concentrations see TJ Blasing, ‘Recent Greenhouse Gas Concentrations’ (Carbon Dioxide
Information Analysis Center, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, US Department of Energy, updated February
2011), http://cdiac.ornl.gov/pns/current_ghg.html (accessed 7 June 2011). Annual greenhouse gas emissions
are generally rising. Jos GJ Olivier and JAHW Peters, No Growth in Total Global CO2 Emissions in 2009
(Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (PBL), 2010); International Energy Agency, ‘Prospect of
Limiting the Global Increase in Temperature to 2°C is Getting Bleaker’ (30 May 2011), www.iea.org/index_
info.asp?id=1959 (accessed 9 June 2011). 
5 According to the most recent IPCC Assessment Report, the projected global average surface warming at the
end of the 21st century in the A1FI scenario (an integrated world with rapid economic growth and a
continued reliance upon fossil fuels) is 4°C. Working Group I of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change, ‘Summary for Policymakers’ in Susan Solomon et al (eds), Climate Change 2007: The Physical
Science Basis: Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (Cambridge University Press, 2007); Working Group III of the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change, ‘Summary for Policymakers’ in Nebojsa Nakicenovic and Rob Swart (eds), Emissions
Scenarios (Cambridge University Press, 2000). The 2°C limit was adopted in the non-binding Copenhagen
Accord at the 2009 Conference of Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992). It
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greenhouse gas emissions have had limited results.6 These efforts face difficult problems
not only of coordination, collective action and free-riding, but also of global and inter-
generational equity and justice.7
In response to the risks of climate change, academics and policymakers have
considered increasingly drastic measures. For example, advocates of reducing greenhouse
gas emissions were originally concerned that their efforts would be undermined by public
discussion of adapting society to a different climate. Now, however, both emissions reduc-
tions and adaptation are generally considered to be the two pillars of effective climate
change policy.8
A third potential set of responses to the threat of climate change is increasingly
entering public debate. Climate engineering, or geoengineering,9 is a group of proposals
to intentionally intervene in global physical, chemical and biological systems on a massive
scale in order to reduce the threat of anthropogenic climate change. These proposals carry
their own risks and have been controversial and, until recently, open discussion of climate
engineering has been limited.
Although there is near unanimous agreement that deployment of climate engineering
should be regulated, there is wide variation as to whether regulation is feasible and, if so,
how it should be done. Various authors have ranged from concluding that climate
engineering will inevitably be prohibited10 to arguing that it cannot be controlled.11
had been the consensus of industrialised countries, but was recently challenged by leaders of various
developing nations who called for a lower limit. For a history of the limit see Michael Oppenheimer and
Annie Petsonk, ‘Article 2 of the UNFCCC: Historical Origins, Recent Interpretations’ (2005) 73 Climatic
Change 195; Chris Shaw, ‘The Dangerous Limits of Dangerous Limits: Climate Change and the Precaution-
ary Principle’ (2009) 57 Sociological Review 103.
6 The Kyoto Protocol (1997) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is the
primary international agreement relating to reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. The countries not
bound by the Protocol include three of the top four emitters (China, the USA and India) and account for
approximately 70% of emissions (2008 data in International Energy Agency, CO2 Emissions from Fuel
Combustion 2010: Highlights (IEA, 2010)). Although the countries that are bound by it are on track to
collectively meet the 2012 target, much of this emissions reduction is due to decreased economic activity,
in Russia and Eastern Europe in the 1990s and throughout the globe in more recent years. See Olivier and
Peters (n 4). The Protocol expires at the end of 2012 and no successor is apparent.
7 See eg Stephen M Gardiner, ‘Ethics and Climate Change: An Introduction’ (2010) 1 Wiley Interdisciplinary
Reviews: Climatic Change 54.
8 See eg Roger Pielke et al, ‘Climate Change 2007: Lifting the Taboo on Adaptation’ (2007) 445 Nature 597.
9 Although ‘geoengineering’ is more common, the term ‘climate engineering’ is increasingly used because of
its greater accuracy and to avoid confusion with geoengineering in the context of civil engineering.
10 William Daniel Davis, ‘What Does “Green” Mean?: Anthropogenic Climate Change, Geoengineering, and
International Environmental Law’ (2009) 43 Georgia Law Review 901.
11 ‘[I]t may be impossible for countries to keep a commitment to abstain from experimenting with
geoengineering. The incentives for countries to reduce emissions on a substantial scale are too weak, and
the incentives for them to develop geoengineering are too strong, for commitment to be a realistic prospect.
Indeed, these two incentives combined are so powerful that many countries may be prepared to develop and
deploy geoengineering unilaterally.’ Scott Barrett, ‘The Incredible Economics of Geoengineering’ (2008)
39 Environmental and Resource Economics 45, 46. 
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Elected lawmakers appear reluctant to address it, and an earlier attempt at self-regulation
stumbled.12 A new effort, the Solar Radiation Management Governance Initiative, seeks
to tackle this problem by focusing on only one of the two main categories of climate
engineering, and on only matters of research, not of deployment. Will this approach help
or hinder the initiative in the attempt to surmount some of the regulatory challenges
presented by climate engineering?
This essay seeks to answer this question by exploring climate engineering and its
regulatory challenges. Part I introduces the history and proposed forms of climate
engineering, in particular distinguishing its two primary categories. Part II provides an
overview of various international legal instruments that may be relevant to climate
engineering, and concludes that one of the two primary forms is largely addressed by
existing legal instruments. Part III describes how climate engineering’s technical,
environmental and political characteristics engender regulatory challenges, which are
mostly distinct between its two primary forms. Part IV explores the logic and legal basis
of regulation of scientific research, in general, and the implications for the regulation of
climate engineering research. Part V highlights specific strengths of and challenges to the
Solar Radiation Management Governance Initiative, focusing on legitimacy and the
definition of research. Part VI offers a brief concluding summary.
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO CLIMATE ENGINEERING
The consideration of climate engineering is historically intertwined with the awareness
of anthropogenic climate change. Soon after Svante Arrhenius proposed that industrial
emissions of carbon dioxide may warm the climate, his ‘good friend’ Nils Ekholm
proposed that such emissions would be beneficial, and could be increased.13 The first
government report on the threat of anthropogenic climate change, submitted to US
President Lyndon Johnson in 1965, recommended increasing the earth’s reflectivity by
using buoyant ocean particles, yet it did not consider reducing fossil fuel consumption.14
In 1977, leading Soviet climatologist Mikhail Budyko proposed what remains the most
widely discussed climate engineering method: injecting aerosols into the stratosphere.15
12 The Asilomar International Conference on Climate Intervention Technologies is described below, at text to
nn 102–6.
13 Svante Arrhenius, ‘On the Influence of Carbonic Acid in the Air upon the Temperature of the Ground’
(1896) 41 Philosophical Magazine and Journal of Science 237; Nils Ekholm, ‘On the Variations of the Climate
of the Geological and Historical Past and their Causes’ (1901) 27 Quarterly Journal of the Royal Meteorological
Society 1; Svante Arrhenius, Worlds in the Making: The Evolution of the Universe (Harper, 1908).
14 President’s Science Advisory Committee, Restoring the Quality of Our Environment (1965).
15 Mikhail Budyko proposed sulfate aerosols. Mikhail I Budyko, Climatic Changes (American Geophysical
Union, 1977). Recent research indicates that sulfate may not be ideal, and some scientists propose engineered
nanoparticles. David W Keith, ‘Photophoretic Levitation of Engineered Aerosols for Geoengineering’ (2010)
107 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 16428.
The term ‘geoengineering’ was coined soon thereafter, in the context of deep ocean
storage of carbon dioxide.16 A 1992 major climate change report from the US National
Academies included a chapter on climate engineering.17 By the next decade, an internal
US government white paper had suggested a $64 million climate engineering research
initiative, but the White House rejected this on political grounds.18
The academic and public debates about climate engineering have grown dramatically
in the last five years.19 The breakthrough was a pair of editorials in 2006 by atmospheric
chemists, one a Nobel Laureate and the other the president of the US National Academy
of Science.20 In the last two years, the UK Royal Society, the US National Research Council,
the UK Institution of Mechanical Engineers, and committees of the UK Parliament and
the US Congress issued reports, and the American Meteorological Society and the
American Geophysical Union released statements, all of which called for climate engin-
eering research.21 Recently, modest research projects began to receive funds, both publicly,
from the European Union and the United Kingdom, and privately, from billionaires Bill
Gates and Richard Branson.22 The leading body responsible for assessing climate change
16 Cesare Marchetti, ‘On Geoengineering and the CO2 Problem’ (1977) 1 Climatic Change 59.
17 Committee on Science, Engineering and Public Policy, Policy Implications of Greenhouse Warming:
Mitigation, Adaptation, and the Science Base (National Academies Press, 1992).
18 Ehsan Khan et al, Response Options to Limit Rapid or Severe Climate Change: Assessment of Research Needs
(2001); Michael MacCracken, ‘Geoengineering: Worthy of Cautious Evaluation?’ (2006) 77 Climatic Change
235; Eli Kintisch, Hack the Planet: Science’s Best Hope—or Worst Nightmare—for Averting Climate Cat-
astrophe (John Wiley & Sons, 2010) 197–9.
19 For example, in 2009 and 2010 the per annum references in academic literature were approximately 10
times greater than those during the period 1992–2005. See the graph in ‘Lift-Off’ The Economist, 4 November
2010.
20 Paul Crutzen, ‘Albedo Enhancement by Stratospheric Sulfur Injections: A Contribution to Resolve a Policy
Dilemma?’ (2006) 77 Climatic Change 211; Ralph Cicerone, ‘Geoengineering: Encouraging Research and
Overseeing Implementation’ (2006) 77 Climatic Change 221.
21 Royal Society, Geoengineering the Climate: Science, Governance and Uncertainty (2009); America’s Climate
Choices: Panel on Advancing the Science of Climate Change, Advancing the Science of Climate Change
(National Academies Press, 2010); Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Geo-Engineering: Giving Us the Time
to Act? (2009); Science and Technology Committee, The Regulation of Geoengineering (HC 2009–10); Rep
Bart Gordon, Engineering the Climate: Research Needs and Strategies for International Collaboration (2010);
American Meteorological Society Council, AMS Policy Statement on Geoengineering the Climate System
(2009); American Geophysical Union Council, Position Statement: Geoengineering the Climate System (2009).
22 ‘Implications and Risks of Engineering Solar Radiation to Limit Climate Change’, http://implicc.zmaw.de
(accessed 7 June 2011). The National Environment Research Council and the Engineering and Physical
Sciences Research Councils supported a public dialogue on geoengineering and are now funding two multi-
university research teams. NERC Public Dialogue on Geoengineering Steering Group, Experiment Earth?
Report on a Public Dialogue on Geoengineering (2010); ‘Integrated Assessment of Geoengineering Proposals’,
http://iagp.ac.uk (accessed 7 June 2011); Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council, ‘Details of
Grant Ep/I01473x/1’ (19 November 2010), http://gow.epsrc.ac.uk/ViewGrant.aspx?GrantRef=EP/I01473X/1
(accessed 7 June 2011); ‘Fund for Innovative Climate and Energy Research’, http://people.ucalgary.ca/~keith/
FICER.html (accessed 7 June 2011); Eli Kintisch, ‘Bill Gates Funding Geoengineering Research’
ScienceInsider, 26 January 2010, http://news.sciencemag.org/scienceinsider/2010/01/bill-gates-fund.html
(accessed 7 June 2011). Branson offered a reward, not traditional research funding. James Kanter, ‘Cash
Prize for Environ-mental Help Goes Unawarded’ New York Times, 21 November 2010.
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information, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, will consider climate
engineering to a significant degree in its next Assessment Report.23
Forms of Climate Engineering
Climate engineering schemes vary significantly in their goals, means, feasibility, costs,
time scales of response, and potential environmental consequences, and are divided into
two primary categories.24 The first, carbon dioxide removal (CDR), would collect and
sequester this leading greenhouse gas from the atmosphere. Proposals include capturing
carbon dioxide from ambient air, fertilising oceans to increase biological uptake, and
enhanced mineral weathering.25 CDR would address the threat of climate change
relatively close to its cause, but would be expensive and slow. Therefore, CDR could be a
longer-term component in a portfolio of responses to anthropogenic climate change.
Most proposed CDR methods would have environmental risks which can be assessed and
managed fairly well; a significant exception is ocean fertilisation.
The second form of climate engineering is solar radiation management (SRM), which
would essentially increase the planet’s reflectiveness and thus counteract warming.
Proposed methods include injecting aerosols into the upper atmosphere, spraying
seawater to increase the brightness of clouds, and injecting microbubbles into the ocean.26
23 Alister Doyle, ‘Futuristic Climate Schemes to Get UN Hearing’ Reuters, 27 October 2010; Co-Chairs of
Working Groups I, II and III, Proposal for an IPCC Expert Meeting on Geoengineering (Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change, 2010). Three previous Assessment Reports briefly touched upon climate
engineering: Rik Leemans et al, ‘Mitigation: Cross-Sectoral and Other Issues’ in Robert T Watson, MC
Zinyowera and Richard H Moss (eds), Climate Change 1995: Impacts, Adaptations and Mitigation of Climate
Change: Scientific-Technical Analyses: Contribution of Working Group II to the Second Assessment Report of
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge University Press, 1995) 811–13; Pekka Kauppi
et al, ‘Technological and Economic Potential of Options to Enhance, Maintain, and Manage Biological
Carbon Reservoirs and Geo-Engineering’ in Bert Metz et al (eds), Climate Change 2001: Mitigation:
Contribution of Working Group III to the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (Cambridge University Press, 2001) 332–4; Terry Barker et al, ‘Mitigation from a Cross-Sectoral
Perspective’ in Bert Metz et al (eds), Climate Change 2007: Mitigation: Contribution of Working Group III to
the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge University Press,
2007) 624–5. 
24 The Royal Society’s Geoengineering the Climate (n 21) is the most comprehensive and accessible overview
of climate engineering methods. A more recent and technical review is Naomi E Vaughan and Timothy M
Lenton, ‘A Review of Climate Geoengineering Proposals’ (2011) Climatic Change (forthcoming); published
online 22 March 2011 at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10584-011-0027-7.
25 See eg David W Keith, ‘Why Capture CO2 from the Atmosphere?’ (2009) 325 Science 1654; Ken O Buesseler
et al, ‘Ocean Iron Fertilization—Moving Forward in a Sea of Uncertainty’ (2008) 319 Science 162; Peter
Köhler, Jens Hartmann and Dieter A Wolf-Gladrow, ‘Geoengineering Potential of Artificially Enhanced
Silicate Weathering of Olivine’ (2010) 107 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 20228.
26 See eg Crutzen (n 20); John Latham et al, ‘Global Temperature Stabilization via Controlled Albedo
Enhancement of Low-Level Maritime Clouds’ (2008) 366 Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A
3969; Russell Seitz, ‘Bright Water: Hydrosols, Water Conservation and Climate Change’ (2011) 105 Climatic
Change 365.
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27 Estimates of the economic cost of stratospheric sulfate injection are generally between a few billion (eg
William D Nordhaus and Joseph Boyer, Warming the World: Economic Models of Global Warming (MIT
Press, 2003)) and 50 billion (eg Crutzen (n 20)) US dollars per year. In their modelling, Nordhaus and Boyer
consider this to be so low as to be essentially costless.
28 ‘The economics of geoengineering are—there is no better word for it—incredible.’ Barrett (n 11) 49.
29 ‘[B]iological communities under acidified seawater conditions are less diverse and calcifying species absent
… Ocean acidification is irreversible on timescales of at least tens of thousands of years.’ Secretariat of the
Convention on Biological Diversity, Scientific Synthesis of the Impacts of Ocean Acidification on Marine
Biodiversity, Technical Series No 46 (Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2009) 9.
30 Alan Robock, Luke Oman and Georgiy L Stenchikov, ‘Regional Climate Responses to Geoengineering with
Tropical and Arctic SO2 Injections’ (2008) 113 Journal of Geophysical Research D16101; Gabriele C Hegerl
and Susan Solomon, ‘Risks of Climate Engineering’ (2009) 325 Science 955.
31 Lianhong Gu et al, ‘Response of a Deciduous Forest to the Mount Pinatubo Eruption: Enhanced
Photosynthesis’ (2003) 299 Science 2035.
32 Peter Braesicke, Olaf Morgenstern and John Pyle, ‘Might Dimming the Sun Change Atmospheric ENSO
Teleconnections as We Know Them?’ (2011) 12 Atmospheric Sciences Letters 184. 
33 P Heckendorn et al, ‘The Impact of Geoengineering Aerosols on Stratospheric Temperature and Ozone’
(2009) 4 Environmental Research Letters 045108.
34 Jason J Blackstock et al, Climate Engineering Responses to Climate Emergencies (Novim, 2009).
35 Other relevant international agreements include the Antarctic Treaty System (1959), the Treaty on Principles
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies (1967), and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982).
In contrast to CDR, these schemes are estimated to be inexpensive and rapid.27 For
example, the economic costs of stratospheric aerosol injection may be as little as 1 per cent
of those of emissions reductions—a characteristic which has been called ‘incredible’.28
However, SRM would address only the warming aspect of climate change and altered
atmospheric composition. Other manifestations, such as ocean acidification, would
continue.29 Furthermore, SRM would have significant and unpredictable negative
environmental effects. Precipitation patterns would likely change, potentially including a
reduction in tropical precipitation, upon which billions rely for agriculture.30 Incoming
light would be more diffuse, increasing primary plant productivity and altering
ecosystems.31 The El Niño/La Niña-Southern Oscillation, a major global climate pattern,
may be altered.32 Sulfate particles, the most widely discussed candidate for injection into
the stratosphere, may damage the ozone layer.33 Because of these characteristics, SRM is
more often suggested as a potential (1) medium-term method to minimise the effects of
climate change as society transitions to low carbon systems and as greenhouse gas
concentrations are reduced, and/or (2) response to abrupt climate change.34
II. CURRENT RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL LEGAL INSTRUMENTS
Building on the foregoing introduction to climate engineering, this part reviews some
relevant international legal instruments.35 Although no such international agreements
directly address climate engineering, some have applicable provisions whose relevance
varies among the proposed climate engineering methods. In general, international legal
instruments are more applicable to CDR than to SRM.
The leading climate change treaty is the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC), whose objective is the ‘stabilization of greenhouse gas
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system’.36 It makes repeated references to the removal of
greenhouse gases by sinks, and to the enhancement thereof.37 Whereas its definition of
sink as ‘any process, activity or mechanism which removes a greenhouse gas, an aerosol
or a precursor of a greenhouse gas from the atmosphere’ seems to include CDR, the
UNFCCC’s Kyoto Protocol—currently the primary platform of national commitments—
limits credit for emission reduction via sinks to ‘human-induced land-use change and
forestry activities’.38
Climate engineering proposals to fertilise oceans in order to increase biological
carbon dioxide uptake, which have already been the focus of around a dozen field trials,39
are subject to existing international agreements. Most importantly, fertilisation could be
considered ocean dumping. Whether a particular form of ocean dumping is prohibited
under the London Convention and its London Protocol, which regulate the practice,
depends upon, inter alia, the action’s purpose, quantity, and potential for harm.40
Following controversy surrounding ocean fertilisation field trials,41 the International
Maritime Organization (IMO), which administers the Convention and Protocol, resolved
that ocean fertilisation does fall within the treaties’ scope, and that fertilisation, other
than ‘legitimate scientific research’, should currently not be permitted.42 It later developed
a framework tool for assessing whether a proposed activity is ‘legitimate scientific
research’.43
Due to its broad mandate and the risks to biodiversity from climate change, the
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) may be relevant to climate engineering. In
particular, its parties must work to ‘[p]revent the introduction of, control or eradicate
those alien species which threaten ecosystems, habitats or species’.44 This could include
36 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992), Art 3.
37 Ibid, Arts 3.1, 4 (throughout), 7.2(d), 12.1(a), and 12.1(b).
38 Ibid, Art 1.8; Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1997), Art
3.3.
39 These field trials are reviewed in Aaron Strong, John J Cullen and Sallie W Chisholm, ‘Ocean Fertilization:
Science, Policy, and Commerce’ (2009) 22 Oceanography 236.
40 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (1972), Art
3.1(b) and Annex 2; its 1996 Protocol, Art 1.4.2 and Annex 1.
41 See eg Aaron Strong et al, ‘Ocean Fertilization: Time to Move On’ (2009) 461 Nature 347.
42 Contracting parties to the London Convention and contracting parties to the London Protocol, Resolution
LC-LP.1 on the Regulation of Ocean Fertilization (2008).
43 Contracting parties to the London Convention and contracting parties to the London Protocol, Resolution
LC-LP.2 on the Assessment Framework for Scientific Research Involving Ocean Fertilization (2010).
44 Convention on Biological Diversity (1992), Art 8(h).
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ocean fertilisation, which typically operates by creating algal blooms. Responding to the
ocean fertilisation field trials, in 2008 the parties to the CBD took a firmer position than
that of the IMO, requesting that
ocean fertilization activities do not take place until there is an adequate scientific basis on
which to justify such activities, including assessing associated risks, and a global, transparent
and effective control and regulatory mechanism is in place for these activities; with the
exception of small scale scientific research studies within coastal waters.45
This apparent divergence between the IMO and the CBD continued in 2010. Just after the
former released its framework assessment for legitimate ocean fertilisation research, the
parties to the CBD broadened their call, inviting
[p]arties and other Governments … to consider [e]nsur[ing] … in the absence of science
based, global, transparent and effective control and regulatory mechanisms for geo-
engineering, and in accordance with the precautionary approach and Article 14 of the
Convention, that no climate-related geo-engineering activities that may affect biodiversity take
place, until there is an adequate scientific basis on which to justify such activities and
appropriate consideration of the associated risks for the environment and biodiversity and
associated social, economic and cultural impacts, with the exception of small scale scientific
research studies that would be conducted in a controlled setting in accordance with Article 3
of the Convention, and only if they are justified by the need to gather specific scientific data
and are subject to a thorough prior assessment of the potential impacts on the environment.46
In a footnote, the statement defined that
any technologies that deliberately reduce solar insolation or increase carbon sequestration
from the atmosphere on a large scale that may affect biodiversity (excluding carbon capture and
storage from fossil fuels when it captures carbon dioxide before it is released into the
atmosphere) should be considered as forms of geo-engineering which are relevant to the
Convention on Biological Diversity.47
Compared to CDR, SRM is poorly addressed by international legal instruments. For
example, the Environmental Modification Convention prohibits the military use of ‘the
deliberate manipulation of natural processes—the dynamics, composition or structure of
120 Law, Innovation and Technology
45 Decisions Adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity at its Ninth
Meeting (2008), IX/16(C)4. 
46 Report of the Tenth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity
(2010), X/33(w).
47 Ibid, fn 3. At the time of writing, the CBD Secretariat is forming a liaison group to work on ‘defining climate-
related geo-engineering, and assessing the potential impacts of geo-engineering on biodiversity’. Secretariat
of the Convention on Biological Diversity, ‘Call for Experts on Climate-Related Geo-Engineering as it Relates
to the Convention on Biological Diversity’ (2011), Ref SCBD/STTM/JW/ac/74873.
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48 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification
Techniques (1977), Arts II and III.
49 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (1979), Art 1(b).
50 Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution on the Reduction of Sulphur
Emissions or their Transboundary Fluxes by at least 30 per cent (1985); Protocol to the 1979 Convention
on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution on Further Reduction of Sulphur Emissions (1994).
51 The amount necessary is in the order of 5 million metric tons (teragrams) per year. See eg Crutzen (n 20).
Current global anthropogenic sulfur emissions are approximately 58 metric tons per year. SJ Smith et al,
‘Anthropogenic Sulfur Dioxide Emissions: 1850–2005’ (2011) 11 Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics 1101.
52 See ‘Trail Smelter Case. United States of America, Canada. April 16, 1938, and March 11, 1941’ 3 RIAA 1905;
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (1992), principles 2, 8, 19; International Court of Justice,
Case Concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project [1997] ICJ Rep 7; International Law Commission,
‘Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities’ (2001) A/56 Official Records of the General
Assembly.
53 Heckendorn et al (n 33).
54 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (1987).
the Earth, including its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere, or of outer space’.
However, it explicitly permits peaceful activities.48
The most widely discussed SRM proposal, stratospheric aerosol injection, could
potentially be interpreted as air pollution, albeit intentional. The Convention on Long-
Range Transboundary Air Pollution is of limited applicability, as it is weak, focuses on only
Europe’s air quality, and addresses pollution ‘which has adverse effects … at such a
distance that it is not generally possible to distinguish the contribution of individual
emission sources or groups of sources’.49 Sulfate is presently the most likely candidate for
aerosol injection, and the Convention’s sulfur Protocols, while requiring parties to reduce
sulfur emissions, do not prohibit intentional releases.50 Furthermore, the amount of
sulfate to be injected under stratospheric aerosol injection would be small relative to that
from ‘unintentional’ pollution.51 Customary international law, under which states gener-
ally have duties to minimise transboundary harm and to cooperate in mitigating risks,
would likely be more relevant.52
Finally, stratospheric sulfate aerosol injection could damage the ozone layer, which is
already thinned.53 A thinner ozone layer would allow more ultraviolet radiation to reach
the earth’s surface, creating risks to the environment and human health. The Montreal
Protocol is currently phasing out certain substances which contribute to this depletion.54
Although the Protocol uses a ‘black list’ of prohibitions which does not include sulfates,
deployment of or research into stratospheric sulfate aerosol injection could instigate action.
III. REGULATORY CHALLENGES
Although some existing international legal instruments may be applicable to climate
engineering, as outlined in the previous section, significant regulatory gaps clearly remain.
This section describes how the technical, environmental and political characteristics of
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55 Royal Society (n 21) xi.
56 ‘By the time undesirable consequences are discovered, however, the technology is often so much part of the
whole economics and social fabric that its control is extremely difficult. This is the dilemma of control.
When change is easy, the need for it cannot be foreseen; when the need for change is apparent, change has
become expensive, difficult and time consuming.’ David Collingridge, The Social Control of Technology (St
Martin, 1980) 11.
57 In its report, the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee concluded (n 21, 17): ‘In our
view, geoengineering as currently defined covers such a range of Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) and Solar
Radiation Management (SRM) technologies and techniques that any regulatory framework for geoengin-
eering cannot be uniform.’
58 Memorandum Submitted by the Royal Society to the UK House of Commons Science and Technology
Committee (2009), para 13.
59 Steve Rayner, ‘The Geoengineering Paradox’ (2010) 1 The Geoengineering Quarterly 7, www.oxfordgeoengin
eering.org/pdfs/geoengineering_quarterly_first_edition.pdf (accessed 7 June 2011).
60 Consider, for example, harvesting biomass and sequestering it as soil organic material, or large scale
afforestation or reforestation. Johannes Lehmann, John Gaunt and Marco Rondon, ‘Bio-Char Sequestration
in Terrestrial Ecosystems: A Review’ (2006) 11 Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change 395;
Committee on Science, Engineering and Public Policy (n 17).
climate engineering contribute to regulatory challenges and thus make filling these gaps
difficult.
The UK Royal Society’s report concluded that ‘[t]he greatest challenges to the
successful deployment of geoengineering may be the social, ethical, legal and political
issues associated with governance, rather than scientific and technical issues’.55 Fortun-
ately, however, presently there are opportunities to identify the challenges, to examine
existing law, and to propose and implement new regulatory instruments before risks are
borne and any technologies may become locked-in. In short, this is the technology control
dilemma: Early on, the risks and negative consequences of a new, powerful technology are
poorly known while appropriate regulation is relatively easy to implement. As the risks
become clearer, regulation becomes more difficult to enact.56
The regulatory challenges vary among the proposed climate engineering methods,
and are greater for—and often exclusive to—SRM compared to CDR.57 In fact, the Royal
Society asserted that ‘CDR technologies could mostly be adequately controlled by existing
national and international institutions and legislation’.58 Steve Rayner described this as
the ‘geoengineering paradox’:
The technology that seems to be nearest to maturity and could technically be used to shave a
few degrees off a future peak in anthropogenic temperature rise [ie SRM by stratospheric
aerosol injection] is likely to be the most difficult to implement from a social and political
standpoint, while the technology that might be easiest to implement from a social perspective
and has the potential to deliver a durable solution to the problem of atmospheric carbon
concentrations [ie ambient air capture CDR] is the most distant from being technically
realized.59
Some CDR methods which are labelled ‘climate engineering’ differ little from the
enhancement of natural sinks, except in their proposed scale.60 As with sink enhancement,
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61 Contracting parties to the London Convention and contracting parties to the London Protocol (n 42 and
n 43). 
62 A report of the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission concluded that ‘even using the highest
estimates for both carbon export ratios and atmospheric uptake efficiencies, the overall potential for ocean
fertilization to remove CO2 from the atmosphere is relatively small’. Doug WR Wallace et al, Ocean
Fertilization: A Scientific Summary for Policy Makers (IOC/BRO/2010/2, 2010). See also Strong et al (n 41);
Mary W Silver et al, ‘Toxic Diatoms and Domoic Acid in Natural and Iron Enriched Waters of the Oceanic
Pacific’ (2010) 107 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 20762.
63 See eg Stephen H Schneider, ‘Earth Systems Engineering and Management’ (2001) 409 Nature 417; Mark
Lawrence, ‘The Geoengineering Dilemma: To Speak or Not to Speak’ (2006) 77 Climatic Change 245.
Ironically, some supporters of climate engineering research are concerned about the moral hazard (David
W Keith, ‘Geoengineering the Climate: History and Prospect’ (2000) 25 Annual Review of Energy and the
Environment 245), while some skeptics are less so (Martin Bunzl, ‘Researching Geoengineering: Should Not
or Could Not?’ (2009) 4 Environmental Research Letters 045104).
64 See eg the first ‘headline message’ and ‘key recommendation’ of the Royal Society (n 21, ix): ‘The safest and
most predictable method of moderating climate change is to take early and effective action to reduce
emissions of greenhouse gases. No geoengineering method can provide an easy or readily acceptable
alternative solution to the problem of climate change … Parties to the UNFCCC should make increased
efforts towards mitigating and adapting to climate change, and in particular to agreeing to global emissions
reductions.’ For specifics see TML Wigley, ‘A Combined Mitigation/Geoengineering Approach to Climate
Stabilization’ (2008) 314 Science 452.
65 Edward Teller, Roderick Hyde and Lowell Wood, ‘Active Climate Stabilization: Practical Physics-Based
Approaches to Prevention of Climate Change’, paper delivered at the National Academy of Engineering
Symposium, Washington, DC, 23–24 April 2002; Alan Carlin, ‘Global Climate Change Control: Is there a
Better Strategy than Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions?’ (2007) 155 University of Pennsylvania Law
Review 1401; Barrett (n 11).
66 Climate engineering researcher Ken Caldeira concedes that ‘[t]here’s a slippery slope from laboratory
research to large-scale deployment’. Ken Caldeira, ‘Has the Time Come for Geoengineering?’ (2008) Bulletin
of the Atomic Scientists, www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/roundtables/has-the-time-come-geoengineering
(accessed 7 June 2011).
these methods will require determinations as to whether they qualify as carbon credits, a
process which can be managed using existing legal instruments and institutions. In some
cases of CDR, local law can adequately deal with environmental concerns, such as how to
store captured carbon dioxide. An exception is enhanced maritime storage, particularly
through ocean fertilisation, which is associated with greater environmental risks which are
transboundary in character. However, even ocean fertilisation is being addressed through
the London Convention and Protocol,61 even though it may not be an effective CDR
method.62
Furthermore, those difficulties that are held in common by both SRM and CDR may
not be of the sort to be addressed through regulation. For example, one common concern
is that climate engineering is not merely a distraction from addressing the causes of
climate change, but presents a ‘moral hazard’ which will weaken incentives for emissions
cuts and adaptation.63 Although almost all climate engineering researchers and advocates
repeatedly emphasise the primacy of emissions cuts,64 a handful assert that climate
engineering could be a substitute.65 There is also the related possibility that climate
engineering research is a slippery slope to deployment,66 especially considering the
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67 David G Victor et al, ‘The Geoengineering Option: A Last Resort against Global Warming?’ (2009) 88 Foreign
Affairs 64, 72.
68 See eg Dale Jamieson, ‘Ethics and Intentional Climate Change’ (1996) 33 Climatic Change 323.
69 Silvio O Funtowicz and Jerome R Ravetz, ‘Science for the Post-Normal Age’ (1993) 25 Futures 739. See also
Mike Hulme, Why We Disagree about Climate Change: Understanding Controversy, Inaction and Opportunity
(Cambridge University Press, 2009) 78–81.
70 John D Graham and Jonathan Baert Wiener (eds), Risk vs Risk: Tradeoffs in Protecting Health and the
Environment (Harvard University Press, 1995).
71 In the UNFCCC, the Precautionary Principle is given as: ‘Where there are threats of serious or irreversible
damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such measures.’
UNFCCC (n 36) Art 3.3. However, both climate change and climate engineering pose ‘threats of serious or
irreversible damage’ and lack ‘full scientific certainty’. Consequently, the relationship between climate
engineering and precaution is unclear.
72 Andy Stirling distinguishes risk, uncertainty, ambiguity and ignorance. Andy Stirling, ‘Risk, Uncertainty
and Precaution: Some Instrumental Implications from the Social Sciences’ in Frans Berkhout, Melissa Leach
and Ian Scoones (eds), Negotiating Environmental Change: New Perspectives from Social Science (Edward
Elgar, 2003).
73 Roger Brownsword, Rights, Regulation, and the Technological Revolution (Oxford University Press, 2008).
74 Amongst the groups sympathetic to climate engineering research, the Environmental Defense Fund is a
convening partner of the Solar Radiation Management Governance Initiative, and Greenpeace and WWF
UK are stakeholder partners thereof. ‘Solar Radiation Management Governance Initiative’, www.srmgi.org
(accessed 7 June 2011). Friends of the Earth (UK) has supported ambient air CDR but opposed other CDR
methods with wider environmental side-effects and SRM by aerosol injection. Friends of the Earth (UK),
Briefing Note: Geoengineering (2009). Nature Conservancy’s lead scientist called for an aggressive climate
engineering research program, albeit with some caveats. M Sanjayan, ‘Forum: Geoengineering Research’
(2011) 27 Issues in Science and Technology, www.issues.org/27.2/forum.html (accessed 7 June 2011). The
potential entrenchment of powerful interests under a large research program.67 Finally,
some observers have questioned the ethics of intentionally modifying the earth on a
massive scale.68
Because, in general, CDR appears to be able to be adequately controlled through
existing instruments, this essay will henceforth focus on SRM.
The scientific characteristics of climate change and the technical characteristics of
SRM exacerbate the technology control dilemma. Climate science is ‘post-normal’ science,
in which ‘facts are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high and decisions urgent’.69
Furthermore, SRM presents an extreme case of a risk-risk tradeoff,70 which makes
attempts to apply the precautionary principle ambiguous.71 It operates in a state of not
mere uncertainty, but of ignorance, the condition in which knowledge about both
outcomes and their probabilities is low.72 Finally, climate engineering techniques may be
developed and modified rapidly, making a ‘connection’ between the regulation and
technology difficult to maintain.73
The development of regulation is a political process, yet the mere discussion of
climate engineering gives rise to a complicated political landscape. Among environmental
advocates, climate engineering (to the extent that it is even discussed) has divided
pragmatists, who focus on minimising the impacts of climate change, and ‘deeper’ Greens,
who seek a more modest relationship with the planet.74 Public statements from environ-
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Natural Resources Defense Council sent its Director of Climate Programs to the 2010 Asilomar meeting (see
text to nn 102–6), and it later issued a report backing research into biochar for CDR. Michael MacCracken
et al, The Asilomar Conference Recommendations on Principles for Research into Climate Engineering
Techniques (Climate Institute, 2010) 32; Stephen Brick, Biochar: Assessing the Promise and Risks to Guide US
Policy (Natural Resources Defense Council, 2010). For groups opposed to climate engineering, see two
efforts led by the ETC Group: Open Letter to the Climate Response Fund and the Scientific Organizing
Committee (ETC Group, 2010); Hands Off Mother Earth, ‘Organisations’, www.handsoffmotherearth.org/
organisations (accessed 7 June 2011). 
75 See eg David Adam, ‘Extreme and Risky Action the Only Way to Tackle Global Warming, Say Scientists’
The Guardian, 1 September 2008; Doug Parr, ‘Geo-Engineering is No Solution to Climate Change’ The
Guardian, 1 September 2009.
76 Industrial and corporate support for climate engineering research has been limited. The American
Enterprise Institute, a business-friendly conservative think tank, has a geoengineering policy program.
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, ‘Research Areas: Geoengineering’, www.aei.org/
yra/100009 (accessed 7 June 2011). The CDR project Cquestrate was funded by the oil company Shell.
Cquestrate, ‘About Us’, www.cquestrate.com/about-us (accessed 7 June 2011).
77 ‘For more than a decade the Global Climate Coalition, a group representing industries with profits tied to
fossil fuels, led an aggressive lobbying and public relations campaign against the idea that emissions of heat-
trapping gases could lead to global warming … But … even as the coalition worked to sway opinion, its own
scientific and technical experts were advising that the science backing the role of greenhouse gases in global
warming could not be refuted.’ Andrew C Revkin, ‘Industry Ignored its Scientists on Climate’ New York
Times, 23 April 2009. See also David Adam, ‘Royal Society Tells Exxon: Stop Funding Climate Change Denial’
The Guardian, 20 September 2006.
78 The only significant investigation into public opinion on climate engineering is the NERC Public Dialogue
on Geoengineering Steering Group (n 22).
mental groups have often criticised climate engineering but have fallen short of outright
condemnation of it or calls for its prohibition.75 At the other end of the traditional
political spectrum, industrial interests that would benefit from continued greenhouse gas
emissions have been notably quiet on climate engineering.76 Some of these have
previously denied the threat of anthropogenic climate change;77 backing climate
engineering could be interpreted as a tacit admission. Moreover, public support of climate
engineering from such industries may make it even more controversial. Among the public,
the prospect of scientists tinkering with the entire planet’s climate systems is likely to be
greeted with concern and skepticism.78 Given this complex political landscape,
establishing legitimacy will be both crucial and difficult for any regulatory scheme.
The regulatory challenges raised by the political characteristics of SRM are most
apparent in the deployment context. Various countries and powerful interests would
disagree about what climate is ideal, and the possibility of unilateral deployment would
make any agreements difficult to maintain. Furthermore, the low estimated financial cost
of SRM would enable small nations and non-state actors to implement it. How would
the international community manage SRM deployment, some of which could be
unauthorised and performed by rogue actors? Furthermore, some parties may feel that
they have been harmed by the negative effects of SRM. In these cases, climate counter-
engineering and militarisation appear possible. Finally, SRM would need to be maintained
for a long time—perhaps centuries—because its cessation would result in a dangerously
rapid temperature increase.79 Establishing institutions for such a time scale is obviously
challenging, and any parties responsible for SRM maintenance would wield enormous
power.
Some challenges to effectively limit the environmental and human health effects of
SRM extend from deployment scenarios to field research. This is particularly the case
because weather is naturally variable, and thus field trials may need to increase quickly in
size in order to produce significant results discernable from background noise.
Furthermore, in the case of stratospheric aerosol injection, merely observing whether the
particles stay aloft or sink would require large aerosol clouds. Some scientists have gone
so far as to assert that ‘geoengineering cannot be tested without full-scale implemen-
tation’.80 Because current SRM models predict spatially uneven results and negative
side-effects, both deployment and field trials could place the environment and people at
significant risk. This will challenge existing international norms of transboundary risk,
and raise questions of liability. Furthermore, SRM deployment and large field trials may
have entirely unpredicted effects.81 Populations near test areas will be in a situation similar
to that of human biomedical research subjects, yet it is unclear how to apply traditional
bioethical principles such as respect for autonomy, beneficence and justice.82 These risks,
both known and unknown, are most apparent in the case of stratospheric aerosol
injection, which by its nature will impact a large area. However, smaller scale and more
remote methods, such as spraying seawater to increase the brightness of clouds and
injecting microbubbles into the ocean, also pose environmental risks.83
Nevertheless, effective regulation of SRM field research is needed soon. SRM research
is crucial in order to improve understanding of possible responses to climate change and
to prevent uninformed action in the face of abrupt climate change. Furthermore, scientists
are moving rapidly toward SRM field experiments. Calls for coordinated funding of
79 SRM ‘may have to last for the length of perhaps a millennium. And … the efforts will be of little use unless
we continue the aerosol emission without interruptions.’ Lennart Bengtsson, ‘Geo-Engineering to Confine
Climate Change: Is it at all Feasible?’ (2006) 77 Climatic Change 229, 232. See also H Damon Matthews and
Ken Caldeira, ‘Transient Climate-Carbon Simulations of Planetary Geoengineering’ (2007) 104 Proceedings
of the National Academy of Sciences 9949.
80 Alan Robock et al, ‘A Test for Geoengineering?’ (2010) 327 Science 530, 530.
81 Alan Robock, ‘20 Reasons why Geoengineering may be a Bad Idea’ (2008) 64 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
14.
82 ‘[T]he potential severity of its effects merits the application of ethical norms similar to those governing
biomedical studies. We suggest that [SRM] research is, in this respect, similar to nuclear weapons testing,
in which an experiment’s indirect effects are dangerous enough to be ethically significant.’ David R Morrow,
Robert E Kopp and Michael Oppenheimer, ‘Toward Ethical Norms and Institutions for Climate Engineering
Research’ (2009) 4 Environmental Research Letters 045106, 3. See also Pablo Suarez, Jason J Blackstock and
Maarten van Aalst, ‘Towards a People-Centered Framework for Geoengineering Governance: A Humani-
tarian Perspective’ (2010) 1 The Geoengineering Quarterly 2.
83 See eg Alan Robock, ‘Bubble, Bubble, Toil and Trouble’ (2011) 105 Climatic Change 383.
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climate engineering research are almost ubiquitous in reports and articles.84 Some
scientists are outlining how a research program could scale up to large outdoor trials.85
A new project in the UK plans to test aerosol spraying outdoors.86 A private American
company intends to undertake a 10,000km2 trial of maritime cloud brightening.87 One
Russian team, led by a prominent scientist, has already conducted a small scale field
experiment, spraying aerosols into the lower atmosphere.88
Climate engineering scientists and advocates themselves acknowledge the need for
regulation of SRM research. For example, the Royal Society report concluded:
A research governance framework is required to guide the sustainable and responsible
development of research activity so as to ensure that the technology can be applied if it becomes
necessary. Codes of practice for the scientific community should be developed, and a process
for designing and implementing a formal governance framework initiated.89
Because discussions of SRM deployment quickly raise problematic matters, such as
geopolitics, jointly considering the regulation of field research and that of deployment will
unnecessarily impede the progress of the former. Efforts toward SRM regulation will thus
be more likely to be successful if they are initially limited to matters of field research.
IV. THE REGULATION OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
The previous section demonstrated that effective regulation of climate engineering will
be difficult; that the regulatory challenges vary between CDR and SRM, and between
deployment and research; and that regulation of SRM field research should be developed
84 The Royal Society (n 21) called for £10 million (US $16 million) per year. David W Keith et al wrote: ‘An
international research budget growing from about $10 million to $1 billion annually over this decade would
probably be sufficient to build the capability to deploy SRM and greatly improve the understanding of its
risks.’ David W Keith, Edward Parson and M Granger Morgan, ‘Research on Global Sun Block Needed Now’
(2010) 463 Nature 426, 427. The lead scientist of the Nature Conservancy called for US $50 million per year.
Sanjayan (n 74).
85 See eg Ken Caldeira and David W Keith, ‘The Need for Climate Engineering Research’ (2010) 27 Issues in
Science and Technology, www.issues.org/27.1/caldeira.html (accessed 7 June 2011).
86 The Stratospheric Particle Injection for Climate Engineering project ‘will investigate the effectiveness of
stratospheric particle injection. It will address the three grand challenges in solar radiation management: 1.
How much, of what, needs to be injected where into the atmosphere to effectively and safely manage the
climate system? 2. How do we deliver it there? 3. What are the likely impacts?’ ‘Details of Grant Ep/I01473x/1’
(n 22).
87 Ben Webster, ‘Bill Gates Pays for “Artificial” Clouds to Beat Greenhouse Gases’ The Times, 8 May 2010.
88 Y Izrael et al, ‘Field Studies of a Geo-Engineering Method of Maintaining a Modern Climate with Aerosol
Particles’ (2009) 34 Russian Meteorology and Hydrology 635. The lead author was chairman of the Soviet
Committee for Hydrometeorology, was vice-chair of the IPCC, and is director of the Institute of Global
Climate and Ecology of the Russian Academy of Sciences. 
89 Royal Society (n 21) xii.
The Regulation of Climate Engineering 127
first and separately. Before going into further detail, an exploration of the logic and legal
basis of regulation of scientific research is warranted.
Any current or proposed regulation of scientific research must address a potential
challenge that such research or the communication of its results is protected by
fundamental rights, particularly the right to free speech. In general, the case for such
protection is weak. For example, while the UN Universal Declaration on Human Rights
recognises a right ‘to share in scientific advancement and its benefits’, it does not refer to
the actual conducting of scientific research.90 Although the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union clearly states that ‘The arts and scientific research shall be
free of constraint’, this right must be balanced against others. However, the right is yet to
be interpreted by the courts due to the newness of the document.91 In contrast, several
international agreements do acknowledge or even regulate certain dangerous or unethical
scientific practices.92 Nationally, claims to US First Amendment protection of research are
generally limited to the content of science, not its practice. For example, a seminal paper
which asserts a general constitutional right to research concedes that:
the right to experiment—the right to select appropriate means of conducting research—is a
weaker right than the right to select the end of research. The right to experiment is less absolute:
it includes the qualification that although the scientist is free to choose any means of
conducting research he thinks scientifically sound, he may not cause direct, substantial harm
to the cognizable interests of others.93
However, even these claims may not withstand scrutiny.94
There are three sets of reasons to regulate or prohibit certain forms of scientific
research. Each has relationships with regulation, rights, and climate engineering.
First, some concerns about scientific research are based upon the possible impli-
cations or misuse of results. Perhaps the best-known instance is the so-called ‘dual-use’
technologies, which have both peaceful and military or terroristic uses. Scrutiny of fields
90 United Nations Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948), Art 27.
91 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000), Art 13. The Charter became effective in
2009. Among the Charter’s other passages which could be relevant in the context of scientific research are
human dignity (Art 1), respect for privacy (Art 7), and protection of personal data (Art 8).
92 See eg Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (1972); Declaration of Helsinki (1975, revised
through 2000); UNESCO Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights (1997).
93 John A Robertson, ‘The Scientist’s Rights to Research: A Constitutional Analysis’ (1977) 51 Southern
California Law Review 1203, 1206. See also R Alta Charo, ‘Prepared Statement of R Alta Charo’ in Cloning:
A Risk to Women? Hearing before the Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space of the Committee on
Commerce, Science and Transportation, United States Senate (US Government Printing Office, 2002) 29,
which similarly asserts a right to research and concedes that ‘even protected activities are subject to
reasonable regulation to avoid interfering with the rights of others’.
94 J Weinstein, ‘Democracy, Individual Rights and the Regulation of Science’ (2009) 15 Science and Engineering
Ethics 407.
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such as biological and nuclear sciences has increased, in some cases resulting in new
laws.95 Similarly, certain topics, such as the relationships among race, genes and intelli-
gence, may have troubling social implications and are often taboo for researchers.96 A
third example is potential breaches of privacy when communicating research results. In
this set of reasons for concern, if experiments were to occur but the results never released,
there would be no cause for unease. Thus, concern is not with the experiment per se but
with the communication of its results. Therefore, relative to the other two categories
presented here, the regulation of the publication of results from research which is
otherwise permitted would face the strongest criticism that it would violate free speech
rights. For climate engineering, the dual-use concerns could possibly be relevant, given
the low economic cost of SRM and its potential for militarisation. Perhaps more likely,
however, opponents of climate engineering could raise the spectre of the slippery slope,
described above, and argue that dissemination of the results of climate engineering
research would make its deployment unacceptably more probable.
Second, certain actions in the research process, such as the destruction of human
embryos or animal testing, may be seen as inherently immoral. To its strongest critics,
whether the action occurs within or outside of the research context matters little, if at all:
If destroying a human embryo is wrong in the lab, then it is also wrong elsewhere.
However, the law does, in fact, often distinguish based upon the scientific context. For
example, research practices which may be permitted in the lab would be animal cruelty
outside, due to the potential benefits of research. The challenge to developing regulation
of these research actions will be primarily political, in that opponents of an action viewed
as inherently immoral may be unlikely to compromise. To them, a law designed to
minimise but not prohibit the practice may be seen as a tacit endorsement. It is unlikely
that climate engineering research would be the subject of regulation or prohibition based
upon the inherent immorality of the action. Even those who argue that climate engin
eering deployment may be fundamentally wrong concede that its research may need to
go forward.97
95 See eg Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism Act 2001 (USA), s 81; Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and
Response Act 2002 (USA); Committee on Advances in Technology and the Prevention of their Application
to Next Generation Biowarfare Threats, Globalization, Biosecurity, and the Future of the Life Sciences (National
Academies Press, 2006).
96 See eg Steven Rose, ‘Darwin 200: Should Scientists Study Race and IQ? No: Science and Society Do Not
Benefit’ (2009) 457 Nature 786; Stephen Ceci and Wendy M Williams, ‘Darwin 200: Should Scientists Study
Race and IQ? Yes: The Scientific Truth Must be Pursued’ (2009) 457 Nature 788.
97 Both Dale Jamieson and Stephen M Gardiner place the ethical bar for climate engineering quite high, but
concede that research should go forward. Jamieson (n 68); Stephen M Gardiner, ‘Is “Arming the Future” with
Geoengineering Really the Lesser Evil? Some Doubts About the Ethics of Intentionally Manipulating the
Climate System’ in Stephen M Gardiner et al (eds), Climate Ethics: Essential Readings (Oxford University
Press, 2010). See also Claire L Parkinson, Coming Climate Crisis? Consider the Past, Beware the Big Fix
(Rowman & Littlefield, 2010).
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Finally, scientific research may negatively affect human health or the environment. Of
course, some people give their informed consent to be affected, sometimes negatively, by
an experiment. The oversight of human subjects research is perhaps the most established
form of regulation of scientific conduct. More relevant to climate engineering research are
externalities which pose risks to non-consenting third parties and the environment. As
with the previous category, there is a strong legal case to be made that the scientific context
is relevant, and that the positive external benefit of greater knowledge may outweigh the
negative external risks to non-consenting people and the environment. This is not carte
blanche for unregulated scientific conduct. The balance of these benefits and risks is the
fundamental question of the regulation of climate engineering research.
Perhaps the best historical analogy to SRM is above-ground nuclear weapons testing.
It carried significant risks to the health of humans, who essentially were non-consenting
research subjects, and to the environment, including major irreversible harm. The tests
operated under similar conditions of ignorance and post-normal science. Furthermore,
as in the case of climate engineering, these risks needed to be balanced with others, such
as that of a nuclear attack by one’s opponents, and the benefits of reducing the risks.98
However, above-ground nuclear weapons testing largely ended before the implementation
of modern norms of human research subjects and environmental protection.99 Thus, it
is unclear how and whether such testing could be compatible with current bioethical
standards.
V. TOWARD THE REGULATION OF SRM FIELD RESEARCH
In this section, I will highlight the background, specific strengths and challenges of a
current effort to regulate SRM field research, namely the SRM Governance Initiative,
emphasising claims to legitimacy and the definition of research.
Any regulatory regime for SRM field research must address the challenges described
above in section III: It must minimise the risks to human health and the environment
posed by experiments, and ensure that trials are as encapsulated and reversible as possible.
To maintain ethical norms, it must obtain some form of consent from those who are
placed at risk, while providing recourse for those who are demonstrably and significantly
impacted. It must prevent commercial interests from unduly influencing the research in
a manner contrary to the public interest. It must be flexible enough to adapt to a variety
98 Of course, given the dynamics of escalation and mutually assured destruction during the Cold War, the risk
of attack may have been exaggerated, and the need for testing a self-fulfilling prophecy.
99 The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water took effect
in 1963. France and China continued limited atmospheric nuclear testing through 1974 and 1980, respective-
ly. Major milestones in human research subject protection include the Nuremberg Code (1947), the
Declaration of Helsinki (1964), and the Belmont Report (1979). 
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of SRM proposals, a wide range of scales, and an evolving knowledge base. And it must
perform these functions under conditions of ignorance, political volatility, and post-
normal science.
Unsurprisingly, the present actors in the policymaking arena differ over how to
proceed toward regulation of SRM research. How wide a consensus is needed? Climate
engineering research is occurring in only a few countries. Is agreement needed throughout
the international community, or only among the capable countries? How should top-
down and bottom-up approaches to developing regulation be balanced? Is a ‘stamp of
approval’ from national governments or international bodies needed, or can the scientific
community act on its own? How binding must regulation be? Are mere ‘guidelines’
acceptable?
Some observers believe that binding regulations are not only unnecessary, but could
do more harm than good. They emphasise the present lack of knowledge and the absence
of incentives for countries with the capacity for climate engineering to endorse a binding
agreement. Furthermore, detailed constraints on behaviour now may prevent valuable
research from occurring. Instead, such writers thus recommend the development of
norms from the bottom up.100
The Convention on Biological Diversity, as described above, may offer a vehicle for
the regulation of climate engineering research.101 Almost all countries are parties to it, and
decisions of its Conference of Parties thus carry significant weight. However, the United
States—the world’s largest economy and leading site of research—is not a party.
Furthermore, the CBD more closely resembles a framework treaty, and detailed
obligations have thus far required further protocols. 
Climate engineering scientists and advocates have already taken steps toward
regulation of climate engineering research. In March 2010, they organised a week-long
meeting at the Asilomar Conference Grounds in California in order to develop self-
regulation, explicitly invoking early self-regulation by the first genetic engineering
researchers,102 which has been touted as a paragon of scientific responsibility.103 However,
100 David G Victor, ‘On the Regulation of Geoengineering’ (2008) 24 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 322;
Keith et al (n 84). A scenario study by the RAND Corporation concludes that the US leadership should
prefer norms to regulate SRM research if it believes that SRM could be effective. Robert J Lempert and Don
Prosnitz, Governing Geoengineering Research: A Political and Technical Vulnerability Analysis of Potential
Near-Term Options (RAND Corporation, 2011).
101 See text to nn 44–47.
102 The Asilomar International Conference on Climate Intervention Technologies chose the same venue as the
1975 Asilomar Conference on Recombinant DNA, and was even informally dubbed ‘Asilomar 2’. The
‘honorary chair’ of its Scientific Organizing Committee was Paul Berg, who was the chair and a principle
architect of the 1975 conference. ‘The conference recalled the important role that early agreement on
guidelines by the recombinant DNA research community played in limiting the research risk and clearing
a path for that research.’ MacCracken et al (n 74) 4.
103 Retrospective analyses of the 1975 meeting are more mixed. See eg Marcia Barinaga, ‘Asilomar Revisited:
Lessons for Today?’ (2000) 287 Science 1584.
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the meeting met with strong criticism, from both inside and outside the climate
engineering community, arising from a lack of transparency, concerns over personal
commercial interests, and the limitations of self-regulation.104 Consequently, the confer-
ence’s legitimacy suffered, and it produced only a modest statement.105 The conference
leadership later produced five principles for climate change research: 
1. Collective benefit …
2. Establishing responsibility and liability …
3. Open and cooperative research …
4. Iterative evaluation and assessment …
5. Public involvement and consent …106
More recently, the UK’s Royal Society, in partnership with a major US environmental
organisation and the developing world’s network of academies of science, launched the
SRM Governance Initiative, which ‘seeks to develop guidelines to ensure that
geoengineering research is conducted in a manner that is transparent, responsible and
environmentally sound’.107 In contrast to the Asilomar meeting, it focuses on the
regulation of SRM research, excluding CDR.
As the Asilomar process highlighted, the development of legitimacy presents a
particularly difficult task in order for any regulation of SRM field research to be effective.
Climate engineering carries such enormous risk and is so controversial that any regulatory
regime must pass a high bar of legitimacy. State lawmakers, often a source of regulation
with great legitimacy, have generally been quiet on the topic, potentially due to its political
volatility.108 However, legislation is not the sole claim to legitimacy. Robert Baldwin cites
other means: accountability, due process, expertise, and efficiency.109
104 See eg Joe Romm, ‘Exclusive: Chief Sponsor of Landmark Climate Manipulation Conference Maintains
Close Financial Ties to Controversial Geo-Engineering Company’, Climate Progress, 18 March 2010,
http://climateprogress.org (accessed 7 June 2011); ETC Group (n 74).
105 The statement implicitly acknowledges the limitations of complete self-regulation: ‘The group recognized
that given our limited understanding of these methods and the potential for significant impacts on people
and ecosystems, further discussions must involve government and civil society.’ Michael MacCracken et al,
Asilomar Conference Statement (2010), reprinted as Appendix B in MacCracken et al (n 74). 
106 Margaret Leinen, ‘The Asilomar International Conference on Climate Intervention Technologies:
Background and Overview’ (2011) 4 Stanford Journal of Law, Science & Policy 1.
107 ‘Solar Radiation Management Governance Initiative’ (n 74).
108 Consider the case of John Holdren, who as US President Obama’s newly appointed top science advisor
came under strong criticism after saying that climate engineering must ‘be looked at. We don’t have the
luxury of taking any approach off the table’, and that ‘we might get desperate enough to want to use it’. Seth
Borenstein, ‘Obama Looks at Climate Engineering’ Associated Press, 8 April 2009. Holdren later clarified
his position. An exception to the trend of politicians avoiding discussion of climate engineering is UK House
of Commons Science and Technology Committee (n 21). 
109 Robert Baldwin, Rules and Government (Clarendon, 1995).
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The SRM Governance Initiative may establish its legitimacy claim by emphasising
expertise. Whereas the Asilomar meeting was a one-off event involving many individuals,
almost entirely from industrialised countries, gathered under the banner of a largely
unknown organisation,110 the new project’s convening partners are the world’s oldest
scientific academy (the Royal Society), the union of scientific academies of the developing
world (TWAS), and a major environmental organisation (Environmental Defense Fund).
Its working group further reinforces this expertise and diversity with, for example,
representatives of other environmental organisations, and one-third of its members are
from the developing world. On top of that, the working group contains prominent
skeptics of climate engineering.111
Another critical yet difficult requirement will be a definition of ‘field research’. At
the lower boundary, as laboratory and small field experiments increase in scale, at what
point should they be regulated? The UK Science and Technology Committee proposed
that small SRM field tests need comply only with a set of international principles (yet to
be agreed upon), as long as the project has a ‘negligible or predictable environmental
impact’ and ‘no trans-boundary effects’. However, if assessment of potential impacts on
the environment and human health is among the purposes of a novel experiment, how
can negative effects be ruled out ex ante? A more precautionary approach may be justified,
given the potential negative consequences and the condition of risk ignorance. The initial
placement of the lower regulatory threshold at the transition from the laboratory to the
field would be advantageous: It would be unambiguous, and it would identify any negative
environmental or health effects better and sooner. If early experiments indicate de minimis
risk, then the lower boundary could be raised.
How to define the upper end of research, distinguishing it from deployment, is less
clear. If there is no sharp line between them, and if some scientists argue that relevant
field research amounts to small scale deployment, how can regulation be limited to the
former?112 Could any definition prevent deployment from masquerading as research?113
Analogous cases may be able to shed light on a path forward.
First, the development of drugs and medical devices proceeds through stages of
clinical trials before approval.114 Like SRM field tests, these trials operate in the environ-
110 The Asilomar meeting was convened by the Climate Response Fund, which has seen little activity other
than the meeting.
111 Robock (n 81); Clive Hamilton, ‘An Evil Atmosphere is Forming around Geoengineering’ New Scientist, 21
July 2010.
112 Robock et al (n 80).
113 Consider that Japanese and Icelandic whalers harvest hundreds of whales per year claiming ‘scientific
research’ despite an international moratorium. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling
(1946), Art VIII; Schedule to the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, para 10(e)
(adopted 1982); International Whaling Commission, ‘Scientific Permit Whaling’, http://iwcoffice.org/
conservation/permits.htm (accessed 14 June 2011).
114 See generally Richard E Ashcroft and Adrian M Viens, ‘Clinical Trials’ in Peter A Singer and Adrian M Viens
(eds), Cambridge Textbook of Bioethics (Cambridge University Press, 2008).
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ment (ie, the human body) where they may eventually be utilised, and they carry
significant risk. Furthermore, there is some lack of clarity at the upper boundary of
research. In later stage clinical trials, research may provide medical benefits. Consequently,
the actors have dual roles: Clinical researchers can be cast into the second role of
physician, and research subjects seek to participate in experiments expecting therapeutic
benefits, and can thus simultaneously be patients.115 The clinical trials are generally
reviewed by an institutionally-affiliated ethics board, while approval of the drug or device
is done by national or EU regulators.116 However, even after approval, post-marketing
surveillance can further clarify the safety and effectiveness of the drug or device.117
Second, genetically modified organisms are similarly tested in increasingly large trials,
moving from the laboratory to the field. In the EU, for example, an extensive regime
regulates and distinguishes among field trials, agricultural production, and consumption
as food and feed.118 There is a relatively clear upper boundary for research, in this case
‘placing on the market’ a GMO product.119 Regulations address the need for public
consultation;120 labelling, traceability and valid methods of detection;121 the coexistence
of GMO and non-GMO agriculture;122 and the avoidance of accidental transboundary
movement.123
Finally, research into ocean fertilisation, as described above, is newly regulated under
international law. The IMO has developed a framework to determine whether a project
is ‘legitimate scientific research’, which is based upon four criteria:
115 Nancy MP King and Larry R Churchill, ‘Clinical Research and the Physician-Patient Relationship: The Dual
Roles of Physician and Researcher’ in Singer and Viens, ibid; Madison Powers, ‘Theories of Justice in the
Context of Research’ in Jeffrey P Kahn, Anna C Mastroianni and Jeremy Sugarman (eds), Beyond Consent:
Seeking Justice in Research (Oxford University Press, 1998).
116 Clinical trials are regulated in the EU under the European Clinical Trial Directive (2001/20/EC), and in the
US under the so-called ‘Common Rule’ (45 CFR 46). 
117 Post-marketing surveillance is sometimes called ‘phase IV clinical trials’.
118 Directive on the Deliberate Release into the Environment of Genetically Modified Organisms (2001/18/EC);
Regulation on Genetically Modified Food and Feed (EC, No 1829/2003).
119 ‘“[P]lacing on the market” means making available to third parties, whether in return for payment or free
of charge.’ Directive 2001/18/EC (n 118) Art 2(B).
120 Directive 2001/18/EC (n 118) Art 24; Decision Laying Down Detailed Arrangements for the Operation of
the Registers for Recording Information on Genetic Modifications in GMOs (2004/204/EC); Regulation
(EC) No 1829/2003 (n 118) Art 28.
121 Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 (n 118); Regulation Concerning the Traceability and Labelling of Genetically
Modified Organisms and the Traceability of Food and Feed Products Produced from Genetically Modified
Organisms (EC, No 1830/2003); Regulation on Detailed Rules for the Implementation of Regulation (EC)
No 1829/2003 (EC, No 641/2004). 
122 Commission Recommendation on Guidelines for the Development of National Co-Existence Measures to
Avoid the Unintended Presence of GMOs in Conventional and Organic Crops (2010/C200/01).
123 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity (2000); Regulation on
Transboundary Movements of Genetically Modified Organisms (EC, No 1946/2003).
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The proposed activity should be designed to answer questions that will add to the body of
scientific knowledge …
Economic interests should not influence the design, conduct and/or outcomes of the proposed
activity …
The proposed activity should be subject to scientific peer review at appropriate stages in the
assessment process …
The proponents of the proposed activity should make a commitment to publish the results in
peer reviewed scientific publications.124
If the proposal is deemed to be legitimate, passes a six-point environmental assessment,
and is not otherwise contrary to the London Convention and Protocol, it may
conditionally proceed while being monitored. Although ocean fertilisation is a proposed
form of CDR, it resembles SRM schemes in its risks of large transboundary environmental
effects. Thus, the framework may be able to provide a precedent and model for making
the distinction between research and deployment.125
However, these cases are of rather limited utility. SRM field research has three
characteristics, described above, which make its regulation challenging, yet these
characteristics are not shared by these examples. First, effective outdoor research into
SRM may require large scale testing, bordering on deployment, whereas the effects and
risks of a drug, a GMO crop and ocean fertilisation can generally be assessed from
experiments of a limited scale. Second, the potential consequences of experimenting with
the earth’s atmosphere and climate are greater than those posed by the examples. While
the significance of injured research participants, genetic contamination and reduced
marine biodiversity should not be belittled, I assert that SRM—even its field research—
poses risks of a greater magnitude. Third, in all three cases, ‘deployment’ (ie, use beyond
the test scale) is legally prohibited until research indicates that a particular application
poses an acceptable level of risk to human health and the environment. Of course, an
international moratorium on SRM deployment could address this gap, and will be needed
in any effective regulatory regime for SRM research.126 However, such a moratorium
would need to define the boundary of scale between research and deployment, and thus
presents something more like tautology instead of a step toward the regulation of research.
124 Contracting parties to the London Convention and contracting parties to the London Protocol (n 43).
125 David Santillo and Paul Johnston, ‘Governance of Geoengineering Research Cannot be Left to Voluntary
Codes of Conduct’ (2010) 1 The Geoengineering Quarterly 4; Till Markus, ‘Regulating Scientific Ocean
Fertilization Experiments under the Law of the Sea’, paper delivered at the Bremen Environmental Law
Conference, ‘The Law on Climate Engineering’, Bremen, 17 February 2011. 
126 Depending on interpretations of the role and language of the CBD, such a moratorium may already exist.
See text to nn 44–47.
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CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE 
SRM GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE
Climate engineering is coming under increasing consideration, and may prove to be an
important component of a portfolio of responses to the threat of climate change.
However, it presents several regulatory challenges. Key to overcoming them is the
separation of solar radiation management (SRM) climate engineering from carbon
dioxide removal (CDR), and of deployment from research. CDR can generally be
controlled through existing legal instruments and institutions. SRM presents a more
difficult case, and discussions often become mired in the geopolitics of deployment. Thus,
initial steps toward regulation should focus on research. Because this is the approach of
the SRM Governance Initiative, it holds potential for significant progress toward
regulation of SRM research. Furthermore, the initiative may be able to stake a particular
claim to legitimacy via expertise. However, crafting an effective definition of field research
will still present a significant challenge. More binding, top-down regulation or less
binding, bottom-up norms remain possible alternatives. The outcome will largely be
politically contingent.
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Climate Engineering Research
I. Introduction
The likely impacts of anthropogenic climate change
on humans and the environment are vast. Mitigat-
ing the risks through greenhouse gas emissions
abatement requires overcoming an extremely chal-
lenging collective action problem. However, efforts
thus far to reduce these risks have been disappoint-
ing.
As the evidence and probable severity of climate
risks have mounted, a wider range of options is now
being considered. Efforts toward emissions abate-
ment were the first global response, and then adapt-
ing society and ecosystems to new climates became
a second legitimate category of action. Now, propos-
als to develop the means to intentionally intervene
on massive scales in global physical, chemical, and
biological systems in order to counterbalance cli-
mate change are being seriously discussed. While
diverse, these proposed climate engineering (CE)
or geoengineering methods are controversial for
several reasons, including the contention that
they pose uncertain but potentially serious risks to
humans and the environment.
In debates over CE, precaution is often invoked.
Daniel Bodansky predicted that precaution would
“be invoked frequently and loudly at the inter-
national level” and possibly contribute to an inter-
national prohibition.1 The Conference of Parties to
the Convention on Biological Diversity cited “the
precautionary approach” in a nonbinding advisory
statement against CE activities that may affect
biodiversity.2 Moreover detractors of CE also often
cite precaution as a rationale for opposing CE
research and/or deployment.3 However, in this
article, we assert that a precautionary approach
favours improving knowledge about CE options
through research, including field experiments, but
in a manner that recognizes risks.
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Climate Engineering Research: 
A Precautionary Response to Climate Change?
Jesse L. Reynolds and Floor Fleurke*
In the face of dire forecasts for anthropogenic climate change, climate engineering is
increasingly discussed as a possible additional set of responses to reduce climate
change’s threat. These proposals have been controversial, in part because they – like
climate change itself – pose uncertain risks to the environment and human well-being.
Under these challenging circumstances of potential catastrophe and risk-risk trade-off,
it is initially unclear to what extent precaution is applicable. We examine what precau-
tion is and is not, and make a prima facie case that climate engineering may provide
means to reduce climate risks. When precaution is applied to the currently pertinent
matter of small to moderate scale climate engineering field tests, we conclude that
precaution encourages them, despite their potential risks.
II. Climate Change and Climate
Engineering
A brief review of the risks of and potential
responses to the threat of climate change will con-
textualize CE. Greenhouse gas emissions have
caused their atmospheric concentrations to rise at
an unprecedented rate, and their emission rates
continue to grow. Both temperatures and precipita-
tion figures are rising. Because climate change lags
relative to emissions, there is an unknown commit-
ment to future climate change. Climate change is
accelerating an already disturbing rate of species
extinction. In terms of human impacts, analyses are
highly sensitive to the assumed discount rate, and
their estimated annual costs range from 1% to 20%
of global economic activity.4 Food production and
water resources will be disrupted. Infectious dis-
eases, extreme weather events, and involuntary
migration will likely increase in frequency and
magnitude. Low-lying coastal areas, including entire
countries, will be inundated. In almost all of these
aspects, poor populations will suffer disproportion-
ately. Meanwhile, the Kyoto Protocol and the latest
nonbinding commitments are unlikely to keep
global warming below the target of 2°C, and further
emissions cuts are at an impasse.5 Models that
extrapolate current trends estimate that warming
could reach 4°C by 2100.6 Financing of adaptation
measures also appears to be inadequate.7
As climate change forecasts become starker, con-
sideration of CE has moved inward from the mar-
gins. The category is broad, encompassing numer-
ous proposed methods whose means, goals, finan-
cial costs, response times, and risks vary widely, and
whose boundaries with emissions abatement and
adaptation are blurry.8 Some methods would
remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere (CDR),
whereas others would reduce incoming solar radia-
tion (solar radiation management, or SRM) to coun-
terbalance warming. In general, the former would
be slower, more expensive, and less risky but
address the cause of climate change more closely to
its cause, whereas the latter would be faster, less
expensive, and riskier, and address only the warm-
ing aspect of climate change.9
Because arguments against CE arise more often
in the context of the riskier methods, we limit our
focus in this article to larger-scale SRM methods
such as stratospheric aerosol injection and marine
cloud brightening. In these cases, models indicate
they could counter a significant portion – and per-
haps all – of global warming, although the effects
would be regionally heterogeneous.10 Models also
point toward potential negative effects of SRM that
may be significant but remain partially uncertain.
Precipitation patterns will change.11 The incoming
light would be more diffuse while carbon dioxide
would remain elevated, increasing plant primary
productivity and altering ecosystems.12 The leading
candidate for stratospheric aerosol injection, sul-
phate particles, could damage the ozone layer.13
Furthermore, because the current relevant question
is whether to proceed with field tests, our discus-
sion focuses on these more immediate steps, not on
future potential SRM deployment.
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III. A Prima Facie Case for Climate
Engineering Deployment 
The benefits of research rest on whether SRM de-
ployment may provide net benefits. This case need
not be irrefutable. Indeed, too many unknowns
remain, and the purpose of research is to reduce
these unknowns. Therefore, we need to make only a
prima facie case, i.e., we ask whether, at first appear-
ance, SRM deployment could provide significant
net benefits to humans and the environment under
reasonable assumptions about a climate change
future.
In short, most studies which use climatic and eco-
nomic modelling indicate that SRM deployment
would be highly beneficial under most circum-
stances. Early studies compared only the direct (and
small) financial costs of SRM with the benefits of
reducing climate change, but did not consider nega-
tive side effects.14 More recent papers tried to incor-
porate such effects, as well as secondary benefits
such as increased agricultural productivity due to
diffuse light.15 For example, one paper used the
Dynamic Integrated Climate Change Model to con-
sider both the beneficial and damaging effects of
SRM. The authors found that when SRM supple-
ments emissions abatement, it passes a cost-benefit
test in a large majority, but not all, of the ranges of
damages due to SRM, and of the probability that
the SRM would be prematurely terminated.16
The greatest concern about the environmental
effects of SRM is in the context of regional pre-
cipitation reductions predicted by some models.17
The authors of a recent article used a climate model
to calculate, for each of 22 terrestrial regions of
the planet, damage functions that combined and
equally weighed temperature and precipitation
changes. The authors examined optimization sce-
narios under which the regions were alternatively
weighted by area, population, and economic activ-
ity. The results demonstrated that under both
Pareto optimal and potentially Pareto optimal sce-
narios, all regions benefitted significantly under cli-
mate change with SRM relative to climate change
alone.18
The capacity to deploy SRM in an informed man-
ner adds further value, independent of whether it
actually is deployed. This is because the probability
distribution of climate change damages has a long
tail, in which there is a significant but low chance of
very high damages. There are three reasons for this,
each of which will not be known for decades due to
the latency of climate change. First, climate sensitiv-
ity (the magnitude of climate change for a given
amount of cumulative greenhouse gas emissions)
may turn out to be greater than expected.19 Second,
climate change could induce a positive feedback
loop, leading to non-linear climatic responses.20
Third, an optimal abatement strategy may be unat-
tainable due to the political demands of global col-
lective action. Bearing in mind that some proposed
SRM techniques may be rapidly effective, they
could be deployed in response to learning about or
actually experiencing the above possibilities.21 In
other words, the potential to deploy SRM is a form
of insurance, and having such capacity would have
a high value, especially – as we discuss below –
from a precautionary perspective.
From these studies, we conclude that there is a
reasonable chance that SRM deployment would sig-
nificantly reduce the net damage from climate
change to humans and the environment, and that
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the capacity to deploy it under low probability, high
impact scenarios will have great value.22
The costs of SRM research have two components.
First, the direct costs of the research are small
enough to be negligible relative to forecast climate
change damages. Current proposed projects are on
the order of hundreds of thousands of USD. Any
proposed future budgets are rough conjectures.
Nevertheless, one estimate is to increase funding to
a magnitude of hundreds of millions USD annually
for decades, yielding a total estimate on the order of
tens of billions USD total.23 Calculations of dam-
ages to humans and the environment, the second
component, are likewise preliminary approxima-
tions. The first field tests, such as those now being
proposed, pose no risks to humans and the environ-
ment. For example, one group of scientists planned
on spraying seawater 1 km above the ocean in order
to test delivery systems, and another proposes to
inject very small amounts of light-scattering aero-
sols at a high altitude.24 Clearly, further research
would gradually scale up, posing small but increas-
ing risks. Such proposed field projects can and
should be carefully evaluated for their potential
risks and benefits. Indeed, this may lead to a situa-
tion wherein risks outweigh benefits, and such proj-
ects should be aborted. The decisions faced now,
though, are whether to proceed with small-scale
field experiments that cost hundreds of thousands
of USD with negligible risks. 
Some observers have asserted that “geoengineer-
ing cannot be tested without full-scale implementa-
tion”, however, and this would create unacceptable
risks.25 However, while it is true that moving from
the laboratory to the field is a leap, by no means
does this imply immediate full-scale deployment.
For example, a recent paper described the impor-
tant early role of analogue experiments and taking
advantage of natural phenomena before commenc-
ing with experiments that perturb the environ-
ment.26 Beyond that, projects can gradually increase
in scale and potential impacts, and can be adap-
tively managed so that how and whether to proceed
with subsequent stages is dependent upon prior
results. Specifically, research could engage in “sus-
tained science with small-scale field experiments.
Early tests would focus on understanding processes.
Later tests potentially could be large enough to pro-
duce barely detectable climate effects and reveal
unexpected problems, but be small enough to limit
risks.”27
IV. Precaution
Precaution reflects recognition on the part of regu-
lators of special properties of the environment and
human health as object of regulation, even if this
may result in false negatives. These include, in par-
ticular, the irreversible nature of much environmen-
tal damage, and the interests of future generations. 
Precaution can be seen as a correction to existing
legal systems. The principle arose from unease
about the difficulty to legally engage threats to the
environment or human health for which scientific
evidence remained inconclusive, particularly in
cases of new technologies or large scale interven-
tions in the environment. In essence, precaution
establishes legal competence to act where, if not for
precaution, there would be no such competence.28
Hence, precaution is an empowering principle, and
may justify public action. Although there are
numerous different articulations of the precaution-
ary principle in circulation,29 they have three
elements in common: threats of harm, scientific
uncertainty, and a possible precautionary action.
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Brunnee, and Ellen Hey (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Inter-
national Environmental Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2007), 597.
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In international law, the adoption of precaution
in the Rio Declaration, and its incorporation in the
Convention on Biological Diversity and the UN Con-
vention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) signalled its
widespread acceptance as a soft law norm.30 The
principle as such is not legally enforceable, but will
typically be embedded in a concrete regulatory con-
text, meaning that precaution often is enforceable.
The empowering effect of precaution has been fur-
ther operationalized through one or more of the
constitutive elements of precaution. The totality of
these elements instructs regulators to, inter alia:
a. recognize serious or irreversible harm;
b. acknowledge uncertainty;
c. apportion responsibilities to prove safety with
regulatees;
d. stimulate public participation and deliberation;
e. consider alternative options;
f. respect the principle of proportionality;
g. ensure the provisional nature of measures;
h. monitor environmental performance.31
Precaution has substantially impacted multiple
domains of environmental and human health law.
Because the precautionary principle addresses risks
to only humans and the environment, political and
social risks, such as potentially reducing the politi-
cal willpower toward emissions abatement and
adaptation, fall outside the scope of precaution.32
Although some of these concerns may be legiti-
mate, they are not appropriate for the application of
the precautionary principle and instead must be
resolved through social, political, and legal path-
ways. 
V. Precaution and Climate Engineering
Precaution has been invoked, both from within and
outside academia, as part of a wider debate concern-
ing CE.33 Here we will discuss two important issues
that have dominated this debate. The first is
whether precaution could ever help guide CE deci-
sions, considering the critique that the precaution-
ary principle is incoherent since it can sometimes
be argued to justify pursuing a particular approach,
as well as prohibiting it.34 In the context of climate
engineering, it could simultaneously direct towards
the employment and the prohibition of climate
engineering, as both responses are characterized by
uncertain risks for the environment and human
health. 
At least for the research phase, this is not the
case. Precaution is a tool to deal with uncertain
risks, but does not dictate an outcome. Although it
is generally associated with banning certain prod-
ucts, activities, or technologies, in reality precau-
tionary action has a variety of implications, poten-
tially including warranting the use of, for example,
a new technology to reduce risks.35 Moreover, the
elements noted above, such as proportionality and
deliberation, should prevent arbitrary application of
the principle. 
The second issue concerns what guidance pre-
caution may provide, particularly considering the
problems of risk-risk trade-offs and potential catas-
trophes.36 Hartzell-Nichols, for example, argues that
if climate engineering creates new uncertain, poten-
tially catastrophic risks, then its use – including
research – should be rejected:
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30 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, UN Doc.
A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I), Principle 15; Convention on Biological
Diversity, Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992, in force 29 December
1993, 31 International Legal Materials (1992), 818, Preamble,
Para. 9; United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Rio de Janeiro, 9 May 1992, in force 21 March 1994,
31 International Legal Materials (1992), 849, Art. 3.3.
31 Floor M. Fleurke, “Unpacking Precaution: A Study on the
Application of the Precautionary Principle in Europe” (Ph.D.
thesis on file at the University of Amsterdam, 2012), at 34 et seq.
32 See, e.g., Benjamin Hale, “The World That Would Have Been:
Moral Hazard Arguments against Geoengineering”, in
Christopher J. Preston (ed.), Engineering the Climate: The Ethics
of Solar Radiation Management (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and
Littlefield, 2012), 113.
33 Bodansky, “May We Engineer the Climate?”, supra, note 1; UK
House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, The
Regulation of Geoengineering (London: The Stationery Office,
2010), at 34–35; Kevin Elliott, “Geoengineering and the Precau-
tionary Principle”, 24 International Journal of Applied Philosophy
(2010), 237 et seq.; CBD Decision, supra note 2; Jesse Reynolds,
“The Regulation of Climate Engineering”, 3 Law, Innovation and
Technology (2011), 113, at 124; Ralph Bodle, “Geoengineering
and International Law: The Search for Common Legal Ground”,
46 Tulsa Law Review (2010), 305, at 309–311; Han Somsen,
“When Regulators Mean Business”, 40 Rechtsfilosofie en Rechts-
theorie (2011), 47, at 55–56; Dorothee Amelung et al., “Beyond
Calculation: Climate Engineering Risks from a Social Sciences
Perspective”, available on the Internet at <http://archiv.ub.uni-
heidelberg.de/ojs/index.php/forum-mk/article/view/9408> (last
accessed on 6 March 2013), at 25–41; Lauren Hartzell-Nichols,
“Precaution and Solar Radiation Management”, 15 Ethics, Policy
& Environment (2012), 158 et seq. 
34 Cass R. Sunstein, Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary
Principle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
35 Imagine a scenario wherein there is a significant but uncertain
chance that an asteroid may strike the Earth, with catastrophic
results. Precaution would call for proactive steps, such as
research into and development of technologies to prevent a
disaster. See Richard Posner, Catastrophe: Risk and Response
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
36 Jonathan B. Wiener and John D. Graham (eds.), Risk vs. Risk:
Tradeoffs in Protecting Health and the Environment (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995); Cass R. Sunstein, Worst-
Case Scenarios (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
2007), at 144.
[P]recautionary measures themselves prima facie
should not pose new or further threats of catas-
trophe … [I]f we believe we have moral reasons to
avoid the threats of catastrophe posed by climate
change we also have reasons to avoid the threats
of catastrophe posed by any risky SRM strate-
gies.37
Although it may seem to be morally ideal to attempt
to avoid all potential catastrophes, this may simply
not be the case with climate change given the seri-
ous consequences that unabated climate change
may pose. Consequently, the above statement leads
to paralysis, and likely suboptimal results with sig-
nificant implications for humans and the environ-
ment.
Ideally, when applying precaution, regulators
would adhere to a substitution clause that directs
them to comparisons. In the case of climate engi-
neering, this means that risks of climate change and
risks of climate engineering would be compared
with regard to their relative magnitude and scien-
tific uncertainty.38 It does not mean that a strategy
that seeks to abate risks should be abandoned solely
because it brings new, different risks to the table.
Precaution can play a constructive mediating role in
this kind of weighing exercise, where it is difficult
to balance potential benefits and risks because of
scientific uncertainty. Moreover, the presumption
that maintaining the status quo takes priority over
intentional change is a strong but refutable bias.39
Notably, exhibiting bias in risk perception is partic-
ularly common concerning new technologies that
seem beyond individual control and whose effects
and not immediately perceptible.40
We conclude that a precautionary approach
favours SRM research. There is scientific consensus
on the risks of climate change: the Intergovernmen-
tal Panel on Climate Change Assessment Reports
outlines extremely serious potential impacts of cli-
mate change. However, it is becoming increasingly
clear also that climate policies, at least their current
incarnation, will probably be ineffective in signifi-
cantly reducing these risks.41 On the other hand,
current models indicate that SRM deployment
would provide net reduction in both temperature
and precipitation changes. Field trials would be
smaller in scale and could be monitored for emerg-
ing risks, and will reduce uncertainty. The results
might indicate lower risks for SRM than previously
thought. Such research will not only indicate which
climate engineering techniques have potential, but
which ones might pose too much risk and should be
taken off the table. Furthermore, if there is a feasi-
ble future scenario under which SRM will be
deployed, research now will improve later decision
making. This argument is bolstered by the results of
a model of large-scale SRM field tests that indicated
trade-offs among duration of the experiment, its
intensity, and the certainty of its results.42 Thus,
beginning field research sooner rather than later
will have the advantage of requiring less intense
interventions in the environment in order to pro-
duce a given certainty of results. In addition to the
insurance value of SRM knowledge, there is another
feasible future scenario under which, for whatever
reason, climate change imposes large negative
impacts on humans and the environment. Under
pressure, political leaders may demand that scien-
tists do whatever they can, including SRM deploy-
ment, even if the uncertainties remain great. Pre-
caution would call for those future scientists to
know more. 
VI. United Nations Framework
Convention for Climate Change
Is there support in legally binding treaties for our
argument that a precautionary approach favours
SRM research? Although the UNFCCC, the most
important text in international law concerning cli-
mate change, does not directly address CE, it does
invoke precaution: 
The Parties should take precautionary measures
to anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of
climate change and mitigate its adverse effects.
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible
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37 Hartzell-Nichols, “Precaution and Solar Radiation Manage-
ment”, supra, note 33, at 166.
38 Posner, Catastrophe, supra, note 35; Sunstein, Worst-Case
Scenarios, supra, note 36. 
39 Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard H. Thaler,
“The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias”,
5 The Journal of Economic Perspectives (1991), 193; Somsen,
“Cloning Trojan Horses”, supra, note 28, at 223.
40 Paul Slovic and Elke U. Weber, “Perception of Risk Posed by
Extreme Events”, Presentation at “Risk Management Strategies in
an Uncertain World”, Palisades, New York, 12 to 13 April 2002.
41 Intergovernmental Panel on Climage Change, Fourth Assessment
Report, supra, note 19.
42 Douglas G. MacMynowski et al., “Can We Test Geoengineer-
ing?”, 4 Energy & Environmental Science (2011), 5044.
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damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not
be used as a reason for postponing such measures
taking into account that policies and measures to
deal with climate change should be cost-effective
so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possi-
ble cost.43
Although “lack of full scientific certainty” here is
aimed at uncertainty related to climate change as
such, since the UNFCCC was drafted the uncer-
tainty regarding climate change has been reduced.
Meanwhile, the potential effectiveness of a possible
set of responses, SRM, remains greatly uncertain. It
is reasonable to generalise the purpose of the pre-
cautionary principle as it is embodied in the
UNFCCC – i.e. for scientific uncertainty to not be a
barrier to taking measures – to imply support for at
least exploring SRM through research. This reading
is bolstered by two other considerations. First, the
precautionary passage in the UNFCCC calls for
responses to be cost-effective, and both SRM
research and deployment appear to be remarkably
inexpensive. Second, the UNFCCC calls for the
development and diffusion of technology and
research.44 For example: 
All Parties … shall … Promote and cooperate in sci-
entific, technological, technical, socio-economic
and other research … intended to further the
understanding and to reduce or eliminate the
remaining uncertainties regarding … the eco-
nomic and social consequences of various
response strategies; [and p]romote and cooperate
in the full, open and prompt exchange of relevant
scientific, technological, [and] technical... informa-
tion related to ... the economic and social conse-
quences of various response strategies.45
VII. Conclusions
We have argued not only that precaution does not
condemn SRM research, but that SRM research is in
itself a precautionary response to the grave and
potentially irreversible risks of climate change. This
is not an argument for deployment, a decision that
would require information presently unavailable. It
is also not an argument to reduce efforts toward
emissions abatement and adaptation. It simply
means that in the face of potential climatic catastro-
phe, we should not postpone serious investigation
into the capacity of SRM.
However, research itself should be organized and
conducted in a precautionary manner. Specifically,
this means that the elements noted above that
constitute and operationalize precaution should
become part of the risk assessment in the research
phase.46 Notably, some CE researchers and other
scholars are working to further develop these prin-
ciples as part of legitimate responsible oversight.47
This is a crucial first step, as SRM, and CE in gen-
eral, warrant both further research and appropriate
regulation.
CCLR 2|2013 107
43 UNFCCC, supra, note 30, Art. 3.3.
44 Ibid., Art. 4.1, 4.3, 4.7, 4.8, 4.9, and 11.1.
45 Ibid., Art. 4.1(g) and (h). “Response strategies” is undefined,
but presumably could include responses other than those
encouraged by the UNFCCC.
46 See text to note 31.
47 Margaret S. Leinen, “The Asilomar International Conference on
Climate Intervention Technologies: Background and Overview”,
4 Stanford Journal of Law, Science, and Policy (2011), 1;
Bipartisan Policy Center’s Task Force on Climate Remediation,
Geoengineering: A National Strategic Plan for Research on the
Potential Effectiveness, Feasibility, and Consequences of Climate
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Rayner et al., “The Oxford Principles”, Climatic Change (2013),
available on the Internet at <http://download.springer.com/static/
pdf/874/art%253A10.1007%252Fs10584-012-0675-2.pdf?
auth66=1380180336_dbb6694df2e5d5947c88a6088fe12f3e
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ABSTRACT
Proposals for climate engineering—intentional large-scale interventions in climate
systems—are increasingly under consideration as potential additional responses to
climate change, yet they pose risks of their own. Existing international regulation of
large-scale field testing and deployment is considered inadequate. This article looks to
the closest existing analogy—nuclear power—for lessons, and concludes that climate
engineering research will most likely be promoted and will not be the subject of a bind-
ing multilateral agreement in the near future. Instead, climate engineering and its
research will probably be internationally regulated gradually, with an initially low
degree of legalisation, and through a plurality of means and institutions. This regula-
tion is expected to proceed from norms, to non-binding and non-legal policies, and
then to relatively soft multilateral agreements which emphasise procedural duties. Any
eventual agreements will have trade-offs between their strength and breadth of partici-
pation. Intergovernmental institutions could play important facilitative roles. Treaties
regarding liability and non-proliferation of global deployment capability should be
considered.
KEYWORDS : climate engineering, climate change, geoengineering, nuclear power,
international environmental law
1. INTRODUCTION
In the face of worsening forecasts for climate change and inadequate reductions of
greenhouse gas emissions, intentional large-scale interventions in climate systems are
now being considered as potential additional responses to reduce climate risks.
Although at first glance these proposed ‘climate engineering’ or ‘geoengineering’
techniques may appear to be impractical, dangerous, and/or contrary to international
environmental law, upon closer inspection some proposals may be effective in
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reducing the net climate risks to humans and the environment while receiving
favourable consideration under international law. The movement of climate engin-
eering discussions from the margins to the mainstream has been accompanied by the
rise of a debate over the existing, and optimal, international regulation of climate
engineering research and deployment.
This article looks to the international regulation of climate engineering’s closest
existing analogy—nuclear power—for lessons. It also aims to add a dose of realism
to the climate engineering regulation discourse, which too often neglects what is ac-
tually possible in a world of sovereign states with diverse interests, capabilities, and
levels of power, and too often focuses on climate engineering’s risks while ignoring
its potential benefits. Finally, the article maintains a distinction between climate
engineering research and deployment, focusing on the more urgent question of the
former while maintaining an awareness of the latter. The following section briefly
introduces climate engineering, and notes that this article restricts itself to the riskier,
poorly regulated climate engineering techniques. The third section presents nuclear
power as an instructive case. The next section summarises the most important as-
pects of the international regulation of nuclear power, providing relevant observa-
tions. The final section draws appropriate inferences for the international regulation
of climate engineering. It concludes that observers should be modest in their expect-
ations of climate engineering’s international regulation, particularly through binding
multilateral agreements. Instead of implying that the international regulation of
climate engineering and its research will be entirely lacking, it will more likely be
gradual, with a low degree of legalisation, and through a plurality of means and insti-
tutions.1 Although some may react to this with pessimism, I cautiously find the tra-
jectory to be encouraging.
2 . CLIMATE CHANGE AND CLIMATE ENGINEERING
Considered in isolation, suggestions that humans could intentionally alter the climate
appear unjustified and possibly contrary to international law. However, because cli-
mate engineering is proposed as a means to counter the most dangerous aspects of
anthropogenic climate change, it must be considered in that context. Industrial activ-
ities have altered the atmospheric concentrations of some ‘greenhouse gases’, which
allow sunlight to enter the atmosphere but restrict heat from exiting it. The most im-
portant of these is carbon dioxide, whose concentration has increased in the past
two centuries by roughly 40% due to processes such as burning of fossil fuels and
land-use changes.2 These increases in greenhouse gas concentrations will change the
climate by warming it and altering precipitation patterns, harming humans and the
environment in the process.3 To date, there have been two leading categories of
internationally coordinated efforts to reduce climate change risks: to limit and reduce
1 ‘Legalization’ in the sense of greater obligation, precision, and/or delegation. See Kenneth Abbott and
others, ‘The Concept of Legalization’ (2000) 54 Int’l Org 401.
2 Thomas Stocker and others (eds), Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working
Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (CUP 2014) 11.
3 Christopher Field and others (eds), Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerabilities.
Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (CUP 2014).
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greenhouse gas emissions, and to adapt society and ecosystems to a changed
climate.4 Efforts toward emissions reductions and adaptation have thus far been dis-
appointing, and there are reasons to be pessimistic about the future. Furthermore,
scientists remain uncertain as to the magnitude of climate change risks, in part be-
cause climate change is delayed by several decades relative to greenhouse gas emis-
sions. Meanwhile, the intensity of climate change as a function of greenhouse gas
concentrations and its damage to humans and the environment as a function of cli-
mate change are not perfectly known. Therefore, we are already committed to a yet
unknown amount of climate change, and there is a significant chance that the dam-
age may be much worse than the simple expected value.5
In response to climate change risks and the limited prospects for emissions reduc-
tions and adaptation, some scientists and other observers are increasingly discussing
intentional large-scale interventions in the planet’s climate systems as potential add-
itional responses.6 There are two distinct categories of such ‘climate engineering’ or
‘geoengineering’, the first of which would pull carbon dioxide from the atmosphere
(carbon dioxide removal or negative emissions technologies). These proposals would
be relatively slow, expensive, and low risk while addressing a cause of climate change.
A significant exception to the low-risk character of these proposals is ocean fertil-
isation. In this, a nutrient would be added to the ocean, instigating an algal bloom.
The algae indirectly incorporate atmospheric carbon dioxide into their bodies, some
of which would sink to the deep ocean after their death, effectively sequestering the
carbon. Ocean fertilisation presents risks, such as generating other greenhouse gases
as by-products and depriving nearby marine areas of nutrients.
The second category of climate engineering proposals, collectively called solar radi-
ation management (SRM), would attempt to make the planet slightly more reflective
in order to compensate for the warming aspect of climate change. These would be rela-
tively fast, inexpensive, and high risk, and only address a symptom of climate change.
Under the most widely discussed technique, a reflective aerosol would be injected into
the stratosphere, mimicking the global cooling effect experienced after major volca-
noes. Another would involve the lower atmospheric spraying of seawater mist, which
after evaporation would result in small salt particles in the air. These would act as cloud
condensation nuclei, in turn making marine clouds more reflective.
The vast majority of those who research climate engineering assert that it would
not be a substitute for emissions reductions or adaptation. Instead they emphasise
the primacy of emissions reductions, hope that climate engineering would never be
deployed, and see emissions reductions, adaptation, and climate engineering
4 These categories are enshrined in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) (adopted 9 May 1992, entered into force 21 March 1994) 1771 UNTS 107, arts 4.1, 4.2.
5 That is, the probability distribution of damage is not symmetrical, but instead has a ‘long tail’ of low prob-
ability, high-impact damage.
6 A good non-technical introduction is John Shepherd and others, Geoengineering the Climate: Science,
Governance and Uncertainty (The Royal Society 2009). A more recent, detailed review is Tim Lenton and
Naomi Vaughan (eds), Geoengineering Responses to Climate Change: Selected Entries from the Encyclopedia of
Sustainability Science and Technology (Springer 2013). Climate engineering received a prominent but cau-
tious discussion in the latest report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Stocker
and others (eds) (n 2) SPM-21 and ss 6.5, 7.7.
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(if necessary) as complementary. For example, the first ‘headline message’ and ‘key
recommendation’ of a seminal report from the Royal Society are, respectively,
The safest and most predictable method of moderating climate change is to
take early and effective action to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases. No
geoengineering method can provide an easy or readily acceptable alternative
solution to the problem of climate change.…Parties to the UNFCCC should
make increased efforts towards mitigating and adapting to climate change, and
in particular to agreeing to global emissions reductions.7
On this view, carbon dioxide removal would decelerate and then reduce its atmos-
pheric concentration. SRM would be a temporary means to reduce harm to humans
and the environment until greenhouse gas concentrations have been reduced and/or
society has adapted. Another perspective holds that climate engineering, particularly
SRM, could be developed and held as something of an insurance option in case
climate change turns out to be worse than expected.
The environmental and social risks of climate engineering would vary among the
proposed techniques and also by the stages of their development. Some observers fear
that the mere discussion of climate engineering could decrease the political willpower
for emissions abatement and adaptation.8 Researching climate engineering could lead to
technological momentum and the development of influential vested interests, both of
which could cause biases in favour of which technique(s), if any, are actually deployed
in future. Large-scale field research and deployment may have unintended negative side
effects to humans and the environment, in particular changes in precipitation. Because
some effects may be at least partially known but not intended, climate engineering field
research or deployment could raise questions of informed consent of those who will be
impacted.9 Deployment could pose issues of control, decision-making, and disagree-
ment among states.10 Some SRM methods could be inexpensive enough to be globally
deployed for tens of billions of dollars, within the budget of small states as well as some
non-state organisations and individuals.11 Perhaps the greatest risk would be if, once de-
ployed, SRM were to stop for some reason, causing the climate change that would have
occurred in the absence of SRM to occur in less than a year. This very rapid rate of cli-
mate change would cause much greater damage relative to ‘normal’ climate change.
Because many of these risks are transboundary and/or would occur in areas beyond
national jurisdiction, international environmental law is relevant for climate engineering.
7 Shepherd and others (n 6) ix.
8 Albert Lin, ‘Does Geoengineering Present a Moral Hazard?’ (2013) 40 Ecol LQ 673.
9 David Morrow, Robert Kopp and Michael Oppenheimer, ‘Toward Ethical Norms and Institutions for
Climate Engineering Research’ (2009) 4 Envtl Res Lett 045106.
10 In reality, international tensions regarding climate engineering deployment may not be so strong because,
according to models, the world’s regions may agree more than not as to the desired intensity of climate
engineering. See Katharine Ricke, Juan Moreno-Cruz and Ken Caldeira, ‘Strategic Incentives for Climate
Geoengineering Coalitions to Exclude Broad Participation’ (2013) 8 Envtl Res Lett 014021.
11 Realistically, implementation costs, the inability to carry it out undetected, and the probability of retaliation
make unilateral deployment unlikely. Scott Horton, ‘Geoengineering and the Myth of Unilateralism:
Pressures and Prospects for International Cooperation’ (2011) 4 Stan JL Sci & Pol’y 56; Edward Parson and
Lia Ernst, ‘International Governance of Climate Engineering’ (2013) 14 Theo Inq L 307, 332–33.
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I have argued elsewhere that, on the whole, existing international environmental law
leans in favour of climate engineering research as developing potential means toward
reducing risks to humans and the environment.12 One reason for this is because, even
though climate engineering poses some risks, those from climate change are of a much
higher order.13 Additionally, some multilateral environmental agreements encourage sci-
ence and technology, and climate engineering and its research are also consistent with
principles of international environmental law including the polluter pays principle, the
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, and the precautionary prin-
ciple.14 Moreover, those agreements whose substance is most closely related to climate
engineering are best interpreted as being favourable to it. Some existing multilateral en-
vironmental agreements do impose certain duties, mainly procedural ones, on states
that might carry out, or be responsible for, climate engineering. These duties are part
of, or roughly consistent with, the customary international law of transboundary risks.
A handful of specific climate engineering activities are prohibited or curtailed.15
There is a consensus that existing international regulation—broadly defined—of
climate engineering is inadequate. To date, the academic literature discussing this
regulatory gap has been rather general in its nature, suggesting guideposts on the
path toward some form of international regulation. The positions in this discourse
can be generalised as varying in at least two dimensions.16 First, some observers be-
lieve that the regulation of climate engineering and its research should be developed
through existing international legal institutions.17 The most-cited forum is the
Conference of Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC-COP), which could possibly work towards a new Protocol to the
UNFCCC. Others argue that such forums would be unproductive and likely lead to
stalemate or to premature, poorly crafted binding rules.18 Instead, these writers often
12 Jesse Reynolds, ‘Climate Engineering Field Research: The Favorable Setting of International
Environmental Law’ (2014) 5 Wash & Lee J Energy, Clim & Environ (forthcoming).
13 Juan Moreno-Cruz, Katharine Ricke and David Keith, ‘A Simple Model to Account for Regional
Inequalities in the Effectiveness of Solar Radiation Management’ (2012) 110 Clim Change 649. Consider
that both climate change and climate engineering may satisfy the definitions of ‘pollution’, ‘adverse effect’
or ‘damage’ which multilateral environmental agreements seek to reduce. More general obligations to
protect the environment further support climate engineering research. For details, see Reynolds (n 12).
14 Jesse Reynolds and Floor Fleurke, ‘Climate Engineering Research: A Precautionary Response to Climate
Change?’ (2013) Carbon Clim L Rev 101.
15 For treaty details, see Reynolds (n 12).
16 Of course, the positions are rarely at the extremes of the suggested axes and often cannot be placed on a
clear, single ‘location’.
17 Scott Barrett, ‘The Incredible Economics of Geoengineering’ (2008) 39 Envtl & Resour Econ 45, 53; Albert
Lin, ‘Geoengineering Governance’ (2009) 8 Issues Legal Schol, 17–26; Karen Scott, ‘International Law in
the Anthropocene: Responding to the Geoengineering Challenge’ (2013) 34 Mich J Int’l L 309, 355;
Michael Zürn and Stefan Schäfer, ‘The Paradox of Climate Engineering’ (2013) 4 Glob Pol’y 266, 273.
18 Daniel Bodansky, ‘May We Engineer the Climate?’ (1996) 33 Clim Change 309, 319; David Victor, ‘On
the Regulation of Geoengineering’ (2008) 24 Oxford Rev Econ Pol’y 322, 331–32; William Daniel Davis,
‘What Does “Green” Mean?: Anthropogenic Climate Change, Geoengineering, and International
Environmental Law’ (2009) 43 Ga L Rev 901, 928–38; David Victor and others, ‘The Geoengineering
Option: A Last Resort Against Global Warming?’ (2009) 88 Foreign Aff 64, 75; David Keith, Edward
Parson and M Granger Morgan, ‘Research on Global Sun Block Needed Now’ (2010) 463 Nature 426,
427; Richard Elliot Benedick, ‘Considerations on Governance for Climate Remediation Technologies:
Lessons from the “Ozone Hole”’ (2011) 4 Stan JL Sci Pol’y 6, 7–8; Parson and Ernst (n 11) 324.
The International Regulation of Climate Engineering  273
emphasise the benefits of initially developing norms from the bottom-up,19 coordi-
nating scientific activities (perhaps through central institutions),20 and a well-crafted
moratorium on deployment and research projects above a certain threshold.21 As a
second dimension of variability, some scholars believe that many countries should
be brought into forums for developing international regulation—whatever their
nature—as early as possible,22 whereas a counter position is that a smaller group of
states would be more effective.23
This article is concerned chiefly with those proposed climate engineering meth-
ods that may be effective and affordable yet pose significant risks. This presently in-
cludes SRM techniques such as stratospheric aerosol injection and marine cloud
brightening, although this set could change over time. Even though carbon dioxide
removal by ocean fertilisation could arguably be included, it appears to now be fairly
well regulated,24 a recent incident notwithstanding.25 Therefore, from here onward,
‘climate engineering’ will refer only to these relatively riskier, weakly regulated SRM
methods.
19 Victor (n 18) 332–33; Davis (n 18) 941–42; Victor and others (n 18) 74; Keith, Parson and Morgan
(n 18) 427; Lisa Dilling and Rachel Hauser, ‘Governing Geoengineering Research: Why, When and
How?’ (2013) 121 Clim Change 553; M Granger Morgan, Robert R Nordhaus and Paul Gottlieb,
‘Needed: Research Guidelines for Solar Radiation Management’ (2013) 29 Issues Sci Tech 37, 41–43;
Parson and Ernst (n 11) 324–25; Stefan Schäfer and others, ‘Field Tests of Solar Climate Engineering’
(2013) 3 Nature Clim Change 766.
20 Victor (n 18) 332–33; Davis (n 18) 940–44; Victor and others (n 18) 73–74; John Virgoe, ‘International
Governance of a Possible Geoengineering Intervention to Combat Climate Change’ (2009) 95 Clim
Change 103, 116–17; Keith, Parson and Morgan (n 18) 427; Benedick (n 18); Daniel Bodansky,
‘Governing Climate Engineering: Scenarios for Analysis’ (2011) 11–47 The Harvard Project on Climate
Agreements Discussion Papers, 29; Dilling and Hauser (n 19).
21 Ralph Cicerone, ‘Geoengineering: Encouraging Research and Overseeing Implementation’ (2006) 77
Clim Change 221; Davis (n 18) 944–45; Morgan, Nordhaus and Gottlieb (n 19) 41–42; Edward Parson
and David Keith, ‘End the Deadlock on Governance of Geoengineering Research’ (2013) 339 Science
1278, 1279.
22 Bodansky (n 18) 320. This implicitly also includes those who propose action through the UNFCCC
(n 17), which has universal participation.
23 Victor (n 18) 332; Davis (n 18) 938–40; Benedick (n 18); Parson and Ernst (n 11) 333–34.
24 The Contracting Parties to the London Convention and London Protocol, which regulate marine dump-
ing, developed (and continue to refine) regulations for marine geoengineering permitting only ‘legitimate
scientific research’. The parties have approved amendments to the London Protocol in order to make this
binding. ‘Resolution LC-LP.1 on the Regulation of Ocean Fertilization’ (2008) in ‘Report of the Thirtieth
Consultative Meeting and the Third Meeting of Contracting Parties’ (2008) IMO Doc LC 30/16;
‘Resolution LC-LP.2 on the Assessment Framework for Scientific Research Involving Ocean Fertilization’
and ‘Assessment Framework for Scientific Research Involving Ocean Fertilization’ in ‘Report of the
Thirty-Second Consultative Meeting and the Fifth Meeting of Contracting Parties’ (2010) IMO Doc LC
32/13; ‘Resolution LP.4(8) on the Amendment to the London Protocol to Regulate the Placement of
Matter for Ocean Fertilization and Other Marine Geoengineering Activities’ in ‘Report of the Thirty-
Fifth Consultative Meeting and the Eighth Meeting of Contracting Parties (2013) IMO Doc LC 35/15.
25 A ‘rogue’ scientist performed the largest ocean fertilization experiment to date with the purported inten-
tions of restoring salmon and somehow selling carbon credits in order to fund the project. The Canadian
government is currently investigating. See Neil Craik, Jason Blackstock and Anna-Maria Hubert,
‘Regulating Geoengineering Research through Domestic Environmental Protection Frameworks:
Reflections on the Recent Canadian Ocean Fertilization Case’ (2013) Carbon Clim L Rev 117.
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3 . THE NUCLEAR POWER ANALOGY
The academic discourse discussed above has emphasised the challenging novelties of
regulating climate engineering. In this, most authors have referred to previous new
risky technologies only in passing and have drawn few useful lessons from them.26
This is a missed opportunity, and I detail six reasons that nuclear power generation
and its attendant risks provide the best existing case in international law from which
to draw insights into the potential international regulation of climate engineering
and its research. First, both nuclear power and climate engineering present trans-
boundary risks to human health and the environment. An accident at a nuclear
power installation can result in dangerous levels of radiation in other countries and
non-state areas. This was most evident in the 1986 Chernobyl accident, which
occurred in the Soviet Union and contaminated parts of about a dozen other coun-
tries. Similarly, large-scale climate engineering field research projects and deployment
will threaten the environments of other states and non-state areas in ways that re-
main partially unknown. The most significant risks are changes in rainfall patterns
and in sunlight characteristics due to SRM, in turn impacting ecosystems and agricul-
ture.27 Larger environmental changes caused by SRM are not out of the question.28
Second, the risks posed by nuclear power and climate engineering are ultra-
hazardous, in that they carry low probabilities of very high damage.29 To date, the
vast majority of deaths due to nuclear power generation have occurred as a result of
only two accidents, Chernobyl and Fukushima in 2011, which together led to dozens
of direct deaths and thousands of indirect ones.30 The risk of much greater damage,
such as from larger accidents or terrorism, is uncertain. In the case of climate engin-
eering, potentially catastrophic hazards include major changes in precipitation and
light, and perhaps even alterations in major global phenomena such as the El Niño/
La Niña-Southern Oscillation.31 These ultra-hazardous risks are difficult to manage
because of the long durations between negative events. As a result, little empirical
data is available, causing great uncertainty in any cost-benefit analysis.32
Furthermore, the choice of an intergenerational discount rate has a dramatic effect
26 Eg Barrett (n 17) 51–53, Victor (n 18) 332, and Bodansky, ‘Governing Climate Engineering: Scenarios
for Analysis’ (n 20) 24 briefly mention the European Organization for Nuclear Research and its Large
Hadron Collider. Nuclear safety or weapons were brought up by Bodansky, ‘May We Engineer the
Climate?’ (n 18) 318; Victor (n 18) 328; Virgoe (n 20) 112; Bidisha Banerjee, ‘The Limitations of
Geoengineering Governance in a World of Uncertainty’ (2011) 4 Stan JL Sci & Pol’y 15, 32–33.
27 Simone Tilmes and others, ‘The Hydrological Impact of Geoengineering in the Geoengineering Model
Intercomparison Project (GeoMIP)’ (2013) 18 J Geophys Res 11036; J Pongratz and others, ‘Crop
Yields in a Geoengineered Climate’ (2012) 2 Nat Clim Change 101.
28 Peter Braesicke, Olaf Morgenstern and John Pyle, ‘Might Dimming the Sun Change Atmospheric ENSO
Teleconnections as We Know Them?’ (2011) 12 Atmos Sci Lett 184.
29 Other ultra-hazardous activities in international law are maritime oil transportation, space activities, and
activities involving hazardous substances. See Hanqin Xue, Transboundary Damage in International Law
(CUP 2003) 19–72.
30 Chernobyl Forum, ‘Chernobyl’s Legacy: Health, Environmental and Socio-Economic Impacts and
Recommendations to the Governments of Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine’ <http://www.
iaea.org/Publications/Booklets/ss.html> 14, 16; John Ten Hoeve and Mark Jacobson, ‘Worldwide
Health Effects of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident’ (2012) 5 Energy Environ Sci 8743.
31 (n 27–28).
32 See eg Martin Weitzman, ‘On Modeling and Interpreting the Economics of Catastrophic Climate
Change’ (2009) 91 Rev Econ Stat 1.
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on cost and benefit estimates but is ethically ambiguous.33 Moreover, if centuries-
long trends continue, then future generations will most likely have greater capacities
to adapt to negative events. Future generations will also probably have different val-
ues concerning, among other things, risk aversion, equity, and the values of biodiver-
sity and ‘undisturbed nature’ versus the well-being of people. Finally, costly efforts to
reduce low-probability risks that are infrequent or have not yet happened are usually
politically unpopular, limiting action by political leaders in democratic states.34
The third basis for an analogy between nuclear power and climate engineering is
that both present risk–risk tradeoffs, in which the reduction of targeted risks creates a
new set of countervailing risks. Nuclear power is a substitute for the burning of fossil
fuels, which causes deaths and illness in the short term and climate change in the long
term. One recent study placed the benefits to date of the existing capacity of nuclear
power relative to the use of fossil fuels at 1.84 million prevented air-pollution deaths
and two years’ worth of averted global greenhouse gas emissions.35 In the case of cli-
mate engineering, it may be able to greatly reduce climate change risks to humans and
the environment, while posing some risks of its own. These risk–risk tradeoffs are diffi-
cult to manage in that the two sets of risks may be of fundamentally different types
and/or affect different populations or ecosystems.36 Applying traditional legal norms,
especially precaution, becomes very difficult under these circumstances.
Fourth, although the politics of climate engineering presently remain amorphous,
they are likely to emerge in a similar pattern as that of nuclear power. Among the
general population, nuclear power has been, and climate engineering probably will
be, perceived as unknown, dreadful and involuntary, characteristics that are corre-
lated with strong aversion.37 Among political leaders, nuclear power has been, and
climate engineering probably will be, developed in the context of potential dual-use
33 The discount rate is the quantification of people’s preference for receiving rewards sooner rather than
later (and for incurring losses later rather than sooner). This is problematic when considering subsequent
generations. On one hand, intergenerational discounting amounts to transferring costs onto another
population cohort (ie, the future) which lacks a voice in present decision-making processes, while those
with a voice reap the benefits. On the other hand, using an intergenerational discount rate of zero also
produces perverse results. For example, all but the most essential current consumption would be unjusti-
fied, and instead nearly all present resources would be invested in future generations, even though they
will be wealthier than us. See Paul Portney and John Weyant (eds), Discounting and Intergenerational
Equity (Resources for the Future 1999).
34 Although support for action against climate change is popular in the abstract, it is low when it competes
with other objectives. Eg, in an American annual survey, ‘dealing with global warming’ has been last or
second-to-last among 15–20 public policy priorities since its inclusion in 2007. The Pew Research Centre
for People and the Press, Twelve Years of the Public’s Top Priorities (2013) <http://www.people-press.
org/interactives/top-priorities> accessed 7 November 2013.
35 Pushker Kharecha and James Hansen, ‘Prevented Mortality and Greenhouse Gas Emissions from
Historical and Projected Nuclear Power’ (2013) 47 Environ Sci Tech 4889.
36 John Graham and Jonathan Baert Wiener, ‘Confronting Risk Tradeoffs’ in John D Graham and Jonathan Baert
Wiener (eds), Risk vs Risk: Tradeoffs in Protecting Health and the Environment (Harvard UP 1995) 19–41.
37 Paul Slovic, ‘Perception of Risk’ (1987) 236 Science 280; Ellen Peters and Paul Slovic, ‘The Role of
Affect and Worldviews as Orienting Dispositions in the Perception and Acceptance of Nuclear Power’
(1996) 26 J Appl Soc Psychol 1427; Adam Corner and others, ‘Messing with Nature? Exploring Public
Perceptions of Geoengineering in the UK’ (2013) 23 Glob Envtl Change 938. See also Dan Kahan and
others, ‘Geoengineering and the Science Communication Environment: A Cross-Cultural Experiment’
(2012) The Cultural Cognition Project Working Paper 92 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id¼1981907> accessed 10 October 2013.
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and highly heterogeneous state capacity. Specifically, nuclear power is internationally
promoted, but can be used as a basis for nuclear weapons programmes, which the
nuclear powers desire to limit to themselves.38 Similarly, climate engineering
research appears to be encouraged by existing international environmental law, and
can be expected to be pursued by states.39 And as with nuclear weapons, countries’
relative power will be impacted by their acquisition of an ability to deploy large scale
climate engineering. Those states with this capacity will wish to prevent inappropri-
ately risky, premature, or militarised implementation and, will also most likely, wish
to prevent its proliferation to a greater number of states in order to maintain their
relatively greater power.
Fifth, scientists and technological expertise play a necessary role in the regulation of
nuclear power and climate engineering. Of course, environmental law cannot be disen-
tangled from the science on which it is based. Regulators must rely upon technical
experts and their specialised knowledge due to the complex and dynamic nature of cer-
tain issues. In turn, these experts can form close-knit communities that are influential
in establishing norms and shaping policy.40 Expertise is also used as a means to
establish and maintain legitimacy, particularly within regulated domains—such as nu-
clear power and climate engineering—that pose uncertainty and/or complexity and
that cross lines between states and among international, national, quasi-public, and pri-
vate institutions.41 Indeed, ‘[i]n emerging areas of international law concerned with
the regulation of risk, expertise based on scientific and technical knowledge is typically
viewed as a plausible basis for legitimating the growing authority exercised by relevant
international rules’.42 Of course, these experts are also likely to be practitioners, and
thus to the extent that they influence regulation, it partially takes on the form of self-
regulation. This brings both benefits and challenges. In addition to greater knowledge
and legitimacy, the inclusion of the regulated actors in the development, monitoring,
and enforcement of regulation can make it more effective due to less adversarial rela-
tionships between the regulators and regulated. This is also the case when it is difficult
for consumers to learn about the quality of a product before purchasing it, and when
the producers’ reputations are important, sensitive, and shared.43 In the cases of
38 The peaceful development of nuclear technologies and the prevention of nuclear weapon proliferation
are the foundations of international nuclear law. Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency
(opened for signatures 26 October 1956, entered into force 29 July 1957) 26 UNTS 3, arts II, III; Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (opened for signatures 1 July 1968, entered into force 5
March 1970) 729 UNTS 161 (Non-Proliferation Treaty) arts IV, V.
39 Text to (n 13–15).
40 Although nuclear power scientists and engineers appear to meet Haas’s criteria for an epistemic community,
he asserts that they enjoy less political influence because their research is expensive and thus less independent
of their funding source. Peter Haas, ‘Epistemic Communities’ in Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée and Ellen
Hey (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law (OUP 2007) 763–65.
41 Daniel Bodansky, ‘The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for International
Environmental Law?’ (1999) 93 Am J Int’l L 596, 601; Gráinne de Búrca, ‘Developing Democracy
Beyond the State’ (2008) 36 Colum J Transnat’l L 221, 240–46.
42 Jacqueline Peel, Science and Risk Regulation in International Law (CUP 2010) 14.
43 Thomas Gehrig and Peter-J Jost, ‘Quacks, Lemons, and Self Regulation: A Welfare Analysis’ (1995) 7 J
Reg Econ 309; Andrew King, Michael Lenox and Michael Barnett, ‘Strategic Responses to the Reputation
Commons Problem’ in Andrew Hoffman and Marc Ventresca (eds), Organizations, Policy and the Natural
Environment: Institutional and Strategic Perspectives (Stanford University Press 2002).
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nuclear power and climate engineering, the ‘consumers’ can include the government
agencies which approve and fund the activities and the voters who lend support, the
‘quality of the product’ includes the generated risks, ‘purchasing’ is done through
grants or regulatory approval, and the ‘producers’ are energy companies or climate en-
gineering researchers. On the other hand, the self-regulated can use their position for
rent-seeking behaviour, at the expense of both the public and potential competing
‘producers’. Yet regulatory regimes are rarely pure self-regulation, with a spectrum of
hybrid forms and roles for the regulated actors available.
The final basis for a nuclear power–climate engineering analogy is that the regula-
tions of the two technologies present similar problem structures. Both nuclear power
and climate engineering research are, in some aspects, global public goods.44 The for-
mer is one in that it is a substitute for the burning of fossil fuels.45 From this, the
world benefits from reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, even though the coun-
try hosting nuclear power bears the costs, including the environmental risks.
Similarly, climate engineering research can increase shared knowledge of possible
additional responses to climate change, while the costs are borne by few.46 Notably,
both are positive only to the extent that they reduce the negative effects of another
global public ‘good’, greenhouse gas emissions. More specifically, the emissions-
reducing aspect of nuclear power and climate engineering research are aggregate
effort global public goods,47 whose supply is a function of worldwide cumulative ef-
forts, and both are promoted in international law.48 Scott Barrett concludes that
international cooperation—generally through multilateral agreements—is useful in
the promotion of global public goods in order to coordinate efforts, share costs, tap
potential where local capacity may be lacking (such as in developing countries), and
overcome free-riding.49 This international cooperation need not be global, because
non-participating states do not hinder the provision of the good, although they may
unjustly free-ride on its provision by others.
At the same time, nuclear power and climate engineering research each increase
the likelihood of events with large negative effects: the former could lead to
44 A public good is something which is non-rivalrous and non-excludable. Its effects can be positive or nega-
tive for various people or states. See Daniel Bodansky, ‘What’s in a Concept? Global Public Goods,
International Law, and Legitimacy’ (2012) 23 Eur J Int L 651. Of course, public goods also often also
confer private benefits.
45 Text to (n 35).
46 Scientific research and accessible knowledge in general are public goods. Doinique Foray, The Economics
of Knowledge (MIT Press 2004) 113–29. Research as a public good assumes that the results are published
and not subject to extensive intellectual property claims. Recently proposed norms for climate engineer-
ing research call for transparency, open publication of positive and negative results, and/or no private in-
tellectual property. Michael MacCracken and others, The Asilomar Conference Recommendations on
Principles for Research into Climate Engineering Techniques <http://climateresponsefund.org/> accessed
19 November 2013; Jane Long and others, Geoengineering: A National Strategic Plan for Research on the
Potential Effectiveness, Feasibility, and Consequences of Climate Remediation Technologies <http://bipartisan
policy.org/library/report/task-force-climate-remediation-research> accessed 19 April 2013; Steve Rayner
and others, ‘The Oxford Principles’ (2013) 121 Clim Change 499.
47 See the distinction among single best efforts, weakest links, and aggregate efforts in Jack Hirshleifer,
‘From Weakest-link to Best-shot: The Voluntary Provision of Public Goods’ (1983) 41 Pub Choice 371;
Scott Barrett,Why Cooperate? The Incentive to Supply Global Public Goods (OUP 2007).
48 (n 38); text to (n 13–15).
49 Barrett (n 47), ch 3.
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accidents, terrorism, and weapons proliferation, while the latter makes inappropri-
ately risky, premature, or militarised climate engineering deployment possible.
Efforts to prevent these negative events are mixtures of weakest link global public
goods, whose provision depends upon the state with the weakest performance, and
mutual restraint, in which all states must refrain from doing something.50 Barrett
argues that international coordination is needed in these cases in order to establish
standards and sometimes to share costs, but that multilateral agreements are less
useful than with aggregate effort global public goods. Instead, norms, consensus and
customary law can better provide incentives to those laggard states that may not
otherwise have the incentives to join a multilateral agreement.51 Notably, in the two
cases here, the desire to prevent negative events is particularly acute among the advo-
cates and practitioners of the technology. This is because the reputations of the indi-
vidual actors (ie nuclear power providers or climate engineering researchers) are
important and sensitive due to the controversial nature of their practice, and require
a social license to operate.52 However, the actors are relatively small in number and
their identities are not clearly distinguished by members of the public. Consequently
they share a reputations ‘common’.53 Since these actors are few in number, they may
be able to cooperate in order to maintain their shared reputation.54
Of course, nuclear power and climate engineering differ in important ways. The
risks of nuclear power are known, and power plants can reasonably strive for negli-
gible harm to humans and the environment, whereas climate engineering inherently
will have some unknown risks—at least initially—and will impact the environment.
When nuclear accidents do occur, the negative effects are regional and of a limited
type, while those from climate engineering deployment could be global and could
take a wide range of forms. At the same time, the benefits of climate engineering re-
search (and perhaps deployment) would be more clearly, and probably more widely
distributed, than the benefits of nuclear power. Furthermore, nuclear power is a rela-
tively consistent practice year-to-year, whereas climate engineering research would
be more dynamic, changing in light of previous results. Relatively speaking, deter-
mining causation of damages is easier with nuclear power because of radioactive iso-
topes’ traceability, the predictability of radioactive materials’ movement and lifespan,
and better knowledge of radiation’s effects, while the precise impact of a climate en-
gineering field experiment may be difficult to pinpoint. Finally, the line between pro-
moted and proscribed applications is clearer in the case of nuclear technologies.
Nevertheless, some useful insights from experience with the existing technology of
nuclear power can be drawn.
50 See n 47.
51 Barrett (n 47) chs 2, 5.
52 Neil Gunningham, Robert Kagan and Dorothy Thornton, ‘Social License and Environmental Protection:
Why Businesses Go Beyond Compliance’ (2004) 29 L & Soc Inquiry 307.
53 Consider the reactions among the public and politicians around the world to nuclear accidents such as
Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima. Matthew Fuhrmann, ‘Splitting Atoms: Why Do Countries
Build Nuclear Power Plants?’ (2012) 38 Int’l Interact 29.
54 King, Lenox and Barnett (n 43).
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4. THE REGULATION OF NUCLEAR POWER
The international regulation of nuclear power is vast, but here, a few relevant obser-
vations will suffice. These are based primarily on international regulation concerned
with reducing the risks of accidents at civilian nuclear power facilities, including both
ex ante accident prevention and ex post accident response. However, the basis for
these observations extends to international regulation of nuclear weapons prolifer-
ation, because nuclear power and climate engineering research are each promoted
while the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the risky, premature, or militarised
deployment of climate engineering are widely condemned.
It is both obvious yet noteworthy that nuclear power, perhaps the riskiest of
the ultra-hazardous activities recognised under international law, is not illegal.
Indeed, it is actively promoted under international law55 and the ‘research, produc-
tion and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes’ constitute an ‘inalienable right’
of states.56 Instead, like other transboundary risks, nuclear power must be carried out
with due diligence, which in this case includes among other things national regula-
tion consistent with globally promulgated standards, prior assessment, notification
and international peer review. This is evident in the 1994 Convention on Nuclear
Safety, the first and most important binding international law regarding the safety
standards of civilian nuclear power facilities.57 Parties are obligated to ‘take the ap-
propriate steps to ensure’ that general standards regarding—among other things—
the siting, design, construction, and operation of nuclear installations; emergency
preparation; funding for the safety of nuclear facilities; and training of staff.58
Parties must maintain a domestic regulatory framework that establishes safety stand-
ards, issues licenses, inspects installations and enforces the regulations.59 The
Convention also calls for its parties to issue reports on their progress for peer review
meetings.60
Second, states generally prefer to retain sovereignty, and this preference is stron-
ger the closer an issue is to national security. This is most apparent in the case of nu-
clear weapons, in which states such as China, France, India, Israel and the USA have
refused to join widely adopted agreements and/or have rejected the decisions of
international courts when these agreements or rulings were inconsistent with their
nuclear ambitions. France and China never signed the 1963 Limited Test Ban
Treaty—which has 126 parties including all other known nuclear weapons powers—
and subsequently continued and began testing, respectively.61 When the
International Court of Justice ruled that France’s atmospheric testing in the South
Pacific might violate international law and issued Interim Measures (roughly analo-
gous to an injunction), France rejected the Court’s jurisdiction and proceeded with
55 N 38.
56 Non-Proliferation Treaty (n 38) art IV.1. The UN General Assembly has also declared that the peaceful
development and use of nuclear energy to be a right of all states. UN General Assembly 32/50 (1977).
57 Convention on Nuclear Safety (opened for signatures 17 June 1994, entered into force 24 October 1996)
1963 UNTS 293.
58 ibid arts 10–19.
59 ibid arts 7–8.
60 ibid arts 5, 20–22.
61 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (opened for
signatures 5 August 1963, entered into force 10 October 1963) 480 UNTS 43.
280  The International Regulation of Climate Engineering
atmospheric testing.62 The 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty has been
ratified by 159 countries, but remains not in force due to the non-participation of eight
‘select’ countries, six of which have nuclear weapons (China, India, Israel, North
Korea, Pakistan and the USA) and one of which appears to have ambitions for them
(Iran).63 The 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty, with 189 parties, recognised the then-
five nuclear weapon states, which are the permanent members of the UN Security
Council.64 All four countries that have developed nuclear weapons since then either
never ratified the treaty or withdrew from it. Notably, such withdrawals are explicitly
allowed if a state ‘decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this
Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country’.65 It also commits parties
with nuclear weapons to ‘pursue negotiations in good faith’ on agreements for com-
plete nuclear disarmament.66 Those five parties have essentially ignored this.
This preference is also present, albeit to a lesser degree, in the case of nuclear
power, whose international regulation is soft in form and limited in substance. Three
Conventions are modest and have wide participation. The Convention on Nuclear
Safety relies upon soft commitments to general principles of nuclear safety,
‘reaffirm[s] that responsibility for nuclear safety rests with the State’, and lacks both
independent monitoring for compliance and an enforcement mechanism for non-
compliance.67 The Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident requires
parties to notify neighbouring and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Member States in the event of a potentially significant transboundary release of radi-
ation, and partially standardises the information to be shared.68 Parties to the
Convention on Assistance in Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency
are not obligated to provide or accept assistance but instead are obligated only to
inform the IAEA of their available expertise and equipment.69
In contrast, the nuclear liability regimes—founded upon the Paris Convention for
Western Europe and the Vienna Convention for other countries—could be poten-
tially effective but are not adequately ratified.70 Under these, liability is channelled to
62 Nuclear Tests cases: Australia v France (Interim Measures) (1973) ICJ Reports 99; New Zealand v France
(Interim Measures) (1973) ICJ Reports 135.
63 Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (opened for signatures 24 September 24 1996) 35 ILM 1439.
64 Non-Proliferation Treaty (n 38).
65 ibid art X.
66 ibid art VI. The International Court of Justice unanimously concluded that ‘There exists an obligation to
pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its as-
pects under strict and effective international control.’ Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,
Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996 [1996] ICJ Rep 226.
67 Convention on Nuclear Safety (n 57). Quote is from Preamble, para iii.
68 Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (opened for signatures 26 September 1986,
entered into force 27 October 1986) 1439 UNTS 275.
69 Convention on Assistance in Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (opened for signa-
tures 26 September 1986, entered into force 26 February 1987) 1457 UNTS 133.
70 The cornerstones are the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy
(opened for signatures 29 July 1960, entered into force 1 April 1968) 956 UNTS 251 (Paris
Convention); Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (opened for signatures 21 May
1963, entered into force 12 November 1977) 1063 UNTS 265 (Vienna Convention). These are furthered
by numerous supplements and protocols, some of which have minimal participation or are not yet in
force. For a thorough overview, see Stephan Tromans, Nuclear Law: The Law Applying to Nuclear
Installations and Radioactive Substances in Its Historic Context (2nd edn, Hart 2010) 166–82.
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the operator of the nuclear power installation, who is solely and absolutely liable for
transboundary damages.71 Liability is limited in both time and amount. Operators
are required to carry insurance up to a minimum that is stated in the treaties, but
may be increased by the individual parties. If damages exceed the operator’s liability,
the state will provide public funds up to a second threshold. Under the Paris
Convention regime, parties are collectively liable up to yet a higher amount. Legal
actions are to be pursued in the courts of the party where the accident occurred. In
theory, this liability regime is beneficial in a number of ways. Absolute liability allows
the victims of a nuclear accident access to remedies without the burden to demon-
strate fault. Furthermore, the courts need not define appropriate levels of care, which
would be difficult given nuclear power’s complexity. The responsibilities of the
victims and the courts are further lessened by the channelling of liability to a single
operator. Moreover, the nuclear industry has greater clarity and its operators are gen-
erally able to obtain insurance due to the channelling of liability to the operator and
the limitations in amount and time. In reality, however, the effectiveness of the inter-
national nuclear accident liability regime is unclear. Less than half of the world’s nu-
clear power capacity is located in a country that is a party to one of the two core
treaties.72 Furthermore, the limitations on the amount of liability are low, presently
approximately 350 million euro, whereas a major nuclear accident could cost tens or
hundreds of billions of euro.73 The limitation of liability in time, generally at
10 years, also could be problematic, as some manifestations of radiation such as can-
cer may not occur within that time. Finally, the covered damage in the Western
Europe regime is limited to people and property, not inclusive of damage to the en-
vironment or of lost economic activity. Notably, each of these shortcomings is
addressed by existing conventions, protocols and supplementaries that are not yet in
force or ratified only by few states with little nuclear power capacity.
From these details, we see that countries do have incentives to commit to general
international safety principles and internationally coordinate information sharing and
cooperation in the event of an accident. On the other hand, they lack adequate
incentives for the international harmonisation of safety regulations and for strong
liability measures. As a result, the regulation of nuclear power through public
71 Although demonstration of fault is not required, there are exceptions such as war, negligence of the vic-
tim, and grave natural disasters.
72 International Atomic Energy Agency, Nuclear Share of Electricity Generation in 2012 (2012) <http://
www.iaea.org/PRIS/WorldStatistics/NuclearShareofElectricityGeneration.aspx> accessed 21 March
2014; Nuclear Energy Agency ‘Paris Convention on Nuclear Third Party Liability: Latest Status of
Ratifications or Accessions’ <http://www.oecd-nea.org/law/paris-convention-ratification.html> accessed
21 March 2014; International Atomic Energy Agency, ‘Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear
Damage’ <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/liability_status.pdf> accessed
21 March 2014.
73 Damages from the Chernobyl accident may have been on the order of hundreds of billions of euro.
Chernobyl Forum, ‘Chernobyl’s Legacy: Health, Environmental and Socio-Economic Impacts and
Recommendations to the Governments of Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine’ <http://www.
iaea.org/Publications/Booklets/ss.html>, 33 Ludivine Pascucci-Cahen and Momal Patrick, ‘Massive
Radiological Releases Profoundly Differ from Controlled Releases’ Institut de Radioprotection et de
Sûreté Nucléaire (French Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety) <http://www.irsn.fr/
FR/Actualites_presse/Actualites/Documents/EN_Eurosafe-2012_Massive-releases-vs-controlled-
releases_Cost_IRSN-Momal.pdf> accessed 15 March 2013.
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international law is soft in form and limited in substance, and will most likely remain
so. This implies that countries are reluctant to make strong binding commitments on
a topic as close to national security as nuclear power, and that there will generally be
trade-offs between proposed agreements’ strength and their breadth of participation.
Indeed, given that ‘states continue to resist significant intrusions upon their sover-
eignty in the area of nuclear safety…modest and incremental inroads into autono-
mous national decisionmaking may be the most effective means of creating and
maintaining state commitments’.74
The third observation about the international regulation of nuclear power is that
it extends beyond centralised public international law. Instead, there are partially
overlapping systems of regulation that differ in their geographic scales, breadths of
participation, means and degrees of legalisation. These includes informal and formal
norms; associations of experts and of institutional practitioners; self-, co-, meta- and
private regulation and soft and binding policies. These occur at the national and
international scales. Specifically, the most important international vehicle for the pro-
motion of nuclear power safety is the standards of the IAEA.75 These standards are
binding only for projects that receive assistance from the IAEA, and such projects
and their facilities are subject to inspection by the IAEA. However, the standards are
influential and widely adopted voluntarily. These ‘health and safety standards have
been a significant contribution to controlling the risks of nuclear energy [and] have
resulted in a high degree of harmonization’.76 This can be attributed to the involve-
ment of governments, intergovernmental organisations, non-governmental organ-
isations and experts. Furthermore, states can (and sometimes do) voluntarily request
from the IAEA inspection and advice for their nuclear facilities. In addition to the
IAEA, the UN Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation assesses
the effects of exposure to ionising radiation. The International Commission on
Radiological Protection, a professional society, builds upon that work and issues rec-
ommendations as to how to reduce exposure. These recommendations are often in-
fluential in formulating IAEA standards.77 The Nuclear Energy Agency of the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the private in-
dustry group World Association of Nuclear Operators, the US-initiated International
Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation (until recently called the Global
Nuclear Energy Partnership) and the World Institute for Nuclear Security reinforce
the work of the IAEA in developing nuclear power and ensuring its safety. Their
activities are further supported by the promulgation of norms, both informal and
more explicit, such as those of the Nuclear Power Plant Exporters.78
Fourth, experts and expertise are essential in the regulation of nuclear power, not
only because of nuclear power’s technical character. A relatively small professional
74 Monica Washington, ‘The Practice of Peer Review in the International Nuclear Safety Regime’ (1997) 72
NYU L Rev 430, 440, 465.
75 Statute of the IAEA (n 38) arts III.6, XI, XII.
76 Patricia Birnie, Alan Boyle and Catherine Redgwell, International Law and the Environment (3rd edn,
OUP 2009) 496.
77 ibid 44.
78 Nuclear Power Plant Exporters, ‘Principles of Conduct’ (2013) <http://nuclearprinciples.org/> ac-
cessed 5 May 2013.
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cohort such as nuclear engineers and technicians are unlikely to readily accept
detailed binding regulations developed by actors who are perceived to be outsiders.
Moreover, the promulgation of, and adherence to, technical standards are not
enough. Instead, as the experience in the USA after the 1979 Three Mile Island acci-
dent revealed, an appropriate culture among experts is necessary, something which
can only be achieved with their cooperation.79 In that case, an industry group—the
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations—was formed in order to foster ‘communitar-
ian regulation,’ which is ‘well-defined industry morality that is backed by enough
communal pressure to institutionalize responsibility among its members’.80 Joseph
Rees asserts that this organisation was successful because the accident was due to
institutional failures, not to hardware or inadequate regulations, and because the
nuclear power industry recognised itself as a community of shared fate due to its
reputation ‘commons’.81 This is not to say that an activity as risky as nuclear power
should be left to self-regulation, but instead to emphasise the need to integrate regu-
lated experts as part of the regulatory process, particularly in technical cases.
Finally, the development of regulation, especially binding multilateral agreements,
takes time. This is all the more the case in a dynamic technical field such as nuclear
power, in which little is known during its infancy but more becomes known as re-
search progresses. Furthermore, law is based on norms. Although some norms are
general, within a new domain these must be refined gradually and emerge somewhat
organically. The Convention on Nuclear Safety, arguably the most important multi-
lateral agreement on the topic, was opened for signatures 52 years after the first nu-
clear reaction and 40 years after the first nuclear power installation. Even the rapid
development of international environmental law from 1972 to 1992 was based on
norms that initially developed decades earlier.82
5. LESSONS FOR CLIMATE ENGINEERING
We can now draw some lessons for the potential international regulation of climate
engineering and its research. These will be based on several reasonable assumptions
about the behaviour of states and about climate engineering. Regarding the former,
I assume that states identify and pursue their self-interests, and will coordinate and
cooperate among themselves when it is beneficial to them. In short, this is a
79 The US government’s investigation of the accident, as well as other investigations, attributed the root
cause to the institutional culture within the nuclear industry. John Kemeney and others, The Need for
Change, the Legacy of TMI: Report of the President’s Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island (US
Government Printing Office 1979); Hyman Rickover, ‘An Assessment of the GPU Nuclear Corporation
Organization and Senior Management and Its Competence to Operate TMI-l’ (1983) <http://archives.
dickinson.edu/sites/all/files/files_document/Rickover_Assessment.pdf> accessed 21 March 2014. ‘[I]f
one all-important lesson attaches to the TMI accident, the accident examinations tell us, it mainly con-
cerns…nuclear power’s institutional arrangements.’ Jospeh Rees, Hostages of Each Other: The
Transformation of Nuclear Safety Since Three Mile Island (University of Chicago Press 1994) 12.
80 Rees, ibid 87.
81 ibid.
82 Eg Convention between the United States and Other Powers Providing for the Preservation and
Protection of Fur Seals (opened for signatures 7 July 1911, entered into force 14 December 1911) 104
BFSP 175; Trail Smelter Arbitration Tribunal (US v Canada) (1939) 33 AJIL 182 & (1941) 35 AJIL 684;
International Court of Justice, ‘Corfu Channel Case (UK v. Albania)’ (1949) ICJ Rep 4.
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rationalist approach to international relations and to the resulting development of
international law.83 Further, because the climate significantly impacts a variety of
state interests, climate change and climate engineering will be seen by states as mat-
ters of self-interest and even national security.84 They will consequently act strongly
in order to retain sovereignty in these areas and to maximise their net gains.
Regarding climate engineering, I assume that it holds significant potential to reduce
climate risks to humans and the environment, although it also poses risks of its own.
Thus, climate engineering research should be pursued. Indeed, this has been the con-
clusion of a number of expert bodies,85 and national governments are beginning to
earmark funds for climate engineering research.86 Finally, climate engineering should
be appropriately internationally regulated in order to manage its transboundary risks.
This is essentially the unanimous opinion of those who advocate for consideration
of, and research into, climate engineering.87
I will first describe what is unlikely, and then what is likely, to occur. Note that
one could make a wider range of observations, predictions, and recommendations
regarding the international regulation of climate engineering. I limit myself here to
those that can be inferred from the experience of nuclear power.
Climate engineering is not and will not be internationally prohibited, despite the
desires of some.88 In fact, its research is, and will continue to be, promoted, both
internationally and domestically.89 Moreover, climate engineering will not be the
subject of a binding global agreement or protocol to an existing agreement, at least
anytime in the near future, for several reasons. To the extent that climate change
threatens state interests, climate engineering may offer an opportunity to reduce
those threats. Those states with the capacity to research climate engineering or to
deploy it—which will be the relatively powerful ones—as well as those states which
are especially vulnerable to climate change will resist and not participate in proposed
83 See Andrew Guzman, How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory (OUP 2008).
84 See Daniel Moran (ed), Climate Change and National Security: A Country-level Analysis (Georgetown
University Press 2011); Michael Link and others, ‘Possible Implications of Climate Engineering for Peace
and Security’ (2013) 94 Bull Am Meteorol Soc ES13.
85 Innovation, Universities, Science and Skills Committee, Engineering: Turning Ideas into Reality (HC 2008-
09, 50-I); Shepherd and others (n 6); Pamela Matson and others, Advancing the Science of Climate Change
(National Academies Press 2010); Wilfried Rickels and others, Large-Scale Intentional Interventions into
the Climate System? Assessing the Climate Engineering Debate <http://www.kiel-earth-institute.de/scoping-
report-climate-engineering.html> accessed 14 November 2013; Jane Long and others (n 46); Nationalen
Komitee für Global Change Forschung, der DFG Senatskommission für Ozeanographie, and der DFG
Senatskommission Zukunftsaufgaben der Geowissenschaften, Forschungsfragen einer gesellschaftlichen
Herausforderung <http://www.dfg.de/download/pdf/dfg_im_profil/reden_stellungnahmen/2012/stel
lungnahme_climate_engineering_120403.pdf> accessed 14 November 2013.
86 Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council, Climate Geoengineering Sandpit <http://www.epsrc.
ac.uk/funding/calls/2009/Pages/climategeoengsandpit.aspx> accessed 14 November 2013; Deutsche
Forschungsgemeinschaft, DFG-Schwerpunktprogramm ‘Climate Engineering: Risks, Challenges,
Opportunities?’ (SPP 1689) <http://www.dfg.de/Foerderung/info_wissenschaft/archiv/2012/info_wis
senschaft_12_22/index.html> accessed 14 November 2013.
87 Eg the reports in (n 85) call for regulation.
88 Gerd Winter, ‘Climate Engineering and International Law: Last Resort or the End of Humanity?’ (2011)
20 RECIEL 277, 288.
89 Reynolds (n 12); n 86. Other countries and the EU have also publicly funded climate engineering
research.
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restrictive multilateral climate engineering agreements.90 This is similar to the case of
nuclear power, which internationally is regulated only weakly, as it provides material
benefits to states—especially the powerful ones—who prefer to retain sovereignty
over an issue so closely related to national security.91 Furthermore, too much about
climate engineering and its research remains uncertain: what it precisely may be,
what forms it may take, what benefits and risks it may entail, how these effects and
risks would be distributed, how reversible it would be, what states wish to get out of
it, and what they wish to avoid. Any detailed or restrictive language would thus have
unforeseeable consequences.92 Uncertainty may be gradually reduced, of course.
Recall that decades passed between the development of nuclear power and the pas-
sage and ratification of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, and climate engineering is
at this moment arguably more uncertain than nuclear power was in the 1950s. The
topic also remains too controversial. This is partially due to the lingering uncertainty,
but also because it runs contrary both to the current ‘dominant paradigm’ in interna-
tional climate debates of emissions reduction and adaptation, and to the underlying
logic of many actors who advocate for action to reduce climate risks.93 As a result,
few of them have anything to gain—and much to lose—by proposing a new interna-
tional law regime for climate engineering. Finally, after the flurry of multilateral en-
vironmental agreements of the 1990s, the international community has a generally
low appetite for new treaties.
Instead, as with nuclear power, climate engineering research is likely to be interna-
tionally promoted and regulated gradually with a low degree of legalisation—at least
initially—through a plurality of means and institutions.94 As a first step, norms
regarding, for example, transparency and the role of intellectual property must be de-
veloped.95 This process will require significant time and a wide range of relevant actors,
including experts such as climate engineering researchers.96 While some of this dis-
course may occur within existing international legal forums such as the UNFCCC-COP
90 Of course, this could change if research indicates that climate engineering would increase risks more than
decrease them and/or that many countries (or a few powerful ones) would be put at serious risk.
91 Text to (n 55–74).
92 Consider the often negative reaction against the statements from the Conference of Parties to the
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD-COP), eg Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission Ad
Hoc Consultative Group on Ocean Fertilization, ‘Statement of the IOC Ad Hoc Consultative Group on
Ocean Fertilization’ in Report on the IMO London Convention Scientific Group Meeting on Ocean
Fertilization (IOC/INF-1247) (UNESCO 2008).
93 The climate debates have been used as a vehicle for two other agendas, besides reducing risks to humans
and the environment. The ‘greener’ environmental groups seek to reduce the overall footprint of human-
ity on the natural world. Others see action against climate risks as a means to international retributive
justice. Climate engineering would not further either of these two agendas. See Gareth Davies, ‘The
Psychological Costs of Geoengineering: Why It May Be Hard to Accept Even If it Works’ in Wil Burns
and Andrew Strauss (eds), Climate Change Geoengineering: Philosophical Perspectives, Legal Issues, and
Governance Frameworks (CUP 2012) 71–77.
94 Consider the roles of and interactions among various institutions in the case of nuclear power and its
safety. Text to (n 75–78).
95 This is already occurring. Text to (n 106–108).
96 This is not to imply that the roles of experts and expertise in law are simple. Indeed, there is a large litera-
ture on their sometimes problematic relationship. For differing perspectives, see Sheila Jasanoff, Science at
the Bar: Law, Science, and Technology in America (Harvard University Press 1997); Roger Pielke, Jr, The
Honest Broker: Making Sense of Science in Policy and Politics (CUP 2007).
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and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, other sites with less prior com-
mitment to the ‘dominant paradigm’ of emissions reduction and adaption, and greater
opportunity for candour will also be necessary. After some time, these norms will lay
the foundation for soft policy among non-legal institutions, such as national and inter-
national scientific societies. Once significant climate engineering field testing begins, it
may then be in States’ interest to coordinate their climate engineering activities, for-
mally and informally, to establish and clarify standards, minimise interference among
projects, distribute costs, build capacity, combat free-riding in research efforts and pre-
vent misuse. This would be not unlike the IAEA’s three pillars: safety and security, fos-
tering technology and preventing proliferation.97 A key question at this juncture—if not
sooner—will be whether to place a moratorium on large-scale field research and de-
ployment, and if so, by whom and how.
Once norms and soft policies are in place, and once field activities have reached a
scale that they may pose transboundary risks, there will then be a larger role for the
development of international law, broadly defined. Considering the low level of legal-
isation of existing international law governing nuclear power, resulting documents
concerning climate engineering will likely be—even then—non-binding guidelines
and relatively soft multilateral agreements.98 These will be dominated by procedural
duties such as prior assessment, notification, monitoring, information sharing, public
access to information, consultation and coordination of responses to negative events.
Meanwhile, states could at that time develop, monitor and enforce more detailed do-
mestic regulations. Liability for damages will be controversial. Generally speaking, a
liability regime similar to that for nuclear accidents may be beneficial, at least in
theory.99 This could involve strict, limited liability with channelling to the state in-
stead of the ‘operator’ (due to researchers’ relatively smaller budgets) and with pool-
ing of liability among those states active in research (due to the very large potential
damages and to the public good character of climate engineering research).
However, proving causation in a climate liability claim would be very challenging.
When and if some states gain the capability for the deployment of large-scale cli-
mate engineering methods, they will wish to limit such ability to themselves. Although
this might give a first impression of brute power aggrandisement, it may be beneficial
to have a smaller number of countries that can intervene in the global climate.100
This would minimise conflicts among States and interference among climate engineer-
ing projects, assuming that decisions to affect the global climate are taken in a
97 The functions of the Agency were originally provided in Statute of the IAEA (n 38) art III.A but then
expanded, particularly through the Non-Proliferation Treaty (n 38) and the Convention on Nuclear
Safety (n 57).
98 Some may argue that the 2010 decision on climate engineering by the CBD-COP runs counter to my
analysis. However, it uses strongly qualified language and is non-binding. Report of the Tenth Meeting
of the Conference of Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity’ UN Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/
27 (2010) X/33/8(w). See also Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Geoengineering in
Relation to the Convention on Biological Diversity: Technical and Regulatory Matters (CBD Technical
Series No 66, Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity 2012), 6, which calls the decision
‘a non-binding normative framework’.
99 Text to (n 70–73).
100 Consider the analogy with nuclear weapons. A world in which only a few countries have nuclear weapons is
more stable and less likely to experience nuclear warfare than one in which most countries have them.
The International Regulation of Climate Engineering  287
transparent and inclusive manner. Thus, a non-proliferation agreement—binding or
possibly less formal—could be roughly analogous to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty.101 Under this, those parties with climate engineering capabilities would pledge
to share knowledge with non-capable parties and to include them in research activities,
while not sharing knowledge and research activities with non-participating states. In
turn, all parties would agree to limit climate engineering capabilities to a small number
of States and to abide by certain research standards.
In this regulation of large-scale climate engineering field experiments and deploy-
ment, one or more institutions similar to the IAEA and the others involved in over-
seeing nuclear power could play several important facilitative roles.102 Such
institutions could further research norms and guidelines by, for example, translating
them into detailed best practices and assisting with their implementation among
researches and through national legislation. They could also help coordinate climate
engineering activities, minimising the conflicts among field tests. This could include
fairly distributing costs and fostering research capacity, particularly in developing
countries. Moreover, an international institution could provide a site where a mora-
torium on large-scale field experiments and deployment could be developed and
modified as appropriate. Finally, institutions could promulgate and help implement
multilateral agreements regarding the above-listed procedural duties, liability and
non-proliferation. For example, they could provide forums for information sharing
and access, adjudicate liability claims and verify non-proliferation.
Although the rules regarding when climate engineering deployment would be per-
mitted is already a matter of much interest, it may be wise to delay formal discussions
on this. Such debates could unnecessarily increase international tensions and cloud
understandings of climate engineering, while details are still emerging regarding cli-
mate change risks, states’ ability to reduce these risks through emissions reductions
and adaptation, the nature and potential of climate engineering, and what society de-
sires out of climate engineering. Although one could imagine climate engineering
becoming a source of polarised debate and tension among countries, this is not as
probable as some authors suggest.103 In fact, current models indicate that countries
may more strongly agree on whether and to what degree climate engineering should
be deployed than how much they may disagree over the details.104 Furthermore, if a
final lesson from nuclear weapons may be drawn, international norms may develop
which can prevent misuse in cases where explicit multilateral agreements are impos-
sible to reach—even in the realpolitik world of national security.105
101 Non-Proliferation Treaty (n 38).
102 Banerjee (n 26) also suggests looking at the IAEA as an example.
103 Eg David Victor, ‘On the Regulation of Geoengineering’ (2008) 24 O Rev Env Pol’y 322.
104 See Ricke, Moreno-Cruz and Caldeira (n 10).
105 Nuclear weapons have never been used outside of the arguably exceptional case of World War II. There
is a strong international norm against the first-strike use of nuclear weapons, especially against a non-nu-
clear state. This has been maintained for decades despite the fact that in several instances it would have
been advantageous for states to use them. However, it is improbable that the nuclear weapon states
would commit to such a norm in a binding treaty or UN Security Council resolution. See Thomas
Schelling, ‘An Astonishing Sixty Years: The Legacy of Hiroshima’, Nobel Prize Lecture, 8 December
2005, available at <http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2005/schel
ling-lecture.html> accessed 11 October 2013.
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6 . CONCLUSION
The initial steps on the trajectory described in the last section are already occurring.
In recent years, at least three different ad hoc expert bodies have produced norms to
guide climate engineering research, with significant agreement among their prod-
ucts.106 International institutions are cautiously dipping their toes into the potentially
treacherous waters of examining climate engineering.107 Leading researchers are now
discussing prohibitions on climate engineering patents and a moratorium on large-
scale field research and deployment.108 This is not to say that concerned participants
in the climate engineering regulation discourse should become complacent. Quite
the contrary, all voices, ranging from active practitioners to strident opponents, must
be fully engaged in order to better shape one of the most challenging international
regulatory developments of this era. This engagement will be more productive if the
participants are aware of the range of likely rational behaviour of sovereign states
with diverse interests, capabilities and levels of power, as evidenced by the instructive
case of nuclear power.
106 MacCracken and others (n 46); Jane Long and others (n 46); Rayner and others (n 46). See also Solar
Radiation Management Governance Initiative, ‘Solar radiation management: the governance of research’
<http://www.srmgi.org/report/> accessed 19 April 2013.
107 Eg Stocker and others (n 2).
108 Anne Mulkern, ‘Researcher: Ban Patents on Geoengineering Technology’ (ClimateWire, 2012) available
at <http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id¼researcher-ban-patents-on-geoengineering-tech
nology> accessed 10 May 2012; Parson and Keith (n 21).
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Abstract 
As forecasts for climate change and its impacts have become more 
dire, climate engineering proposals have come under increasing 
consideration and are presently moving toward field trials. This article 
examines the relevant international environmental law, distinguishing 
between climate engineering research and deployment. It also emphasizes 
the climate change context of these proposals and the enabling function of 
law. Extant international environmental law generally favors such field 
tests, in large part because, even though field trials may present uncertain 
risks to humans and the environment, climate engineering may reduce the 
greater risks of climate change. Notably, this favorable legal setting is 
present in those multilateral environmental agreements whose subject 
matter is closest to climate engineering. This favorable legal setting is also, 
in part, due to several relevant multilateral environmental agreements that 
encourage scientific research and technological development, along with 
the fact that climate engineering research is consistent with principles of 
international environmental law. Existing international law, however, 
imposes some procedural duties on States who are responsible for climate 
engineering field research as well as a handful of particular prohibitions 
and constraints
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A Critical Examination of the Climate 
Engineering Moral Hazard and Risk 
Compensation Concern 
ABSTRACT 
The widespread concern that research into and potential implementation of climate engineering 
would reduce mitigation and adaptation is critically examined. First, empirical evidence of such 
moral hazard or risk compensation in general is inconclusive, and the evidence to date in the case 
of climate engineering indicates that the reverse may occur. Second, basic economics of 
substitutes shows that reducing mitigation in response to climate engineering implementation 
could provide net benefits to humans and the environment, and that climate engineering might 
theoretically increase mitigation through strong income effects. Third, existing policies strive to 
promote other technologies and measures, including climate adaptation, which induce analogous 
risk compensating behaviours. If the goal is to minimize climate risks, this concern should not be 
grounds for restricting or prohibiting climate engineering research. Three potential means for this 
concern to manifest in genuinely deleterious ways, as well as policy options to reduce these 
effects, are identified. 
Keywords: climate change, global warming, mitigation, climate engineering, geoengineering, 
moral hazard, risk compensation, climate economics 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Anthropogenic climate change poses major threats to humans and the environment. The 
dominant approach thus far to reducing climate risks has been efforts toward reducing annual 
greenhouse gas emissions (‘mitigation’). However, given the slow rate of the natural removal of 
additional carbon dioxide (CO2), this can be only a long term strategy. There is also a chance that 
this mitigation will be suboptimal. In the meantime, emissions continue to accumulate in the 
atmosphere and the climatic effects of today’s emissions will not be felt for decades. As a 
consequence, we are already committed to an uncertain amount of climate change (Allen et al., 
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2009) which may already surpass the internationally agreed-upon 2°C threshold for ‘dangerous 
climate change’ (Peters et al., 2013). Therefore, even though mitigation remains vital, society 
faces an unpleasant future of managing climate change. Adaptation of society and ecosystems to 
a changed climate has become the second set of responses to climate risks. Significant steps 
toward adaption may now be evident, as countries are pledging billions of dollars for it. The cash 
is not yet in hand, though, and like mitigation, adaptation also easily gets mired in the morass of 
international politics and divergent perceptions of justice.  
In the context of the seriousness of climate risks and the limits of likely mitigation and 
adaptation, some observers are increasingly considering intentional, large scale interventions in 
natural systems in order to reduce climate change risks. These ‘climate engineering’ or 
‘geoengineering’ proposals are diverse, and fall into two general categories. ‘Carbon dioxide 
removal’ (CDR) or ‘negative emission technologies’ would capture the leading greenhouse gas 
from the atmosphere and sequester it. Proposals include CO2 capture from ambient air and ocean 
fertilization. ‘Solar radiation management’ (SRM) would slightly increase the reflective albedo of 
the earth in order to compensate for the warming effect of climate change. These techniques 
could include stratospheric aerosol injection and marine cloud brightening. 
Climate engineering proposals have been controversial for a variety of reasons. Perhaps 
the most widespread concern is that it would undermine mitigation efforts. Indeed, nearly any 
discussion of climate engineering outside of a few scientific journals devotes significant attention 
to this. Taken to an extreme, this concern—typically called ‘moral hazard’ but more accurately 
‘risk compensation’—justifies a taboo, which was essentially the case (Lawrence, 2006) prior to 
an essay by a Nobel laureate atmospheric scientist (Crutzen, 2006), whose bona fides were 
beyond doubt and whose career and legacy were secure. Yet this concern has gone mostly 
unscrutinized (for an exceptional examination, see Hale (2012)). Although attention to climate 
engineering has increased in recent years, relative to mitigation and adaptation it remains on a 
distant tier of consideration. 
This article challenges the concern that the consideration, research, development, potential 
for implementation and actual implementation of climate engineering would lessen mitigation 





 This will be called the climate engineering moral hazard-risk compensation (CE 
MH-RC) concern and, if it manifests, the CE MH-RC effect. Note that, although the CE MH-RC 
concern could apply to all forms of climate engineering, it is much more pronounced in those 
forms—particularly within SRM—which may be effective, rapid and inexpensive. The intention 
in this paper is to be somewhat provocative in order to encourage critical examination of 
widespread assumptions and assertions. It uses three approaches—empirical evidence, basic 
microeconomic of substitutes and existing and potential policies—to demonstrate that this 
concern may be overstated and hindering the development of effective climate policy. 
Specifically, from these approaches, I assert that  
(a) there may be either no CE MH-RC effect or a reverse one;  
(b) even if (a) is not the case and there is indeed such an effect, some substitution of climate 
engineering implementation for mitigation could provide net reduction of climate risks; 
and  
(c) regardless of the veracity of (a) and (b), if policymakers wished to reduce any potential 
CE MH-RC effect, there would be little which they could effectively, realistically and 
ethically do. 
In the process, I highlight three potential mechanisms of a genuinely deleterious CE MH-RC 
effect, although these mechanisms are often present in the formation of a wide range of public 
policies and their problematic consequences for climate change are much broader than potentially 
lessening mitigation. Importantly, examination of the CE MH-RC concern raises the question of 
what precisely are the goal and the means of climate policy. Assuming that the goal is the 
reduction of climate risks and subsequent damage, and that the means to this include but are not 
limited to mitigation and adaptation, the CE MH-RC concern should not be grounds for 
restricting or prohibiting climate engineering research, and responsible climate engineering 
research should be encouraged. However, there are some policy options to address and reduce the 
potential deleterious CE MH-RC effects. 
                                                 
1
 This is intended to be a broad definition with an emphasis on efficiency concerns (per Hale (2012)). Below I try to 
incorporate what Hale calls responsibility and vice considerations. 
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2. MORAL HAZARD, RISK COMPENSATION AND THEIR 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE  
The first approach is to examine existing empirical data in order to see whether it implies 
a probable CE MH-RC effect. Moral hazard and risk compensation, which are the two existing 
categories of analogous human behaviour, will be examined in general. The former is the term 
that has most often been used to describe the CE MH-RC concern, although the latter is a closer 
fit. In each case, existing empirical evidence will be briefly reviewed. This is drawn from the 
disciplines which developed the terms: for moral hazard, behavioural economics of insurance; for 
risk compensation, behavioural psychology of risk and safety. Then the existing but limited 
empirical evidence for the potential CE MH-RC effect will be summarized. Note that this section 
describes responses of individuals whereas climate engineering is a matter of collective decision-
making. Consequently, its actual consideration, research and development could yield distinct 
results.  
Moral hazard 
Moral hazard is a socially inefficient increase in risk-taking by one party once another 
party absorbs some of the potential negative consequences of the first party’s actions, typically 
through an insurance-like agreement between the parties and typically without the latter party’s 
full knowledge of this increase. The term originated in insurance economics to indicate an 
increase in risky behaviour by the newly-insured. Its negative connotation is a vestige of its 
original meaning, which was limited to intentional actions by ‘unscrupulous’ insurees (Black, 
1910: 563). With the rise of more theoretically rigorous economic studies in the mid-twentieth 
century, the concept was broadened to include any increase in risk-taking by insurees (Pauly, 
1968). This was then seen as a rational but possibly subconscious response to altered incentives. 
Now, moral hazard has been further generalized to the principal-agent problem in which the 
agent who creates risk has greater information regarding her actions than the principal who bears 
the risk (Stiglitz, 1983).  
Although moral hazard seems logical and has been supported by modelling, there is not 
agreement as to its actual magnitude due to several challenges in empirical work (for a review, 
see Cohen and Siegelman (2010)). Most importantly, the problem is one of information 
asymmetry, which makes research inherently difficult: if the principal cannot obtain certain 
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information regarding the agent’s behaviour, then often researchers cannot as well. Another 
challenge is how to distinguish among three different behaviours by insurees which each lead 
those with greater insurance to file more claims, which is typically the actual observable event. 
The first of these behaviours is the increase in risk-taking after obtaining or increasing insurance. 
This is more accurately called ex ante moral hazard and is the one most relevant to the CE MH-
RC concern. Second, ex post moral hazard is when an insuree, after increasing his coverage, files 
more or greater insurance claims while his risk-taking remains constant. Third, adverse selection 
is when those who know beforehand that they present more risk will choose to obtain more 
insurance. A further challenge to obtaining empirical evidence of ex ante moral hazard is that 
insurers undertake steps to reduce it, such as monitoring insurees and sharing risk with them 
through deductibles, co-payments and coverage limits. Finally, there are other behaviours, some 
of which may remain unknown, which further confound evidence of ex ante moral hazard. For 
example, obtaining medical insurance may expose insurees to information regarding the benefits 
of eating healthy, resulting in them reducing their risky behaviour.  
Therefore, while numerous studies find that individuals with more insurance file more and 
larger claims, the majority of these studies do not (and generally cannot) distinguish ex ante 
moral hazard from adverse selection and especially from ex post moral hazard.
2
 One review of 
several forms of insurance concluded that ‘This literature identifies a moral hazard effect in some 
contexts but not in others’ (Cohen and Siegelman, 2010: 72). In the best-examined field, that of 
medical insurance, ‘there are theoretical reasons to believe that health insurance coverage may 
cause a reduction in prevention activities, but empirical studies have yet to provide sufficient 
evidence to support this prediction’ (Dave and Kaestner, 2009: 369). Research into automobile 
insurance is just now beginning to try to tease apart ex ante moral hazard; initial data indeed 
supports at least its existence (Abbring et al., 2008). As a final example, the case of workers’ 
compensation is muddled, in part because three parties are involved: the insurer, the employer 
and the employee. A recent study found some support of ex ante moral hazard among workers, 
but this seemed to be more than compensated by greater safety measures taken by the employer 
                                                 
2
 For reviews of insurances such as annuities, automobile, crop, health, housing, life, and long-term care, see 
Chiappori and Salanié (2013) and Cohen and Siegelman (2010). See also the examples of automobile 
repairs (Hubbard, 1998), deposit insurance (Gropp and Vesala, 2004), international lending (Dreher and 




in order to reduce her costs (Guo and Burton, 2010). Outside of insurance, other manifestations 
of ex ante moral hazard—such as mutual defence treaties (Benson, 2012), foreign aid (Bräutigam 
and Knack, 2004), humanitarian intervention (Kuperman, 2008) and financial investments 
(Stiglitz, 1983)—can be theorized and perhaps modelled but are even more difficult to confirm 
empirically. 
Risk compensation 
Risk compensation is an increase or decrease in risk-taking once an individual perceives 
that risk to be lower or higher, respectively. It relies on a model of human behaviour in which 
people balance the advantages and disadvantages of risk-taking. If some exogenous change such 
as a new regulation or technology alters the perceived risk of an activity, then individuals will 
compensate. It differs from ex ante moral hazard in that the increase in risky behaviour is not due 
to its negative consequences being transferred onto another party, and there is consequently no 
information asymmetry. However, like ex ante moral hazard, it can be considered to be a rational, 
although perhaps subconscious, response to changed incentives.  
Empirical evidence of risk compensation is mixed, with studies producing a wide range of 
rates of offsetting behaviours. The best studied field is automobile safety devices and rules, such 
as seat belts, road lighting and vehicle safety inspection. Early work found that although seat belt 
laws reduced driver and occupant fatalities, they led to more dangerous driving as evidenced by 
increases in accidents with pedestrians and bicyclists (Peltzman, 1975). More recent research has 
shown much smaller effects, with one study concluding that ‘If anything, these laws and the 
accompanying increase in belt use result in safer driving behaviour…. Overall, seatbelt laws and 
the higher belt use these laws induce do not increase nonoccupant risk exposure’ (Houston and 
Richardson, 2007: 933). Similarly divergent results have been observed in the cases of children 
and sports protective equipment (McIntosh, 2005; Pless et al., 2006), bicycle and snowboard 
helmets (Fyhri et al., 2012; Scott et al., 2007), vaccines and condoms to prevent AIDS/HIV and 
other sexually transmitted diseases (Brewer et al., 2007; Eaton and Kalichman, 2007) and 
hypertension drugs (Steptoe and McMunn, 2009). Another notable area of debate is harm 
reduction efforts in use of alcohol, tobacco and illicit drugs (Ritter and Cameron, 2006). 
Importantly, the risk compensation literature does not indicate a net increase in harm due to the 
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offsetting behaviour, but instead only a smaller net reduction of harm than would be expected 
from the initial change alone.  
In another similarity with moral hazard, these data are uncertain because reliable 
empirical studies of risk compensation are difficult. In an experimental setting, manipulating 
research subjects’ risk perceptions is challenging, and may raise ethical constraints (Underhill, 
2013). Outside of the laboratory or clinic, the offsetting behaviour can be difficult to measure 
and/or may be confounded by other variables. For example, bicycle helmet laws may lead to a 
selection effect wherein those who bike more slowly yet helmetless are deterred from biking, 
leaving behind those who bike for speed while helmeted (Fyhri et al., 2012). There could also be 
counteracting information effects, in which the perception of safety equipment serves as a 
reminder of a risk’s seriousness, leading to more cautious behaviour.  
Debates over certain policies which may have risk compensation effects are sometimes 
muddled by commentators’ normative commitments. This is particularly the case with behaviours 
which are condemned by some as immoral, such as non-marital sex and illicit drugs. Some 
observers assert that even though policies such as human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccinations, 
prostitution decriminalization and clean intravenous needle exchanges may reduce harm, such 
steps would ‘send a wrong message’ and lead to an increase in the condemned behaviour. These 
situations are typically disagreements as to the policy goal. To some, the goal is to reduce certain 
tangible harms, while to others it is to reduce the occurrence of the morally condemned 
behaviour. This disagreement will be revisited below. 
Empirical evidence for climate engineering moral hazard and risk compensation 
The case of a potential CE MH-RC effect is even more uncertain than the investigated 
examples of moral hazard and risk compensation, because climate engineering is not actually 
being used yet and because the ‘actor’ in question is global society, behaving collectively with 
intergenerational impacts. Although the term ‘moral hazard’ is used more often for climate 
engineering, risk compensation fits better although still imperfect (Keith, 2013; Lin, 2013). In 
order for climate engineering and its research to present moral hazard, then risks would need to 





 If climate engineering research and development were to reduce 
mitigation, then this may transfer some risks to future generations, but future generations would 
also be the ones to benefit by having greater knowledge about climate engineering and perhaps 
the additional option to deploy it. It remains unclear whether these together would result in a net 
increase in their climate risks. Furthermore, future generations have not (and cannot) consent, and 
the crux of the CE MH-RC concern is not that the present generation has greater information 
about its behaviour than future ones do. In contrast, with risk compensation, risks to the actor are 
exogenously reduced, often through a technological intervention, which in turn impacts risk 
perception and behaviour. Models thus far do indicate that climate engineering could provide a 
reduction of risks from climate change
4
, although some risks would be transformed in type (for 
example, from changes primarily in temperature to changes primarily in precipitation) and to 
different populations.  
There are only a handful of opinion studies of climate engineering, and just five of these 
have implications for the CE MH-RC concern.
5
 Although each has limitations, all point toward a 
non-existent or even reverse CE MH-RC effect. First, the Royal Society of London convened 
focus groups, which indicated that  
rather than presenting a ‘moral hazard’ issue, the prospect of geoengineering could 
galvanise people to act, and demand action, on greenhouse gas emission reductions. 
Although participants were generally cautious, or even hostile, towards geoengineering 
proposals, several agreed that they would actually be more motivated to undertake 
                                                 
3
 Actual climate engineering implementation may transfer risks onto others by, for example, changing precipitation 
patterns, and those who would choose to research and implement it may, in fact, have greater information 
than those who would bear the increased risk. However, as noted, the transfer of risk would neither be made 
socially inefficient by this information asymmetry, be part a consensual insurance-like agreement, nor 
necessarily be socially inefficient. At the same time, if anything, climate change itself presents a similar 
dynamic in that those whose actions create the risk—that is, mostly wealthy countries in the past and 
present—transfer those risks onto others—mostly poor countries in the future—and thus suboptimally 
mitigate (Samson et al., 2011). Andrew Parker (2014, personal communication) speculates that this dynamic 
could fuel a form of climate engineering moral hazard in which wealthy countries which presently feel 
insulated from climate change risks will insufficiently research climate engineering, in the process leaving 
vulnerable countries exposed to greater climate change risks. 
4
 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change recently reported that ‘Models consistently suggest that SRM 
would generally reduce climate differences compared to a world with elevated greenhouse gas 
concentrations and no SRM’ (Boucher et al., 2013: 575). See also Kravitz et al. (2014b). 
5
 In some studies, respondents expressed a CE MH-RC concern, but this implies nothing as to whether these 
concerns are warranted. 
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mitigation actions themselves (such as reducing energy consumption) if they saw 
government and industry investing in geoengineering research or deployment 
(Shepherd et al., 2009: 43).  
Second, a public dialogue organized by the UK’s Natural Environment Research Council found 
evidence ‘contrary to the “moral hazard” argument that geoengineering would undermine popular 
support for mitigation or adaptation’ (IPSOS Mori, 2010: 2). Third, an opinion survey of 
residents of Canada, the UK and the US produced a moderate degree of opposition (a mean of 
2.07 on a scale of 1 to 4, where 2 is ‘somewhat disagree’) to the statement ‘Solar Radiation 
Management should be used so we can continue to use oil, coal and natural gas’ (Mercer et al., 
2011: 5). Fourth, in an experimental survey, some respondents were exposed to information 
about climate engineering, while others were not. ‘Contrary to the “moral hazard” effect… 
subjects in the geoengineering condition did not become sanguine about climate change risks. 
Indeed, on the whole, they displayed more concern over climate change than ones in the control 
condition’ (Kahan et al., 2014: 15). Finally, a public discussion group in the UK found that ‘No-
one saw the benefit of geoengineering without mitigation’ (Integrated Assessment of 
Geoengineering Proposals, 2014: 3). 
3. BASIC ECONOMICS OF SUBSTITUTES 
The second approach to examine the CE MH-RC concern is through the basic economics 
of substitutes. Suppose that global society is simultaneously a consumer and a producer of 
various responses to climate change risks. These will have costs which increase for each 
additional unit ‘purchased’ (or better stated, ‘invested in’) because society would try to begin 
with the least expensive actions before moving to the more expensive ones. This gives an 
upward-sloping marginal cost curve. In comparison, the shape of the marginal benefit (or utility) 
curve is less certain: it is often assumed to be upward-sloping, but it may be horizontal on 
average, in that the damage averted by reducing warming from 5°C to 4°C may be equivalent to 
that averted from 1°C to 0°C. Future costs and benefits are included and discounted, in that they 
are reduced by a compounding rate in order to reflect opportunity costs and the preference to 
have benefits sooner and to incur costs later.
6
 This yields single marginal cost and marginal 
                                                 
6
 Although discounting is widely accepted, intergenerational discounting is somewhat controversial, even though its 
assumed value is perhaps the most important variable in climate economics. See Nordhaus (2007). 
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benefit curves using present values, even though the costs and benefits which will actually occur 
at various times. Furthermore, in each case, the curves can incorporate other positive or negative 
effects. For example, mitigation will also reduce other forms of environmental damage, and 
adaptation will also make society more resilient to natural disasters. A world with elevated 
atmospheric CO2 and SRM climate engineering may have higher crop yields (Xia et al., 2014), 
but precipitation patterns would change (Kravitz et al., 2014b), possibly in harmful ways. These 
benefits and costs could even include social and political effects, such as the potential 
militarization of SRM climate engineering and its need to be sustained for a long time, as well as 
aggregate normative preferences, such as the beliefs that we should minimize human interference 
in the natural world and that it is better to address a problem closer to its cause.
7
 It is important to 
note that these curves remain uncertain; they could have greater or lesser slopes and could be 
highly nonlinear. For now, let us maintain four simplifying assumptions: (1) that mitigation is the 
only possible response to climate risks; (2) that decisions are made by a single, omnipotent 
benevolent decision-maker; (3) that the decision-maker is omniscient; (4) that preferences of 
various groups of people coincide; and (5) that decision makers are rational. With this single 
response option, society invests in mitigation until an optimum, efficient quantity, where the 
additional cost of one more unit equals the additional benefit of that unit.  
Now the first four assumptions can be removed stepwise, the first of which is to now 
consider multiple responses to climate risks. After the introduction of a second response, the 
imperfect substitute of climate engineering implementation, the marginal benefit of mitigation 
will decrease because some desire to reduce climate risks will have been met through climate 
engineering. As a result, the quantity of mitigation will also decrease. However, the net benefit 
(which includes and is most likely dominated by the reduction of climate risks) will increase. 
After all, if the net benefit didn’t increase—which could be the case if all the incorporated 
secondary costs caused the optimal amount of climate engineering to be zero or less—then there 
would have been no investment in climate engineering implementation, given the current 
assumptions. Because the benefit curves for both mitigation and climate engineering incorporate 
all effects and normative preferences, one cannot simply state that mitigation is the preferred 
                                                 
7
 This paper adopts a consequentialist approach, and does not directly address deontological ethics. However, here I 
attempt to incorporate individually held normative preferences. This implies that those who hold these 
preferences would be willing to pay for them in terms of greater damage to humans and the environment.  
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option. Under this, any reduction in the quantity of mitigation after the introduction of climate 
engineering implementation is both rational and net beneficial to humans and the environment.
8
  
In reality, there are at least four top-level response categories: mitigation, climate 
engineering, adaptation and suffering climate change damages. The last of these is not purchased 
but instead manifests as a reduction in economic activity. Climate engineering implementation 
would decrease investments in mitigation and adaptation through substitution, and would 
decrease climate damages through its primary intended effect. At the same time, because climate 
engineering implementation is expected to have very low financial costs
9
 while those of 
mitigation, adaptation, and climate change damages will be great, this will liberate some of 
society’s financial resources, some of which could be used for mitigation.
10
 Thus, there would be 
counteracting effects of climate engineering implementation on the amount of mitigation: a 
substitution effect, described in the previous paragraph, which would decrease it, and several 
income effects, described here, which would increase it. It is theoretically possible that climate 
engineering implementation could increase mitigation through dominant income effects.
11
 These 
income effects would be stronger as the costs of mitigation, adaptation, and climate change 
damages approach a greater portion of total economic activity. However, these are each currently 
estimated to be only a percent or two of economic activity. On the other hand, they might turn out 
                                                 
8
 Climate engineering as a partial or imperfect substitute for mitigation has also been discussed by Barrett (2008); 
Bickel and Lane (2010); Emmerling and Tavoni (2013); Goeschl, Heyen and Moreno-Cruz (2013); Moreno-
Cruz and Smulders (2010); Moreno-Cruz (2011) and Rickels and Lontzek (2012). 
9
 Estimates for the direct financial costs of implementation for the most effective yet inexpensive proposed climate 
engineering method, stratospheric aerosol injection, are on the order of a few to tens of billions US dollars 
annually (McClellan et al, 2012). In terms of climate economics, this is ‘essentially costless’ (Nordhaus, 
2013: 153). The costs of mitigation, adaptation, and climate change damages are each orders of magnitude 
greater.  
10
 An income effect is more prominent if the good in question is necessary and as it accounts for a greater portion of 
the consumer’s budget. It has been empirically observed to dominate the substitute effect in the case of, for 
example, dietary staples among poor consumers (Jensen and Miller, 2008).  
11
 As a notable aside, other studies have modelled how climate engineering could lead to an increase in mitigation. 
Millard-Ball (2012), Moreno-Cruz (2011) and Urpelainen (2012) each considered a case in which countries 
are asymmetrical. Countries which could be harmed by the negative secondary effects of climate 
engineering would increase mitigation or be more likely to participate in mitigation agreements in order to 
reduce or prevent implementation of climate engineering other countries. Goeschl et al. (2013) found that a 
present generation which researches and develops climate engineering could simultaneously increase its 
mitigation level if it believed that future generations would have a strong bias in favour of climate 
engineering implementation. Such expected bias could be due, in the future, to (1) decision makers 
deploying SRM climate engineering as a ‘quick fix’ in the face of a ‘climate emergency’, (2) the presence of 




to be higher, and one can imagine a scenario in which voters endorse setting aside only a certain 
percentage of society’s income for climate purposes, which would increase the relative 
importance of the income effect. Nevertheless, the possibility of these multiple income effects 
actually dominating the substitution effect seems unlikely. 
Lifting the second assumption transfers decision-making from a single decision-maker to 
numerous states which pursue their self-interests and can negotiate with each other in various 
forums. Let us examine in some depth the resulting effects on each of the three primary responses 
to climate change risks. First, mitigation presents a global, transgenerational collective action 
problem. In a hypothetical world of homogenous states, the benefits of each country’s costly 
mitigation are diluted across the globe, causing them to each mitigate suboptimally. This is the 
classic underproduction of a public good. In the real world, those countries that are better 
positioned to mitigate (i.e. the industrialized countries) happen to be generally less vulnerable to 
climate change, exacerbating this underproduction. Moreover, the costs are borne now and the 
benefits reaped later, whereas political decision makers lack necessary incentives for this 
transgenerational investment. Barring unprecedented levels of international trust, self-sacrifice 
and enforcement in international cooperation, mitigation will be very suboptimal. Second, 
although adaptation is, for the most part, not a collective action problem, it too will likely be 
under-provided because the more vulnerable developing countries have less capacity to adapt. 
Optimal adaptation will require enormous and politically unpopular international wealth transfers 
from the industrialized ones to the developing ones. Thus, independent of climate engineering, 
adaptation and especially mitigation will be significantly suboptimal in a world of many 
countries. 
The effect of multiple decision makers on climate engineering implementation will 
depend on its form. CDR is much like mitigation, and will follow a similar pattern with the 
magnitude of its underproduction dependent on the various techniques’ costs, risks, and 
capacities. The case of SRM varies by the method’s specific scale of impact. At one extreme, it 
could hypothetically be implemented locally.
12
 Each country would provide for its own SRM at 
                                                 
12
 Localized SRM is offered here primarily as a theoretical exercise. Current assessments of proposed SRM methods 
show them to be either inexpensive and global (e.g., stratospheric aerosol injection) or expensive and 
potentially localized (e.g. surface albedo modification). Some researchers are presently discussing limited 
seasonal and latitudinal variation (MacMartin et al., 2013; MacCracken, 2009; Modak and Bala, 2014). In 
this paragraph, assume that an inexpensive, effective, local SRM method becomes available in the future. 
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its locally optimal level, with some positive and negative side effects for other countries. 
Negotiations between countries for payments could lead to compensation for victims of negative 
side effects, to reimbursement for positive effects, or to some other agreement to adjust the 
magnitude of local SRM climate engineering. In this situation, SRM would be provided at a level 
close to its optimum, but probably somewhat higher due to uncompensated negative externalities. 
At the other extreme, SRM could be completely global, with no capacity for local optimization. 
In an ideally cooperative world, countries would agree upon a level of SRM which maximizes 
total net benefits with side payments to compensate any losers, or—barring that—upon a level 
which would maximize total net benefits without leading to net harm for any country (see 
Moreno-Cruz et al., 2012; Kravitz et al., 2014b). In reality, any negotiations would occur among 
states with diverse levels of power, interests and capabilities. Considering its low expected 
financial cost, and assuming that countries may increase but not decrease the intensity of SRM, 
the amount of global SRM might be determined by the country that preferred the highest SRM 
intensity while possessing sufficient international power and influence to withstand any 
retaliation or reputational damage from those which preferred a lower intensity.
13
 Assuming no 
correlation between countries’ power and SRM preference, SRM climate engineering in this 
scenario would then be over-implemented, the magnitude of which would depend upon the 
degree of alignment among countries’ SRM preferences. One study modelled the preferred 
intensity of global SRM for 22 different regions (Ricke et al., 2013). The highest preferred SRM 
intensity among the regions was approximately 20% greater than that of the lowest. This general 
alignment among regions implies that, in the world of selfish ‘great powers’ described above, 
global SRM climate engineering implementation is likely to be overproduced, but not by a very 
large amount. In reality, SRM intensity will likely be less extreme through technical measures, 
such as optimization by latitude (MacMartin et al., 2013; MacCracken, 2009; Modak and Bala, 
2014) and through social measures, such as implementation through multinational coalitions 
(Ricke et al., 2013). 
Therefore, the inclusion of multiple decision makers leads mitigation and adaptation to be 
suboptimal, independent of climate engineering. In the presence of climate engineering 
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implementation, these two might be somewhat more suboptimal while SRM climate engineering 
may be slightly over-implemented.  
The third assumption to remove is that of omniscience. Thus far, I have assumed that 
decision makers knew the shapes of the marginal cost and marginal benefit curves for each 
action. As noted above, climate science and economics are uncertain. Both mitigation and SRM 
climate engineering pose uncertainty, some of which can be reduced through research and some 
of which may remain irreducible. As the reality of climate change and our responses to it unfolds, 
decision makers can adjust policies as they learn more about the consequences of previous 
actions.  
The implications of uncertainty for mitigation and SRM climate engineering are not 
equal. The latter poses greater uncertainty both because there has been much less research to date, 
and because it relies upon intentional interventions in a highly complex system which has already 
been subject to other (unintentional) interventions. In contrast, mitigation has been studied for 
decades, and its irreducible uncertainty is lesser because it would reduce interventions in complex 
climate systems (although it would increase interventions in complex economic systems). 
Assuming that society is risk averse, decision makers should be willing to increase mitigation and 
to decrease climate engineering relative to their risk-neutral optimal levels. This would result in 
greater financial costs and environmental damage, but this does not imply that such risk aversion 
is irrational. 
As research reduces the uncertainty for a given climate change response option, its 
expected costs, benefits and optimal amount often change. That is, later research may yield 
results contrary to initial expectations and preliminary research. Again, this has different 
implications for mitigation and climate engineering. Because researchers have been refining the 
costs and benefits of mitigation for decades, it seems unlikely that society would now aim for an 
optimal mitigation level which later mitigation research reveals to be dramatically different from 
optimal. In contrast, future climate engineering research may point toward an optimal level which 
is indeed dramatically different from what we now believe. Because the expected optimal level of 
mitigation is influenced by the expected optimal level of climate engineering via imperfect 
substitution and possible income effects, this creates the first of three potential deleterious MH-
RC effects which this paper identifies. If (1) the initial expectations of climate engineering 
implementation were highly positive, (2) this reduced mitigation via expectations of a beneficial 
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substitution effect and (3) later research yielded more negative results, then net climate risks 
would increase (See Moreno-Cruz and Smulders (2010)). However, the reverse could be true as 
well, in which an excessively pessimistic view of climate engineering would hinder its research 
and development, also increasing net climate risks. Regardless, all these scenarios call for further 
research. 
Furthermore, mitigation and SRM climate engineering differ in how decision makers 
learn from and respond to the effects of their policies. In both cases, decision makers may aim for 
a level which they believe to be optimal but, due to lingering uncertainty, only after 
implementation learn to be significantly different from than optimal. In the case of mitigation, 
because climate change and its damages lag for decades behind the greenhouse gas emissions 
which cause them, the benefits of mitigation will also lag. Furthermore, mitigation itself—new 
technologies, policies, infrastructure, agricultural practices, ecosystem management practices, 
etc—is slow to implement. Once decision makers learn more about the magnitude of climate 
change and its damages, as well as about the revised level of optimal mitigation, excessive or 
insufficient mitigation cannot be rapidly corrected. In contrast, the intended effects of SRM 
climate engineering implementation would be felt on a relatively short time scale. If society were 
to implement a level of SRM which it later learned differed significantly from optimal, then this 
level could be adjusted upward or downward relatively rapidly, at least with the most widely 
discussed SRM methods which appear to be effective and inexpensive, such as stratospheric 
aerosol injection and marine cloud brightening (Kravitz et al., 2014a). Of course, in the 
meantime, the costs of insufficient or excessive SRM would be borne by humans and the 
environment. Although the SRM intensity could be adjusted relatively quickly to respond to 
global temperatures, the observation and attribution of some secondary effects of SRM climate 
engineering implementation, such as precipitation changes, could require many years, and any 
corrections would be subsequently delayed. 
Finally, let us remove the assumption that all people have similar preferences. This leads 
to the last two potential deleterious CE MH-RC effects. For one thing, the preferences of decision 
makers and the broader population may not coincide. For example, they may have different 
discount rates, magnitudes of risk aversion, preferences for maintaining a more natural world, 
and preferences for addressing a problem closer to its source. They could also live in different 
locations and thus give different weight to particular effects of climate change and climate 
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policies. That is, the personal costs and benefits for the various climate response options may 
differ between the two groups. There is therefore a risk of a genuine bias if decision makers 
prefer a higher level of climate engineering and a lower level of mitigation relative to the genuine 
population. Of course, the reverse may be true.
14
 The third and final potential deleterious CE 
MH-RC effect could arise if there were temporal misalignment of preferences. If earlier 
generations were to prefer a higher level of climate engineering and a lower level of mitigation 
relative to future generations, then the results could be suboptimal. Again, the reverse may turn 
out to be the case. 
To summarize, this section’s simple economics of substitutes indicates that, even if 
climate engineering were to reduce mitigation, then its implementation could still provide net 
benefits through substitution. This conclusion continues to hold when considering several 
responses to climate change risks and many independent decision makers. Through multiple 
income effects, it is theoretically possible that climate engineering implementation could even 
increase mitigation. The relative impact of uncertainty is less clear, in part due to lesser current 
knowledge regarding climate engineering relative to that of climate change and mitigation. On 
the other hand, the response times of mitigation, adaptation and SRM climate engineering 
implementation indicate an advantage for the latter in response to learning. This section identified 
three potential deleterious CE MH-RC effects: (1) inaccurate initial expectations for mitigation 
and especially for climate engineering; (2) the preferences of decision makers may not coincide 
with those of the general population; and (3) the preferences of earlier generations may not 
coincide with those of later generations. Each of these could decrease or increase the level of 
mitigation with respect to its optimal level. 
4. POLICY OPTIONS  
Assuming that policy makers wished to reduce any potential CE MH-RC effect, 
independent of whether their concerns were warranted, then what could they do? We can first 
examine policies in other areas with ex ante moral hazard or risk compensation. The former is 
caused by information asymmetry between a principal and an agent regarding the risky behaviour 
of the agent. One response is for the principal to adopt policies which reduce the information 
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 Although it is easy to portray decision makers as being captured by powerful wealthy interests who favor 
continued greenhouse gas emissions, note also that aggressive mitigation would hinder economic 
development in poor countries.  
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asymmetry. For example, insurers offer lower rates if insurees demonstrate that they behave in 
certain low-risk ways. However, as discussed above, information asymmetry is not the problem 
with the CE MH-RC concern. Another response to ex ante moral hazard is policies wherein the 
insuree shares some risk, such as through deductibles and co-payments. Although ex ante moral 
hazard is a weak analogy, the suggestion that the present generation should increase its exposure 
to climate risks is considered further below. 
Policies regarding risk compensation are more instructive, although as noted, imperfect. 
Here, the technology or the regulation which induces the risk compensation is generally 
promoted or required because it leads to a net decrease in harm, despite the compensating 
behaviour. In the best-studied case, people drive automobiles more riskily with seat belts, air bags 
and improved lighting, and thus cause slightly more accidents. However, these safety devices are 
promoted or required because they lead to net reductions in injuries and fatalities. The mirror-
image of this is when people drive more carefully when they are intoxicated or use a mobile 
telephone, behaviours which are discouraged or prohibited because they increase harm despite 
the more careful driving. After all, the reduction of injuries and fatalities (balanced with rapid 
transportation) is the goal of automobile safety policies; encouraging cautious driving is merely 
one means to that end. Some economists have made a tongue-in-cheek proposal that, if the goal 
were indeed to be cautious driving, then a spike in the centre of the steering wheel pointed at the 
driver would be preferable to a seat belt (McKenzie and Tullock, 1981: 40). Other examples of 
risk compensation are promoted by similar policies or norms in the cases of sports safety 
equipment, gun storage and public health measures. Furthermore, large public investments are 
made in developing treatments for medical conditions which are caused by lifestyle choices, such 
as lung cancer and type 2 (adult onset) diabetes. These approaches are consistent with the simple 
economics described above, in which the introduction of a substitute might reduce cautious 
behaviour but results in increased net benefits. 
A notable exception to this pattern is when the behaviour is condemned by some as 
immoral. As noted above, harm reduction policies with regard to non-marital sex and illicit drugs 
are often opposed not because of their likely effect on tangible harms (although opponents 
sometimes also try to make that argument) but because they would likely increase the occurrence 
of the condemned behaviour. Here, the disagreement is over the policy goal. If the goal is to 
reduce the tangible harms, then these harm reduction policies are beneficial. However, if the goal 
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is to reduce the condemned behaviour, then the measures are opposed because they would lead to 
an increase in the behaviour’s occurrence. Indeed, from this perspective, the risks of the 
behaviour should intentionally be kept high. 
These examples shed light on the CE MH-RC debate. If the goal of climate policy is to 
minimize climate risks to humans and the environment, then climate engineering should be 
seriously considered, at the present time through research. However, if its goal is mitigation 
itself, then climate engineering and its research should be taboo. 
Those who wish to restrict or forego climate engineering research due to the CE MH-RC 
concern should reflect on the history and current status of adaptation in the climate change 
discourse. In the 1990s, there was widespread concern that consideration of and research into 
adaptation to a changed climate would hinder mitigation. It was called ‘an unacceptable, even 
politically incorrect idea’ because, among other reasons, it ‘could make a speaker or a country 
sound soft’ on mitigation (Burton, 1994: 14). Along similar lines, then-US Vice President Al 
Gore initially called adaptation ‘a kind of laziness, an arrogant faith in our ability to react in time 
to save our skin’ (Gore, 1993: 240). During this time, ‘the first obstacle to adaptation is 
reluctance to contemplate it’ (Waggoner, 1992: 146), and it ‘was viewed with the same distaste 
that the religious right reserves for sex education in schools. That is, both constitute ethical 
compromises that in any case will only encourage dangerous experimentation with the undesired 
behaviour’ (Rayner and Thompson, 1998: 292). However, adaptation is now a second widely 
accepted category of responses to climate risks. This change was due to the facts that some 
climate change cannot be avoided and that the burdens of it will fall largely on the world’s poor. 
Gore now admits that he was ‘wrong in not immediately grasping the moral imperative of 
pursuing both policies [mitigation and adaptation] simultaneously, in spite of the difficulty that 
poses’ (Lind, 2013). Although there cannot be a ‘control group’ in order to compare the climate 
change discourse with and without the consideration of adaptation, it is difficult to argue that the 
mainstreaming of adaptation has significantly reduced mitigation. It is unclear how and why 
climate engineering is fundamentally different from adaptation in this regard. 
Let us concede for a moment that policies should indeed strive to reduce any CE MH-RC 
effect, regardless of whether the concern is warranted. At this point in time, the issue is whether 
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and how to discuss and research climate engineering.
15
 The assertion that the taboo against 
publicly discussing climate engineering should be reinstated or that climate engineering research 
should be severely restricted (or at least not be publicly funded) is an argument that climate 
engineering constitutes a form of ‘forbidden knowledge’ and is, at its core, a case for sustained 
wilful ignorance in the face of large risks to humans and the environment (see Rayner, 2014). 
This is even more so due to the uncertainty of climate change. Climate sensitivity may turn out to 
be much higher than expected; harm to humans and the environment from climate change may be 
greater than expected; the capacities of ecosystems and society to adapt may be much lower than 
expected; and mitigation and adaptation may remain too low. In these events, climate engineering 
could be much more beneficial than it is now understood to be because of the possibilities of 
rapid and unilateral implementation, as described above.
16
 If anything, prohibiting or restricting 
climate engineering research would increase the likelihood of a hazardous CE MH-RC effect due 
to lingering but unsubstantiated expectations of climate engineering’s potential to reduce climate 
risks, and would lead to future decision-making to be based upon a thinner knowledge base.  
Recently, papers by two legal scholars proposed policies which would attempt to reduce 
any CE MH-RC effect (Lin, 2013; Parson, 2013). Some of these proposals, such as international 
deliberation regarding the circumstances under which climate engineering would be warranted, 
public outreach to counter perceptions that climate engineering would ‘solve’ climate change and 
accountable oversight (Lin, 2013) would aim to reduce two of the potential deleterious CE MH-
RC effects cited in the previous section, those due to high expectations and to different 
preferences between decision makers and the general population. Other norms and rules, such as 
open publication of results and no patents on SRM technologies, could also reduce these potential 
negative effects (see Bipartisan Policy Center Task Force on Climate Remediation Research, 
2011; Leinen, 2011; Rayner et al., 2013; Solar Radiation Management Governance Initiative, 
2011).  
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 This is not to say that how climate engineering is considered and researched will have no impacts on how it might 
be implemented and on mitigation.  
16
 Of course, the opposites may turn out to be true, and knowledge of climate engineering would have less value. I 
emphasize its potential value in the event of greater climate damage because people tend to be risk averse 
and because SRM climate engineering could be rapidly implemented. 
6-20 
 
More ambitiously, the authors propose that climate engineering research or 
implementation could be contingent upon whether states meet mitigation targets.
17
 While this 
logic from our current vantage point may appear wise, imagine if those targets are not met—
which seems not unlikely assuming that the targets are meaningful—and climate engineering 
were then not permitted. Should—and would—global society or individual nations then forego an 
option which may reduce climate risks, or would such an agreement lack credibility? Other 
writers have posited that climate engineering should not be considered whatsoever, and among 
their reasons is the CE MH-RG concern (for example, see Hamilton, 2013; Winter, 2011). These 
are often arguments that considering climate engineering would discourage normatively desirable 
behaviour, but I assert that they may have mistaken the means (i.e. mitigation) for the end (i.e. 
risk reduction) of climate policy. Whether through linkage agreements, restrictions, or 
prohibitions, a denial of a potential means to reduce climate risks is equivalent to intentionally 
increasing risk in order to incentivize mitigation. This is analogous to the spike in the 
automobile’s steering wheel, described above, increasing the driver’s risk in order to incentivize 
cautious driving. More accurately, it would be like a spike in front of the passenger, as it is 
largely the current residents of wealthy countries who are shaping climate policy but future 
generations and the world’s poor who will bear most of the climate change harm. It seems unwise 
and unethical to increase climate risks which will largely be borne by others as an assertion of 
mitigation’s primacy or as a sort of high-stakes wager that climate engineering would never be 
beneficial. 
An exception among these authors’ proposals is the most sophisticated of Parson’s (2013) 
proposed means to link mitigation and climate engineering. In this, he suggests that nations agree 
to a treaty in which those states that fail to meet their mitigation targets would be excluded from 
decision-making regarding climate engineering implementation. The author acknowledges its 
shortcomings. For example, if states’ preferences for the form and intensity of climate 
engineering were to be closely aligned, as implied by some studies (Ricke et al., 2013), or if 
effective and affordable localized SRM methods were developed then they would have little 
incentive to participate in the agreement. Furthermore, if the mitigation requirements were quite 
aggressive—which appear necessary in order to significantly reduce climate change risks—then 
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powerful countries which rely on continued emissions might not participate in the treaty or fail to 
meet their targets, with the knowledge that they would have enough international power and 
influence to later implement climate engineering regardless of the agreement. Moreover, climate 
engineering presently remains too uncertain to serve as an effective inducement to mitigate, 
although this may change in the future. Nevertheless, Parson’s proposal warrants further 
consideration. 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This paper has attempted to demonstrate three things. First, the empirical evidences of ex 
ante moral hazard and risk compensation in general and of a CE MH-RC effect specifically are 
not fully conclusive. Indeed, the limited empirical evidence thus far indicates that climate 
engineering could present a reverse CE MH-RC effect. Second, and independent of the first 
conclusion, the simple economics of substitutes suggests that, to the extent that climate 
engineering implementation might actually reduce mitigation through substitution, this could be 
rational and beneficial. In fact, it is theoretically possible that implementation could increase 
mitigation through strong income effects. Third, technologies and regulations which causes risk 
compensation—the better analogy of the two—are usually promoted. Even if policy makers 
wanted to reduce any CE MH-RC effect, regardless of its actual existence, restricting or 
prohibiting climate engineering research is likely to do net harm and would not be feasible.  
In the process, this paper identified three potential mechanisms of deleterious CE MH-RC 
effects. First, expectations of mitigation and especially of climate engineering may differ 
significantly from what is later learned. Second, the relevant preferences of decision makers and 
those of the general population may not coincide. Third, the relevant preferences of earlier 
generations and of later generations may not coincide. To the degree feasible, effective and 
ethical, policies should be adopted which would reduce the likelihood and intensity of these 
mechanisms, or at least of the first two. As noted above, more and better research into all 
response options—including that of climate engineering—to climate change risks would more 
quickly reduce uncertainty and bring expectations closer to reality. Public consultation, 
international deliberations, accountability, transparency, and intellectual property restrictions 
could reduce the negative impacts of the first two mechanisms. The third possible mechanism is 
particularly thorny, as preferences are dynamic and are partially dependent upon the actions of 
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previous generations (see Norton et al., 1998). In particular, the development of new technologies 
can have a strong influence upon future generations’ preferences. The present generation makes 
value-laden decisions, such as trade-offs between incommensurable goods or value, in certain 
ways, and does not wish to be constrained to doing so exactly like previous generations would 
have done. Likewise, future generations presumably will not want to be constrained to doing 
exactly like we do. It is unclear to what extent we should attempt to influence the preferences of 
future generations and to what extent we should attempt to constrain the behaviour of future 
generations in order to reduce the likelihood that they will make choices contrary to our current 
preferences. 
However, these three potentially problematic mechanisms are not limited to climate 
engineering, climate change, or even the environmental but instead are present in many—and 
perhaps all—significant social undertakings, ranging from the relatively mundane (e.g. land use 
planning) to the extraordinary (e.g. war). Similarly, even when considering only the climate 
engineering discourse, these three mechanisms point to challenges which are broader than the CE 
MH-RC concern, such as regulatory capture, technocracy, scientism, hype, technological lock-in, 
and the so-called slippery slope. These challenges are not unique to climate engineering and it is 
not immediately evident why climate engineering policy should be held to especially high 
standards in these regards.  
In addition, all three mechanisms could operate in manners which would increase 
mitigation and suppress climate engineering, even to harmful degrees. The presently expected net 
benefits of mitigation and those of climate engineering could be greater and lower, respectively, 
than actual reality. Decision makers could be more favourable to mitigation and more averse to 
climate engineering than the general population. Future generations could also be more averse to 
mitigation and more favourable to climate engineering than earlier ones. These are, to some 
degree, empirical matters whose answers are not obvious. 
We should not assume that the CE MH-RC concern is warranted and that any substitution 
of climate engineering for mitigation would be negative. Even in the cases of the potential 
mechanisms which might cause deleterious mitigation reduction—mechanisms which go beyond 
the scope of the CE MH-RC concern and which are also present in many other policy choices—
we should not assume that optimal mitigation is always the victim. Policy should be rationally 
designed and based upon the central goal of minimizing net climate risks to humans and the 
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environment in accordance with society’s preferences. Those who argue that consideration of and 
research into climate engineering should be restricted due to the CE MH-RC concern have the 
burden to demonstrate that such effects are likely and would be harmful, and that humans and the 
environment would be better protected by foregoing this option. Until then, this concern should 
not be grounds for restricting or prohibiting climate engineering research. 
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The International Regulation of Climate 
Engineering: Conclusion 
This collection of articles has explored how climate engineering, particularly its research, 
may be internationally regulated. Three of these considered how existing international 
environmental law, broadly defined, might be applied. I argued that climate engineering research 
and implementation, and carbon dioxide removal (CDR) and solar radiation management (SRM), 
should each generally be considered separately
1
 and that, on the whole, existing international 
environmental law is favourable toward climate engineering research.
2
 More particularly, with 
my colleague Floor Fleurke, I asserted that the precautionary principle calls for careful 
exploration of climate engineering’s potential to reduce climate risks.
3
 The other two articles 
were more forward-looking, and considered how future international regulation of climate 
engineering might and should develop. Drawing on the analogous case of nuclear power, I 
claimed that climate engineering is not likely to be regulated by a comprehensive binding 
multinational environment agreement, at least anytime soon.
4
 The final paper critically examined 
the concern that the consideration, research, development, and potential implementation of 
climate engineering would hinder the abatement of greenhouse gas emissions.
5
 I averred that this 
concern is overstated and that it should not play a central role in climate engineering policy.  
The aim of this research project was to suggest components of a feasible international 
regulation for climate engineering, particularly for research into the more highly leveraged 
methods, which would balance the desire to fulfil climate engineering’s potential with that to 
minimize its risks. This assumes, of course, that such research should indeed move forward, 
which I concluded in my examinations of the precautionary principle and the moral hazard risk 
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 At this time, one or more detailed binding multilateral agreements 
regulating the entirety of climate engineering seem unlikely, for several reasons.
7
 Instead, as is 
also argued there, norms regarding climate engineering and its research must develop somewhat 
organically—a slow process—and then gradually become ‘legalized’. I also suggest three 
subsequent components of a regulatory regime, which in decreasing order of confidence are an 
international institution, a liability mechanism, and a non-proliferation agreement.  
Before moving into specifics, a handful of initial guiding principles should be considered. 
First, regulations have numerous, sometimes quite significant consequences, yet policymakers 
cannot be omniscient of these consequences. They should thus exercise caution when attempting 
to purposefully guide human behaviour in domains which are complex, remain partially 
unknown, and have high stakes. Climate engineering fits these criteria. In fact, not only do we not 
yet fully know what climate engineering will be like, but society remains far from a consensus 
regarding what we want from it. Second, law—particularly international law—is slow to change. 
This can be beneficial in terms of the previous exhortation for policymakers to be cautious in 
implementing regulation. Simultaneously, it also reinforces that exhortation, in that regulation 
which is later learned to be suboptimal is usually difficult to amend. Third, even in the absence of 
specific binding multilateral environmental agreements,
8
 actions by one country which are 
strongly contrary to the interests of others will still be costly to the former because the latter ones 
can respond through reputational loss, retaliation, and possible reciprocation.
9
 Thus, although 
unilateral global implementation of global stratospheric aerosol injection (SAI) using engineering 
nanoparticles from a ship on international waters may not be clearly prohibited by an existing 
agreement, a country which would conduct, approve, or passively permit this would face costs in 
the international arena which would likely be greater than the benefits it would receive from the 
climate engineering. Even the United States, as the world’s lone superpower, would gain little, in 
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large part because it is not very vulnerable to climate change in the near term.
10
 At the very least, 
the customary international law of the prevention of transboundary risk and the mitigation of its 
subsequent harm would form an adequate basis for international condemnation of premature and 
irresponsible climate engineering implementation or large-scale research.
11
 From these, I 
conclude that a comprehensive and detailed international agreement on climate engineering is 
both premature and unlikely. If such an agreement were to come into force, it could be harmful 
by restricting potentially beneficially research, perhaps inadvertently, while being difficult to 
later revise. As an alternative, it would be wise to examine what components of a gradually 
emerging regulatory regime would offer the greatest net benefit while remaining both feasible 
and adaptive to future developments. 
1. NONBINDING NORMS 
Throughout the articles collected here, I have emphasized the importance of nonbinding 
norms.
12
 The development, specification, and institutionalization of nonbinding norms are the 
most important first step toward the international regulation of climate engineering and its 
research. The advantages include that they can be relatively rapidly developed, adapted, and 
modified in the face of changing circumstances; that their generality allows appropriate 
application in diverse settings; and that, through their bottom-up development in nonstate forums, 
they can effectively capitalize upon expertise while avoiding some limitations of electoral 
politics. Furthermore, the negotiation process toward norms can help establish consensus on 
some matters of debate while deferring on others, whose resolution may remain challenging. 
Finally, norms can be used as the starting point for developing future binding rules-based 
regulation.  
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Two challenges to nonbinding norms should be highlighted. First, the legitimacy of 
nonbinding norms, particularly if they are developed outside of accountable state institutions, can 
be problematic. However, accountability is not the sole basis of claims to legitimacy, particularly 
when addressing international and technically complex challenges under globally diffused 
authority. For example, Gráinne de Búrca proposed that the traditional means toward legitimacy 
developed in the domestic setting could be compensated for in the global arena through three 
other categories of mechanisms: the merits of the decision makers, such as independent expertise; 
the qualities of the decision making process, such as transparency and protection for basic rights; 
and the aspects of the output, such as quality, efficiency, or general acceptability.
13
 
A second problem for nonbinding norms is the difficulty of their enforcement and the 
potentially resulting ineffectiveness. After all, their violation generally carries no specific 
enforced consequence, although this is not to imply that violating nonbinding norms carries no 
cost. The magnitude of this enforcement challenge varies widely by the setting. Nonbinding 
norms will be ineffective when the regulated actor has strong incentives to violate them yet 
would bear little cost in doing so. For example, producers would be unlikely to consistently 
follow nonbinding norms proscribing known carcinogens in consumer products if the 
carcinogens’ removal would be expensive while their effects would be delayed and of uncertain 
causation. However, climate engineering researchers are not traditional profit maximizers in four 
critical ways. First, instead of profits they pursue some mix of the generation of useful 
knowledge, public acclaim, and career advancement with its related income. To the extent that 
they strive to generate useful knowledge, it is in their interest to learn of and publicize actual or 
potential negative consequences of their experiments. Second, they will be vulnerable to—and 
most likely fear—greater regulation. Third, climate engineering researchers appear to recognize 
the controversial nature of their work
14
 and, like nuclear power operators, will need to maintain a 
positive reputation and to seek a ‘social license to operate,’ lest they incur the wrath of restrictive 
regulation.
15
 Fourth, they are embedded in complex networks—including peers, professional 
societies, publishers, funders, and domestic regulators—which can be leveraged to encourage 
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responsible behaviour. The most intimate of these is the peer network. This is particularly 
important because the public will unlikely clearly differentiate among climate engineering 
researchers. As a consequence, they will share a reputations commons and constitute a 
‘community of shared fate’.
16
 It seems likely that inappropriate or irresponsible work by one will 
have significant spillover effects on them all in terms of public and political support as well as 
resulting regulation. Therefore, the researchers will have reduced incentives to violate norms 
while having strong incentives to monitor each other.
17
  
There have already been steps toward the development of norms for climate engineering 
and its research. Three sets of principles have been drafted in recent years (Table 1). Their 
sources are somewhat disparate: a small group of UK-based academics, a self-organized meeting 
of climate engineering researchers and research advocates, and a task force assembled by a well-
connected American think tank. There is significant but not complete overlap among the three 
sets, and there are no clear disagreements among them. Furthermore, other climate engineering 
reports express norms which are generally consistent with those in the three detailed sets.
18
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Table 1. Summary of proposed climate engineering norms.19 
Oxford Principles Asilomar Principles Bipartisan Policy Center 
 CE to be regulated as a public 
good 
 Public participation in 
decision‐making 
 Disclosure of research and 
open publication of results 
 Independent assessment of 
impacts 
 Governance before 
deployment 
 Collective benefit 
 Establishing responsibility and 
liability 
 Open and cooperative research 
 Iterative evaluation and 
assessment 
 Public involvement and 
consent 
 Purpose of research: protect 
humans and environment from 
climate change and CE 
 Field deployment of SRM 
presently inappropriate 
 Direction for research 
programs based on expert 
advice and informed by public 
engagement 
 Importance of transparency 
 International cooperation 
 Adaptive management 
 
The regulation of climate engineering and its research would be furthered if these norms, 
and perhaps others, were to be more robustly detailed and institutionalized. There is already 
progress on the former process. The original publications containing each set of norms included 
details and remaining issues for each norm. Other writers have elaborated some of them. For 
example, there are numerous articles on climate engineering governance prior to deployment,
20
 
and several recent and forthcoming ones on compensation and liability.
21
 Other norms remain 
less clear. What might it mean, precisely, for climate engineering to be ‘regulated as a public 
good’ or in the ‘collective benefit’? While there appears to be general agreement that the broader 
public should be involved, how might this goal actually be operationalized? Are ‘public 
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participation in decision making’, ‘public involvement and consent’, and ‘public engagement’ 
equivalent, and are each feasible?  
In contrast, there has been little movement toward the operationalizing of these norms. 
From the top, authoritative institutions—particularly electorally accountable ones—could endorse 
them. To this end, the United Kingdom House of Commons backed the Oxford Principles, with 
come caveats.
22
 From a bottom-up perspective, professional societies, funders, and publishers 
could approve these norms or develop their own, in which case membership, funding, and 
publishing respectively could be contingent upon compliance. Finally, climate engineering 
researchers should consider forming their own professional society in order to refine norms, to 
offer membership to researchers who meet certain criteria, to condone particular research 
projects, and to condemn researchers and projects which are contrary to the norms.  
2. AN INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTION 
A second important step toward the international regulation of climate engineering and its 
research would be the establishment of an international institution. Such institutions are vital to 
global environmental governance, performing a diverse array of functions and taking a variety of 
forms. An international climate engineering body could have a limited set of responsibilities, both 
facilitating and regulating climate engineering research. These dual responsibilities would not be 
merely coincidence or convenience. Instead, in some instances the ‘carrot’ of assistance can serve 
to further regulation, particularly in an international, complex, and dynamic environment where a 
more highly legalized regulatory regime is lacking or would be ineffective. 
An international climate engineering body could assume different structures, with 
implications for legitimacy and effectiveness. Three relevant but interrelated questions to this end 
are, firstly, its membership and participation; secondly, how it would relate to the bodies of the 
United Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC); and thirdly; how such an 
institution may originate. Its participants could be drawn not only from states, but also from other 
intergovernmental bodies, scientific organizations and professional societies, major research 
funders, nongovernmental organizations, and leading publishers. In order to maintain legitimacy 
in a potentially contested terrain, it may be preferable to distinguish states and certain 
intergovernmental bodies as full members with collective decision-making authority from other 
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participating parties. Regarding the UNFCCC, on the one hand, that agreement has universal 
participation and its bodies are presently the leading global vehicle for internationally 
coordinated global responses to climate change. Constituting an international climate engineering 
body via the UNFCCC would endow the new organization with greater legitimacy and initial 
capacity, including more robust linkages with existing international institutions. On the other 
hand, the UNFCCC bodies and process have in some ways been arguably ineffective, in part due 
to the agreement’s universal participation and its resulting unwieldy constituency.
23
 Furthermore, 
they might be too strongly committed to abatement and adaptation to seriously move climate 
engineering research forward, causing discussions to become unnecessarily bogged down in the 
moral hazard-risk compensation concern.
24
 In this case, a handful of countries could launch the 
body on their own, expanding membership as it is appropriate and effective.
25
 If so, however, it 
would be critical to begin with diverse representation, including developing countries.  
As stated above, an international climate engineering institution could have 
responsibilities which include both facilitative and regulatory functions. In the former it could 
coordinate activities both to strategically plan projects and to minimize interference among field 
tests; coordinate funding in order to better distribute costs; facilitate international research 
cooperation; foster research capacity, particularly in developing countries; and serve as a 
researchers’ clearinghouse of international and national regulation, relevant intellectual property, 
and experimental results. Looking toward the regulatory side, the institution could further 
operationalize the norms discussed above by providing a forum where they could be detailed and 
gradually legalized into something more closely resembling rules; assist researchers with 
regulatory compliance; and ensure that all results, impact assessments, and other relevant 
documents are centrally and publicly available. More ambitiously, the international institution 
could serve as an intellectual property trustee. This could serve a facilitative function by offering 
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a pool of patents and preventing patent thickets. At the same time, this could prevent critical 
patents from being held by private interests. In the event that the climate engineering institution is 
not subsidiary to the UNFCCC, it would be in a strong position to liaise with the bodies of that 
treaty as well as international institutions, such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change, the Conference of Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, and the UN 
Environment Programme. For all these responsibilities, but particularly the facilitative one, a 
scientific committee within the institution would be warranted. 
The institution should take an approach to fostering compliance which is both managerial 
and sanctions-oriented. A state or researcher which fails to comply with the norms or rules could 
receive assistance with coming into compliance while also be denied access to the institution’s 
facilitative functions, including funding mechanisms and intellectual property. The body could 
also assist individual countries with complying with international obligations; help them develop 
and implement national climate engineering regulation; and in the event of an international 
dispute, offer adjudication. Finally, the international institution could serve as a forum for the 
development, enforcement, and modification of a possible moratorium on large-scale field 
experiments and climate engineering implementation, and of later multilateral agreements 
concerning climate engineering such as the ones discussed below. 
For an international climate engineering institution with the above functions to be feasible 
(in the sense of likely having broad enough participation in order to fulfil its mission) only 
researching states need to join it, although the participation of non-researching ones would 
bolster its legitimacy. The facilitative functions described above would make the research more 
efficient and subsequently lower transaction costs among researching states and scientific groups. 
Assuming for now that countries would research climate engineering in order to genuinely reduce 
climate change risks, they too would desire that it proceed with lower risks and in line with legal 
norms, and would thus endorse the body’s regulatory functions as well. This would particularly 
be the case given climate engineering’s lingering controversial nature. Some observers, though, 
have speculated that individual countries may seek to unilaterally use—and by extension to 
research—climate engineering in order to pursue relative gains in the international arena.
26
 If 
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such potential relative gains were a dominant motivation, then some researching states might 
decline participating in an international institution due to its regulatory responsibilities and 
prioritization of transparency and collaboration. Several lines of evidence point away from such a 
likelihood. First, these researching countries may themselves also be vulnerable to the negative 
secondary effects of climate engineering field research. Second, modelling thus far indicates that 
various regions have roughly similar preferences for the level of global SRM intensity, implying 
that climate engineering preferences may not widely diverge.
27
 Third, a country which engages in 
large scale climate engineering research outside internationally accepted norms and institutions 
runs the risk of suffering reputational and retaliatory costs. Fourth and finally, even if a country 
did indeed wish to later unilaterally implement climate engineering, it could still choose to 
cooperate internationally in responsible field research in order to minimize possible reputation 
and retaliatory costs. 
3. LIABILITY OR COMPENSATION FOR DAMAGES 
A third important component of international regulation would be a mechanism for 
liability or compensation for transboundary damages resulting from climate engineering field 
research. From a legal perspective, liability or some other compensatory mechanism would 
further restorative justice by compensating victims for their losses. From an economic analysis of 
law, which in general attempts to incentivize behaviour that would maximize net benefits, 
liability possesses some advantages over rules-based regulation in the case of climate 
engineering.
28
 Most importantly, the climate engineering researchers will have much more 
information regarding how to minimize risks than would the government or other authoritative 
institution. It is indeed difficult to imagine how a regulatory authority could develop detailed 
rules for climate engineering field trials which would both be effective and remain relevant, given 
that the experiments will vary and knowledge will continuously change. At the same time, some 
of the strongest arguments for rules-based regulation—that individual victims may not perceive 
harm, that they may be unaware of its probable source, and/or that they may have inadequate 
incentive to take action—appear at first to apply to potential harm from climate engineering and 
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its field research, such as harm from secondary negative effects including precipitation changes. 
However, these potential relative shortcomings of liability are ameliorated by two mechanisms. 
First, states can serve as victims as well, and will have the capacity to be aware of the harm and 
its probable causes and will have the incentive to take action. Second, as described above, climate 
engineering researchers have, to some degree, incentives to discover and communicate harm 
from their field experiments.  
From this, I cautiously suggest a multilateral agreement wherein parties establish and 
contribute toward a compensation fund for victims of climate engineering research. The fund 
would be supported through contributions from parties to the agreement, with the relative 
amounts based upon some mixture of their ability to pay, their historical greenhouse gas 
emissions, and their potential benefit from climate engineering. Although holding the injurers 
liable is generally preferable to mere compensation, as this incentivizes their reduction of risk, 
this would not be the case here. First, the researchers will not capture the value of what they 
create. In this sense, the generation of knowledge through research is a public good,
29
 assuming 
open publication of results and minimal intellectual property claims.
30
 Instead, researchers’ civil 
liability would disincentive the production of this public good, something which is generally 
underproduced and often publicly subsidized. Second, the potential damages could be far greater 
than the budgets of research groups, making them unable to pay.
31
 Liability insurance, even if it 
were available (which is difficult to imagine), would likewise be prohibitively expensive for 
scientists. In principle, the authorizing state could be held liable, but this too would create 
perverse incentives. Given that the states which are likely to conduct climate engineering field 
research (i.e. the industrialized countries) are relatively less vulnerable to climate change, state 
liability would discourage them from participating in such an agreement and, if they were to join, 
discourage them from conducting public good research which might reduce climate change risks.  
Claims for compensation would be bounded, in that damage must occur in a party’s 
territory, and damages would be limited in time, amount, and forms of harm. Importantly, parties 
would agree to forego any other international legal recourse in the event of harm. An expert panel 
would review claims and, using the best available methods, assess the probability that that the 
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research actually caused the harm. Fault would not need to be demonstrated. Awarded damages 
would be prorated to the probability of causation, but only above a certain minimum threshold 
probability in order to discourage frivolous suits.
32
 Clearly, demonstrating causation would be the 
greatest challenge to the compensation agreement. However, recent advances in modelling permit 
increasing confidence in probability distributions that particular weather events can be attributed 
to a variable such as climate change or climate engineering.
33
 This is not to imply that this will be 
simple or clearly decisive, but only that it may be feasible. Finally, damages could be reduced or 
eliminated due to contributory negligence on the part of the victim. Expecting countries to 
prepare for harm from climate engineering research may initially seem unjust. Yet imagine a state 
with ineffective, perhaps unaccountable leadership who fails to devote adequate resources to 
natural disaster preparedness and basic infrastructure. A large scale SRM field trial induces a 
change in precipitation, causing severe harm. It seems inappropriate if such a state—or more 
likely, its leadership—were to then receive full compensation. 
Depending on the degree of motivation among researching states to join, a multilateral 
compensation agreement for harm from climate engineering research could include commitments 
to research standards. These countries would be motivated to participate because the agreement 
would give them clarity of and limitations to their potential liability, and because it could give 
them political cover for a possibly controversial practice, particularly if states vulnerable to 
climate engineering harm were to participate also. If the researching states’ motivation were great 
enough, then they could be asked in the agreement to commit to research standards such as state 
authorization of large scale field experiments, impact assessment, notification and consultation 
with potentially affected states, open publication of results, no prohibitive patents on SRM 
methods, public input in decision making, and international coordination. A further advantage of 
including standards is that, in the event that a researching state failed to fulfil these commitments 
for a field experiment which caused transboundary harm, then that state would be held liable for 
full or partial damages, with the compensation fund paying only residual damages. 
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In order for the agreement to be effective, both researching states and potentially harmed 
states would need to participate. The motivations of the former are outlined above. The advantage 
for the latter to participate is clear: they would be compensated in the event of demonstrated 
harm. However, some very vulnerable states—especially those which are not at high risk of 
climate change itself—may decline participation because they would relinquish other means of 
pursuing compensation, and because participation could imply an implicit endorsement of a 
controversial activity which may harm them.  
Finally, a compensation mechanism could also be expanded or developed separately for 
damages resulting from climate engineering implementation. However, the circumstances and 
incentives in that case will differ from those in the research context. It remains too early to make 
serious proposals for how countries, individually and collectively, may wish to use climate 
engineering. 
4. NON-PROLIFERATION AGREEMENT 
 
The fourth and most tentatively suggested component of regulatory regime for climate 
engineering and its research would be a non-proliferation agreement. This would be a tacit 
concession that countries now have and will continue to have divergent capabilities. To the extent 
that climate engineering becomes something which a given country does or does not have the 
capability to deploy globally or regionally, then a world with fewer such states would appear to 
be more stable and easier to manage than one with many more of them.  
Although a non-proliferation agreement would primarily be intended to regulate climate 
engineering implementation, it would have some implications for research. An agreement could 
require those countries with the capability to implement climate engineering globally or 
regionally to cooperate with other states in research. This would both facilitate international 
cooperation and, by increasing the number of states with climate engineering expertise, foster 
transparency.  
5. FINAL WORDS 
I wish to close this dissertation with some brief editorializing. It is my sense that, as 
discussions over climate change became increasingly polarized in the 1990s and 2000s, those 




solution of aggressive abatement of greenhouse gas emissions. This is evident in the earlier 
resistance to adaptation as an additional set of responses.
34
 Now, there is a similar opposition to 
the serious consideration of and research into climate engineering. This resistance may run 
deeper than that to adaptation, as climate engineering evokes a kind of mastery over nature and a 
rejection of ‘the natural’. Both of these images run contrary to much of the original motivation of 
the environmental movement of the 1960s and 1970s.
35
  
While I am sympathetic to these concerns, and indeed began this project dominated by 
them, I have come to fear that they are significantly impeding a reasoned evaluation of all options 
to reduce climate risks to humans and the environment. To me, these goals take primacy over the 
rejection of mastery over nature and the embrace of ‘the natural’. This impedance can be seen in 
the tone of the majority of the climate engineering discourse, both mainstream and academic, 
including within legal scholarship. As I argued in the second article, the reviews thus far of 
applicable international environmental law have examined only the risks of climate 
engineering—without the context of its possible reduction of climate change risks—and have 
asked only how climate engineering activities may be restricted.
36
 Even in the titles, the 
reviewers ask whether climate engineering may be ‘the end of humanity’ or enable ‘continuing 
carbon addiction’,
37
 and rhetorically set it up as a straw man ‘fix’ or ‘solution to climate 
change’
38
—something which no reasonable climate engineering research advocate has claimed it 
offers. I believe that environmentalist critics of climate engineering are ‘more committed to their 
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answer to the problem than really thinking in what I feel is a morally clear way about what our 
duties are to this generation and reducing the risks that they feel.’
39
  
This is unfortunate. Too much is at stake in climate change to approach a potential 
additional response, one which may significantly reduce risks, in this way. To be clear, I support 
only appropriately cautious climate engineering research, and remain agnostic on its eventual 
implementation. I also believe that, all things being equal, not causing a problem in the first place 
is preferable to addressing symptoms later. However, all things are not equal. Aggressive 
abatement will carry significant costs, including impeding economic development, and optimal 
abatement would still permit significant harm to humans and the environment while remaining 
unlikely to actually happen. I hope that my limited contributions to the discourse can help 
balance this bias which I perceive.  
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